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THE IMPACT OF REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE ON THE RISK PROFILE OF 
BANKS 
GIOVANNA M CARRILLO 
ABSTRACT 
 
     The impact of regulation and corporate governance on banks' risk profiles has gained 
greater importance with the passage of new legislations starting late 1990s and the recent 
global turmoil in the financial services industry. The extant literature indicates that the 
effects of corporate governance mechanisms differ between financial and non-financial 
firms. Yet, the effects on risk-taking have been less conclusive for financial firms 
primarily because of changing regulations impacting incentives and risk-taking patterns 
of banks. While the objective of regulation in the banking industry is to preserve the 
stability of the financial sector and the economic system, corporate governance 
mechanisms help mitigate agency problems. As such, regulation and governance 
mechanisms are set to ensure that bank managers serve the best interests of stakeholders. 
This dissertation examines the risk profiles of banks in the context of recent legislations 
concerning bank regulations and corporate governance. The methodology includes 
univariate and multivariate analyses. The study, which covers a 13 year period, examines 
the impact of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999, on banks’ risk profile. The 
findings suggest that governance structures comingle with regulation to determine the 
risk profile of banks, specifically; corporate governance and the risk profile of banks vary 
by bank size. This dissertation finds evidence that the deregulation experienced by the 
banking industry with the passage of the Act has had a diminishing impact on banks’ risk, 
owing to diversification of revenues through nontraditional activities.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Research on corporate governance and regulation has provided great insights into the 
drivers and factors that contribute to corporate risk profile, which in turn impact the 
likelihood of firm failure.  Banks warrant special attention because of their financial 
intermediary function, which affects every aspect of the economy. Corporate governance 
literature has examined agency theory, which suggests mechanisms that influence risk 
behavior of owners and managers; whereas banking literature has examined regulations 
and their effects on bank risk profiles. 
 
Research indicates that the effects of corporate governance mechanisms differ between 
financial and non-financial firms (Mehran et. al. 2011).   The effects of these mechanisms 
on risk-taking are more conclusive regarding non-financial than financial firms.  The 
evidence regarding bank risk profile has produced mixed results based on ownership and 
on the structure of board of directors. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that bank 
regulation could have different effects on a firm’s risk-taking patterns, depending on 
corporate governance structures (Laeven and Levine, 2009). 
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Yet, many questions have not yet been addressed.  This dissertation makes an attempt 
to fill the gap in bank risk-taking literature, with an integrative framework that 
incorporates existing governance and regulation literature. It also examines the effects of 
the 1999 Graham Leach Bliley Act (GLBA), which is the most recent legislation to 
deregulate the financial service industry in the U.S. The purpose of this dissertation, 
along with anticipated contributions to the literature through empirical testing, is 
presented in the following sections. 
 
1.1 Research Impetus 
 
The 2008 failure of many banks and insurance companies led to a financial crisis that 
required unprecedented measures. The fallout within the financial industry resulted in a 
government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. On September 15, 2008, Lehman 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection, and Merrill Lynch was taken over by the Bank 
of America
1
. Following these events, the U.S. government seized control of the American 
International Group (AIG), spending $85 billion for bailout
2
.  On September 25, 2008, 
Washington Mutual was seized by regulators, creating the worst bank failure in U.S. 
history and it was then sold to J.P. Morgan by the federal government
3
.   Federal 
regulators soon approved the acquisition of Wachovia Corporation by Wells Fargo. A 
total of 140 banks and savings institutions with assets totaling $23.4 billion failed in 
                                                 
1
 www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html?pagewanted=all 
2
 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122156561931242905.html 
3
 http://www.marketwatch.com/story/wamu-fails-sold-to-jp-morgan-chase-for-19-billion 
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2009, according to reports by the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC). The 
ramifications are still being felt in the national and global economy.  This crisis has been 
the impetus for this research, for identifying risk factors in bank behavior, especially in 
the period prior to the passage of the GLBA, after its passage, as well as during the 
financial crisis beginning in 2007. 
 
1.2 Purpose of the Research 
 
This dissertation addresses gaps in corporate governance and bank regulation 
literature, and examines the risk profile of banks in context of regulatory changes. Banks 
play a significant role in the economic system, and also as providers of external 
governance of firms. However, more studies are needed to carefully explore their 
corporate governance, considering their impact on the economic stability (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Macey and O’Hara, 2003, Spong and Sullivan, 2010). Furthermore, as 
Laeven and Levine (2009) indicate, research of bank risk and regulations has not yet 
addressed how corporate governance mechanisms factor into regulatory shifts in shaping 
individual bank performance. To explore pertinent literature trends, I examine the risk 
profile of banks from 1997-1999 (prior to the passage of the GLBA), and from 2000-
2009 (after its passage). This period includes the financial crisis in 2007 through 2009 as 
well as the year of the passage of the Sarbanes and Oxley (SOX) Act in 2002. 
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 1.3 Statement of the Problem 
 
The purpose of the GLBA was to enhance competition, to provide stability to 
financial firms, and to improve capital markets (Greenspan, 1997). One of the main 
regulatory concerns prior to its passage was it might also increase risks of financial 
institution and adversely affect the soundness and stability of the U.S. financial system 
(Wall et. al., 1993; Berger and Mester, 1999). Therefore, this research seeks to address 
the following issues, concerning the 1999 enactment of the GLBA: 
 
 How has the GLBA passage impacted the risk profile of banks? 
 Do corporate governance mechanisms tie into the changing financial regulatory 
environment?  
 How does ownership and board structure interact with regulation, and how do 
they influence bank risk profile? 
 After 9 years of the Act’s passage, what are the structural changes in banks’ 
balance sheets and what would be the appropriate measures of risk for analyzing 
banks risk-taking behavior? 
 
1.4 Characteristics of Corporate Governance in Banks 
 
     Corporate governance in banks, as defined by Greunin and Bratanovic (2003) “… 
relates to the manner in which the business of the bank is governed, including setting 
corporate objectives and a bank’s risk profile, aligning corporate activities and behaviors 
with the expectation that management will operate in a safe and sound manner, running 
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day to day operations within an established risk profile, while protecting the interests of 
depositors and other stakeholders.” Along these lines, this study will examine internal 
governance characteristics, and relate them to the risk profile of banks before and after 
the passage of the Financial System Modernization Act in 1999 (FSMA), and also from 
the stand point of economic distress during the financial crisis starting in mid-2007. 
Despite the ongoing debate about whether regulation substitutes or complements 
traditional governance mechanisms, it is widely accepted that the soundness of corporate 
governance would depend on internal mechanisms, such as ownership structure and 
board composition. Therefore, risk profiles are examined according to differences in 
ownership and board structures. In particular, it is argued that the potential conflict of 
interest between managers and shareholders, including asymmetric incentive structures, 
would impact managers’ decisions and the resulting differences in bank risk profiles.  
 
     Further, this study controls for new governance rules enacted in 2002 after a series of 
corporate scandals that resulted from accounting irregularities. These irregularities, along 
with corporate misconduct during the collapse of Enron in December 2001, led to major 
revisions on corporate governance rules by the government and the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC). As a result, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) signed on July 30, 2002, 
aimed to improve corporate financial transparency. Stock exchange regulation 
amendments also improved corporate governance modification and oversight. The new 
rules required the majority of independent directors, plus independent directors in the 
compensation, nominating and audit committees.  Considering the importance of the 
SOX Act in the business world, this dissertation explores its impact bank risk profiles. 
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1.5 Overview of Banking Regulation in the U.S. 
 
     The regulatory structure in the U.S. originated with the passage of the Banking Acts of 
1933 and 1935, following the financial crisis of the Great Depression. It provided 
stability as reflected by the fact that very few banks failed since then, until the last two 
decades of the twentieth century. Figure 1 shows annual bank failures from 1934 until Q2 
2009, based on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Except for the peak of 
the S&L Association crisis, when more than 1,000 bank institutions failed between 1988 
and 1989, their failure rate has been very low since 1934. The subprime crisis, beginning 
in mid-2007, led to the recent increase of U.S. bank failures.  
Figure 1: U.S Bank Failures 1934-2009 
 
     The Banking Act of 1935 established the FDIC as a permanent government agency, 
which provides insurance for deposits at a specified level, while the Banking Act of 1933 
created the separation of investment and commercial banking. In spite of the 1933 Act’s 
dispositions, banks were able to find loopholes, where holding companies could acquire 
7 
 
subsidiaries, such as investment banks and insurance firms. With the intention to close 
these loopholes, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA) designated that 
companies owned by BHCs must be engaged in activities “closely related to banking”4. 
Nevertheless, Finance Holding Companies (FHCs) were already conducting securities 
activities as early as 1987, authorized by Section 20 exemptions. With the introduction of 
the so-called Section 20 subsidiaries, banks were forbidden from being affiliated with any 
group that was "engaged principally" in underwriting or dealing in securities. However, 
in 1987, the Federal Reserve Bank allowed limited securities underwriting of bank 
affiliates. Gradually, these limits were lifted, and by 1996 Section 20 affiliates were 
allowed to underwrite up to 25% of their revenues in corporate bond and equity issues. 
Yeager et. al. (2007) noted that "virtually, all large bank holding companies had 
subsidiaries that were Section 20 Affiliates." 
 
     The FSMA, also referred to as the GLBA, has provisions that repealed restrictions in 
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and the BHCA pertaining to securities firms and insurance 
companies, respectively. Three major changes following the Act contributed to the 
shaping of the currently competitive landscape of financial firms. First, the Act 
eliminated many federal and state legal barriers to affiliation among banks, securities 
firms, insurance companies, and other financial service providers, that had been in the 
BHCA and Section 20 of the Banking Act of 1933. Second, financial service 
organizations acquired flexibility in structuring new affiliations through holding 
companies and financial subsidiaries. Third, the Act permitted a qualifying BHC to 
become a FHC, and engage in an expanded array of activities that are “financial in nature 
                                                 
4
 http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/6000-500.html 
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and incidental to, or complementary to financial activities,” subject to certain Federal 
Reserve Board restrictions that could “pose substantial risk to the safety and soundness of 
depository institutions or the financial system”5. The Act contained a list of pre-approved 
activities that included merchant banking, insurance company portfolio investment, and 
securities underwriting activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/6000-500.html 
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   CHAPTER II 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
     This section is divided into two parts. The first part discusses banking regulation shifts 
prior to and after the enactment of the GLBA, while the second part reviews relevant 
literature pertaining to corporate governance mechanisms and their relation to risk-taking 
of banks. 
 
2.1 Banking Regulation  
 
     Central to this research is the GLBA’s impact on risk-taking behavior, as a result of 
their entry into nonbanking activities (securities, real estate, and the insurance business), 
all of which tend to generate greater risk (Lown et. al., 2000). Yeager et. al. (2007) 
indicate that the passage of the Act opened the way to the so-called “universal bank,” in 
which the most potential benefit is derived from allowing financial institutions to exploit 
revenue efficiencies and economies that was not possible before deregulation. Universal 
banks are also able to capture revenue efficiencies by cross-selling commercial loan 
products and securities underwriting, in addition to cross-selling retail products, such as 
10 
 
certificates of deposit, brokerage services, and insurance.   Critics of the Act argued that 
the financial system would be compromised with the consolidation of commercial banks, 
and other types of financial service firms (Akhigbe and Whyte, 2004), and that 
nonbanking activities would increase the incidence of commercial bank failures.  
     With banks allowed to fully affiliate between entities (securities firms, insurance 
companies, and other financial service providers), those favoring larger universal banks 
anticipated firms to be more stable this way. One view is that larger entities would have a 
stronger, diversified asset base than their specialized counterparts, and decreased profit 
variability, (Denenis and Nurullah, 2000; Mishkin, 1999). Evidence supporting this view 
indicates that diversification benefits can be realized if nonbank financial services reduce 
dependency on loans as a dominant source of income (Hughes et. al., 1999; Saunders and 
Walters, 1994). The second view, with its research on financial services consolidation, 
suggests that consolidation could lead to more diversified loan portfolios, thus making 
bank failures less likely.  That is, if an increase in bank risk occurred, the increase in risk 
would be offset by the increase in average profitability, leading to a decrease in 
commercial bank failure (Mishkin, 1999; Boyd and Graham, 1986). Black (1975) and 
Fama (1980) associate universal banking with enhanced monitoring capability, which 
lowers bank risk-taking, while Steinherr (1996) associates a better risk-return and trade-
off with universal banks, as well as a reduced income variability from the lending 
business. 
      
     Santomero and Eckles (2000) provide a different view on universal banking.  First, 
they argue that as the consolidated entity’s franchise value and firm brand are 
11 
 
interconnected, a negative outcome may in fact be magnified with other business units 
and the consolidated entity. They suggest that the vulnerability of any one of the lines of 
business could harm the entire franchise. Second, they argue that in times of stress these 
effects could be highly detrimental to the firm if a strong correlation exists between lines 
of business during economic downturns. Furthermore, they argue that the Financial 
Modernization Act has important implications for public policy, because of the contagion 
propensity of universal banks and large financial firms.  They anticipate that the “too big 
to fail” standard could be accentuated with the formation of large firms in the financial 
sector that may require significant government bailouts at the expense of taxpayers.  The 
development of the recent financial turmoil makes a strong case to support the argument 
of these authors.  
 
     There are several studies that examine factors impacting the risk profiles of financial 
institutions after major regulatory changes. Aharony et. al. (1988) present evidence that 
the passage of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 
1980 had significant implications for the risk of financial institutions. This Act removed 
the power of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors to set the interest rates of savings 
accounts, and also allowed credit unions and S&Ls to offer checking deposits. Aharony 
et. al. (1988) found that after the Act's passage, the (total) return and risk of money center 
and regional banks increased, while that for thrifts decreased. Cornett and Tehranian 
(1989) found that the passage had a positive impact on the wealth of large commercial 
banks, but a negative impact on that of S & L Associations.  
 
12 
 
     Empirical evidence of the effect of nonbank subsidiaries that engaged in the limited 
underwriting of securities activities on BHC risk prior to the passage of the Act risk is 
mixed. Wall (1987) examines the probability of bank insolvency with nonbank 
subsidiaries and suggests there is no evidence to conclude that deregulation would either 
increase or decrease bank risk.    Boyd and Graham (1986) examine whether 
diversification into nonbank activities decreases or increases risk. Over the sample period 
(1971-1983), no evidence was found indicating that BHC’s involvement in nonbank 
business activities either increased or decreased its risk of failure. However, after 
examining sub-periods, when regulatory policy was less stringent, a positive association 
was seen between the degree of involvement in nonbank activities and risk. During 
periods of stringent regulation of BHCs, no strong relationship was seen between the 
extent of nonbank involvement and risk.  This suggests that regulation of nonbank 
activities partially limits the risk behavior of BHCs, and helps avoid undesirable bank 
failures. On the other hand, Boyd and Graham (1988) study hypothetical mergers 
between BHCs and nonbank financial firms and find that risk increases substantially 
when mergers are simulated between banks and securities firms, or between 
property/casualty insurance firms and real estate development. Rosen et. al. (1989) find 
limited potential for risk reduction from bank entry into real estate activities. By taking a 
portfolio approach, the study finds a BHC’s tolerable level of real estate investment 
without altering its risk, measured by variance of earnings. Using REITs data, they find 
benefits for diversification up to a level of 4 percent in the total portfolio. The authors 
conclude that there is modest potential for diversification benefits by allowing BHCs to 
invest directly in real estate.  
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     Regarding bank expansion into the insurance and securities businesses, Boyd, Graham 
and Hewitt (1993) simulate BHCs that merge with other financial firms to assess 
profitability and risk. They find that mergers between BHCs and insurance companies 
may reduce risk, whereas mergers between BHCs and securities firms would tend to 
increase it. Reichert and Wall (2000) use industry-level data during the period 1974-1997 
to form efficient portfolios of selected sectors that provide traditional and nontraditional 
banking activities. Their model simulates the performance of a diversified financial 
services holding company under the assumption the Act had been enacted before 1999. 
The study finds diversification benefits for the two earlier periods considered, and that 
the increase in expected earnings is associated with reduction in risk. However, the 
results from the last decade provide only weak evidence of diversification benefits, 
leading the authors to conclude that the optimal portfolio is time-varying, possibly due to 
macroeconomic or technological reasons. 
 
     A number of studies have addressed GLBA’s impact by focusing on stock price 
reaction leading to the announcement of the passage of the Act. Prior to the Act in 1999, 
research suggested that combining traditional commercial banking activities with 
securities activities was beneficial to the financial services industry.  Using a sample of 
both commercial banks and thrifts, Akhigbe and Whyte (2001) found that five 
announcements that led to the passage of the Act created a positive wealth effect for the 
banking industry. On the other hand, Carow and Heron (2002) found positive returns for 
investment banks and insurance companies, but insignificant returns for banks for six 
events studied prior to the passage of the Act. Czyrnik and Klein (2004) provide evidence 
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of significant and positive effects on the value of commercial and investment banks but 
find different levels of reactions for all types of institutions.  
 
     Akhigbe and Whyte (2004) document changes in market risk for firms in the financial 
industry given GLBA rules. By using three capital market measures and event data 
methodology, their study finds a significant decline in systematic risk for banks, 
securities firms and insurance companies in contrast to a significant increase in total and 
unsystematic risks for banks and insurance companies. Mamun et. al. (2005) propose that 
exposure to systematic risk for different bank categories of banks decreased after the 
passage of the Act, and conclude that the GLBA is fairly successful in containing the risk 
in addition to creating diversification opportunities. Geyfman and Yeager (2009) found 
that for the period of gradual deregulation before the GLBA’s passage, investment 
securities activities were positively associated with higher total and idiosyncratic risk and 
that small risk reduction occurred in the years after its passage, but do not attribute them 
to the change in the regulatory structure. 
 
     In summary, this first part of the literature provides different views regarding the 
stability of the financial system and the risk of bank failure associated with the 
deregulation of financial services system in the U.S. Prior to passage of the GLBA, there 
was considerable academic debate about the appropriateness of banks expanding into 
nonbank activities. Proponents of deregulation suggested that expansion reduces risk, 
while opponents predicted an increase in risk. This dissertation addresses the debate by 
focusing on the financial condition of banks surrounding the passage of the GLBA. 
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Current financial turmoil also provides a suitable time frame for further empirical 
examination about the link between banks’ risk-taking during a period of deregulation. 
Specifically, this dissertation examines book-based risk measures, market risk measures, 
changes in asset and liability structures, and income streams that might have been caused 
by major changes in the Act. Contrary to previous studies that have focused on the wealth 
effect of the announcements leading to the passage of the Act, this dissertation focuses on 
sub-periods for capturing the trends in financial performance and risk during different 
regulatory regimes. 
 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance in Banks 
 
     In light of recent developments in the financial sector, an analysis of bank risk-taking 
behavior and regulation should include prominent corporate governance mechanisms that 
mitigate the principal-agent problem in firms.  
 
2.2.1 Corporate Governance Differences in Regulated and Unregulated Firms 
 
     Agency theory prescribes corporate governance structures and other internal control 
mechanisms as devices that are geared to lead executives’ activities toward firm-value 
maximization. With banks functioning under strictly-regulated policies, corporate 
governance structures have been found to differ from unregulated firms. Adams and 
Mehran (2003) found systematic corporate governance differences between banking and 
16 
 
manufacturing firms. Their study indicated that BHCs have less stock-based 
compensation in executive compensation packages, larger boards, and committees that 
meet more frequently, and less concentrated block ownership. The authors attribute these 
findings to differences in the investment opportunities of BHCs and manufacturing firms 
as well as to the presence of regulation.  
 
     Bathala et. al. (2007) argue that due to the highly leveraged nature of financial 
services and utilities firms, it is possible that firms in those industries have governance 
structures that are less restrictive and shareholder-friendly than those in unregulated 
firms. Their findings show that banks are superior in corporate governance with respect 
to the Corporate Governance Quotient Index
6
 and executive compensation, but are 
inferior with respect to audit mechanism. They also find that banks and nonbanks do not 
differ in governance mechanisms relating to board of directors and takeover defense.  
 
     Carrillo and Bathala (2009) examine differences in the Insolvency Risk and valuation 
effects of corporate governance and ownership structures in banks and nonbanking firms. 
Their results show that the audit committees do not influence the risk profiles of banks, 
but that the existence of a governance committee lowers the Insolvency Risk for both 
banks and nonbanking firms.  Institutional ownership was found to lower the Insolvency 
Risk for nonbanking firms only. The study concludes that ownership differences seem to 
exert more influence on risk and valuation than corporate governance metrics, and that 
                                                 
6
 The Corporate Governance Index ranks corporate governance performance of more than 7,500 companies 
worldwide, including those represented in market indexes such as S&P 500, S&P, 600, S&P 4000, Russell 
3000, MSCI’s EAFE (Europe Asia and Far East) and S&P’s TSX Composite index (Canada), for further 
description see Bathala et al (2007). 
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the impact is stronger for nonbanking firms than banks. Contrary to the complementary 
relationship between regulation and corporate governance mechanisms, they suggest that 
this could be due to a regulation-induced substitution effect. For board mechanisms, the 
findings do not substantiate board independence as being an effective corporate 
governance mechanism for risk and valuation of banks. They discuss how board 
independence in banks may not be an effective corporate governance mechanism, 
perhaps because outside board members do not fully understand banking industry 
characteristics.  
 
     As indicated, this dissertation helps enhance our understanding of the role of 
regulation in conjunction with the corporate governance of banks by examining the 
relation between risk-taking behavior and corporate governance structures during periods 
of financial system regulation and deregulation, as marked by the passage of the GLBA. 
Based on the literature review, corporate governance structures have not been studied in 
the context of major financial regulatory changes, thus this dissertation contributes to the 
gap in the literature focusing on internal monitoring mechanisms, specifically ownership 
structure and board composition. 
 
2.2.2 Why Ownership Structure can affect Bank Risk-Taking? 
 
     Shareholders of highly leveraged firms (such as financial institutions) may benefit 
from increased risk-taking due to the option value of equity. Shareholders can be thought 
to have a call option on the firm's assets which is exercised only if the firm performs 
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well. As such, shareholders have the right but not the obligation to pay off the debt. The 
value of the debt can be thought of as the exercise price of the shareholder call option on 
the firm’s assets. If the firm performs well, such as the value of the assets is higher than 
the face value of the debt, then shareholders exercise their call option to purchase the 
firm’s assets (and pay the debt). In that case, management has an incentive to change the 
riskiness of the firm’s investment activities because successful outcomes will benefit 
shareholders. If the firm’s performance is poor, or the riskier investment activity is not 
successful to the extent that the value of the debt exceeds the value of assets, shareholders 
default on their obligations or forego their right to purchase the firm’s assets, and 
creditors take ownership of assets (Galai and Masulis, 1976).  
 
     Similar to the call option of shareholders, creditors are considered to have a put option 
on the firm’s assets. When the firm performs poorly, creditors must accept the firm’s 
assets from shareholders. The face value of the shareholder’s obligation is the exercise 
price of the put option. Depositors can be considered as debt holders who would demand 
higher interest rate on their deposits to compensate for the riskier investments undertaken 
by banks’ shareholders. However, since depositors have limited to no ability to monitor 
banks’ shareholders actions, shareholders can increase the value of their equity call 
options by increasing the risk of the asset at a low cost capital. It is argued that the 
existence the federal deposit insurance eliminates the need to monitor banks by 
depositors as bank obligations to depositors are guaranteed with some limits. 
Furthermore, if the deposit insurance premiums don’t fully reflect the risk of the 
19 
 
institution, shareholders have and additional incentive to increase the risk at the expense 
of the insurer, (Merton 1977, Dold and Knopf, 2006).  
 
2.2.2.1 Insider Ownership  
 
     Previous research on issues concerning ownership and bank risk-taking behavior 
shows little consensus. Empirical investigation by Saunders et. al. (1990), Knopf and 
Teall (1996) and Anderson and Fraser (2000) suggest a positive association between bank 
risk-taking behavior and insider ownership, indicating those banks with high insider 
ownership are more likely to be more risky. This can be interpreted as evidence that as 
inside ownership increases, the incentives are more aligned with those of shareholders. 
Studies suggest that the agency problem between outsiders and management is reduced 
through manager stock ownership. In the case of banks, however, increasing management 
ownership may yield an incentive to engage in moral hazard behavior (Belkhir, 2005). 
Chen et. al. (1998) find a negative relation between managerial ownership and market 
based risk measures as well as a non-linear relation between managerial ownership and 
risk proxies. Cebenoyan et. al. (1995) find that S&Ls with high managerial ownership 
engage in greater risk-taking behavior during regulatory leniency and forbearance and 
they engage in lower risk-taking behavior during regulatory stringency and non-
forbearance. Demsetz and Strahan (1997) find that franchise value and ownership 
structure affect bank risk-taking behavior. Specifically, they find that the relationship 
between ownership structure and risk is significant only for low franchise value banks. 
They also find that risk is lower at banks without any insider holdings. However, there is 
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no connection between insider holdings and risk-taking at banks with insider holdings.  
Houston and James (1995) find no evidence that equity-based compensation is used to 
promote bank risk-taking. Alternatively, Kwan (2004) compares the profitability and 
risk-taking between publicly traded and privately held U.S BHCs and finds that publicly 
traded banks tend to be less profitable than privately held BHCs that are similar. 
Additionally, the risk between publicly held and privately owned banking companies, 
whether measured by loan portfolio quality or earnings variability, is statistically 
indistinguishable.  
 
     Two recent studies address the combined effect of bank governance and regulation on 
bank valuation and risk. Caprio et. al. (2007) evaluate the impact of ownership 
characteristics on shareholder protection laws, controlling international differences in 
bank regulation.  They argue that in the case of banks, investor protection laws do not 
provide the necessary tools that allow small shareholders to prevent large shareholders 
from expropriating bank resources. In this sense, their monitoring role is adversely 
affected by the bank’s complexity and opaqueness. In their study, the 10 largest banks 
across 44 countries are classified based on 5 categories of ownership: widely held, 
individuals, families, state, financial corporations, nonfinancial corporations and a trust or 
a foundation. The findings indicate that banks in general have concentrated ownership. In 
regards to ownership patterns, legal protection of shareholders and regulation, they find 
that widely-held ownership is uncharacteristic in countries with lower levels of 
shareholder protection and supervisory power. On the relationship between ownership, 
legal protection of shareholders and bank valuations they find a positive relationship 
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between ownership concentration and bank valuation,  but a negative relationship 
between weak shareholder protection laws and bank valuation. Finally, they find that 
large cash flow rights reduce the negative effect of weak shareholder protection laws on 
bank valuations.  
 
     Laeven and Levine (2009) conduct an empirical examination of risk-taking by banks, 
ownership structure, and regulation in the 10 largest banks in 48 countries. Using cash 
flow rights as the measure to define large ownership, they find that bank risk is higher 
when there is a greater presence of large shareholders with significant cash flow rights. 
After bringing in regulation in the analysis, they find that deposit insurance increases risk 
only in the presence of large shareholders, but the impact is not significant with widely 
held ownership. In a similar study, Westman (2009) examines the interaction between 
ownership characteristics and regulatory environment in European banks and finds that 
ownership structure changes according to the severity of the moral hazard problem 
induced by the deposit insurance system. Chen et. al. (2011) study the effect of financial 
crises within a country’s banking system and the link between control-ownership and cost 
borrowings, and conclude that control rights and cash-flow rights affects firm value and 
determine the cost of financing. 
 
2.2.2.2 Large Shareholder Ownership  
 
     Large shareholders and concentrated ownership are important factors in a firm’s 
governance structure. It is thought that the presence of a large stockholder (after here 
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referred to as blockholder) is expected to have an important disciplinary effect on 
managers through their monitoring role (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Maug, 1998, Noe, 
2002; Gilland and Starks, 2003) since they have sufficient incentive to monitor 
management, along with the capacity to bear monitoring costs. Simultaneously, 
individual shareholders would also enjoy the benefits of monitoring management by 
blockholders without assuming the costs. The benefits for blockholders include the 
influence they can exert to improve firm performance. However, research is not 
conclusive on the monitoring role of blockholders. Bethel et. al. (1998) found that 
performance improves after large share block purchases by activist investors, while Koke 
et. al. (2001), provide little evidence that existing blockholders play an active role in 
disciplining underperforming management. In a more recent study, Borokhovich et. al. 
(2006) argue that blockholders with potential business ties to the firm (affiliated) versus 
those without ties (unaffiliated) have different incentives for monitoring management.  
They examine the abnormal returns related to the announcement of antitakeover 
amendment proposals and conclude that the market views affiliated blockholders as less 
effective monitors than unaffiliated blockholders.  
 
     2.2.3 Bank Regulation and Moral Hazard  
 
     To a large extent, the risk-taking behavior of bank managers is determined by 
restrictions imposed by regulators. Regulation plays an important role in the scope of 
banks’ activities and it is intended to ensure that banks do not take excessive risks. 
However, theory indicates that regulation provides a different incentive for risk-taking 
behavior among bank stakeholders.    Mishkin (1999) argues that the moral hazard 
23 
 
created by a government safety net can result in increased risk-taking that eventually 
leads to institutional losses as seen during the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. 
Financial institutions were allowed to enter new lines of business at that time, which in 
turn led to greater risk-taking.  Macey and O’Hara (2003) argue that the positive effect of 
federal agencies to insure deposits in qualified banks also has a regulatory cost. It 
provides the incentives to both shareholders and managers of insured banks to engage in 
excessive risk-taking. If these decisions lead to higher returns, the bank receives the sole 
benefit. On the other hand, if the risk leads to insolvency that could in turn trigger 
systemic risk then the bank will likely be bailed out. Since deposits are protected to a 
large extent despite the bank’s investment outcomes, deposit insurance reduces the 
incentive for insured depositors to monitor the bank’s risk-taking, and the motivation to 
engage in risky behavior is higher for owners than non-shareholder managers (Laeven 
and Levine, 2009). Additionally, Westman (2009) compares the performance and risk 
profile across similar deposit insurance system classes in European banks, and finds that 
risk is higher for banks with the most common ownership structure (variation of state 
owned banks, unlisted banks with bank blockholder owner, and unlisted banks with 
foreign blockholder) in countries where the moral hazard problem is severe. The author 
suggests that countries with generous deposit insurance induce risk-taking.  
 
2.2.4 Why Board Structure Can Affect Bank Risk-Taking? 
 
     The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency issued a study in 1988 on bank failures, 
and concluded that in addition to management, the board of directors has a significant 
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influence on a bank’s success or failure7. The study indicates that although economic 
conditions are a major influence on a bank’s ability to achieve financial success, 
deficiencies within the board of directors and of management were the primary cause of 
most troubled and failed banks during the 1980s and early 1990s
8
. The study finds that 
characteristics of problematic banks include an uninformed or inattentive board as well as 
problems related to oversight by the board. 
 
     It is argued that the board of directors is a crucial mechanism in resolving the agency 
conflict between managers and shareholders because it is presumed that the board 
performs the monitoring function that individual shareholders are unable to perform due 
to lack of resources (Jensen 1993).  The board of director’s role as a corporate 
governance mechanism in banks deserves special attention due to the complexities of the 
banking industry, regulation, and informational asymmetries. Evidence suggests that 
these asymmetries are more pronounced with banks than with nonfinancial firms due to a 
more complex structure of information asymmetry among the different stakeholders 
(Ciancanelli and Reyes 2001, Furfine 2001). Caprio and Levine (2002) and Levine 
(2003) argue that greater government regulation along with greater opaqueness of banks 
compared to other industries affects corporate governance. Bank assets are 
informationally opaque because “bank loans are customized, privately negotiated 
agreements that, despite increase in availability of price information and in trading 
activity, still lack transparency and liquidity, making them difficult to quantify and 
                                                 
7
  OCC, Bank Failure: An Evaluation of the Factors Contributing to the Failure of National 
Banks (1988) 
8
  OCC, An Examiners Guide to Problem Bank Identification, Rehabili tation, and 
Resolution, (2001).  
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manage”, Greenspan (1996) . Corporate governance mechanisms associated with a 
monitoring role are also altered due to a lack of transparency and a lack of proper loan 
values, thus creating greater asymmetry between insiders and outsiders in the banking 
sector. Bank opacity exacerbates informational asymmetry, as reflected in the inability to 
determine loan quality, the complexity of financial engineering products, and the ability 
to modify investment risk (Levine, 2004).  
 
2.2.4.1 Board of Directors Evidence 
 
     Research relating to the board of directors has focused on board effectiveness in 
monitoring management, which in turn has been linked with board independence. The 
monitoring by outside directors reduces managers’ discretion, and as a result lowers the 
agency costs (Fama, 1980; Bathala and Rao, 1995). Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that 
outside directors are effective monitors since they are motivated by reputational concerns. 
Brickley et. al. (1988) argue that stock ownership by officers and board members 
provides incentive to monitor the managers more effectively. However, the degree to 
which director ownership provides monitoring incentive may also be affected by the level 
of diversification of their personal wealth. Conceivably, outside directors could be 
motivated to engage in risk-taking behavior if pursuing risky business strategies could 
lead to greater wealth and personal rewards.  Therefore, officer and board ownership as 
well as compensation packages are important factors in determining the likelihood that 
board members will take an action that would impact shareholder wealth, and bank’s risk.  
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2.2.5 Corporate Governance Legislation 
 
     Corporate failures that took place in the U.S. during 2001 to 2002 prompted the 
passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 as well as a series of revisions in the 
stock exchange’s regulations. The new rules included provisions to reduce the likelihood 
of corporate fraud and to provide alignment of incentives for the corporate insider with 
investors through enhanced disclosure. These also included explicit changes to corporate 
governance structures requiring increased outside representation on the board. In relation 
to corporate governance, SOX requires all public firms to have an independent audit 
committee while the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules require a majority of 
independent directors on corporate boards, as well as absolute independence in the 
compensation committee, the nominating committee and the audit committee.   
 
     Prior research analyzed the impact of the passage of the SOX Act on firm value and 
risk. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2005) found that during the announcement period of 
these rules the returns response varied across firm size. For small firms that were less 
compliant with the proposed legislation, by either having ineffective internal controls or 
boards that were not independent, they discovered negative abnormal returns to 
announcements prior to the passage of the Act. In contrast, large firms that were less 
compliant prior to the legislation present positive abnormal returns. Related to firm-risk 
evidence, Ashbaugh-Skaife et.al. (2009) look at the internal controls disclosures (ICD) 
setting that the SOX Act requires about financial reporting. They found that firms 
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reporting ICDs had higher idiosyncratic risk, suggesting that firms with internal control 
problems also present greater information risk to investors.  
 
     The corporate governance regulation literature has looked at the impact of the SOX 
Act in the financial services industry. Akhigbe and Martin (2006) estimate its impact on 
the valuation of firms in the financial services industry by evaluating the wealth effect of 
firms surrounding the passage of the Act. The results indicate a positive wealth effect for 
large and small banks, saving institutions and insurance companies, which the authors 
attribute to the disclosure and governance provisions associated with the Act. They also 
suggest that positive response is associated with expected improvement in the 
transparency of the relatively opaque nature of financial services firms. In a subsequent 
study, Akhigbe and Martin (2008) extend the impact of the SOX Act by examining the 
risk implications on U.S. financial services firms. The authors look at short and long term 
changes to market risk measures and find that the passage of the Act was associated with 
increased risk in the short term as a result of how firms disclose unfavorable information 
that was previously undisclosed. In contrast, longer term measures of market risk are 
negative, concluding that new information reflects a decrease in investor uncertainty 
along with increasing transparency.  
 
     In summary, the literature on corporate governance and banking regulation provide 
the framework for the empirical analysis used in this dissertation to analyze the risk-
taking in financial institutions. Specifically, it allows exploring how governance 
structures comingle with regulation to determine the risk profile of banks.  
28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       CHAPTER III 
 
III. HYPOTHESES       
 
     On the basis of the literature review, four hypotheses are tested to examine the impact 
of governance and regulation on the risk profile of banks. 
 
3.1 Hypothesis 1: Regulation Induced Risk-Taking Behavior 
 
     The financial turmoil that started in mid-2007 led to a review of the extent that 
deregulatory changes enacted with the GLBA contributed to the crisis. As stated by 
policymakers, the subprime crisis revealed flaws in the financial regulatory structure: 
“The current system of functional regulation has several fundamental problems” 
(Treasury, 2008). But it is also argued that the supervisory structure is not the cause of 
the crisis. According to Mr. Thomas Hoening, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City, in his address to the Institute of International Bankers on October 13, 2008, 
“No structure might have done particularly better or worse than another in preventing the 
current imbalances.”  
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          Major changes in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 could present risk 
implications in the banking sector. The passage of the GLBA creates potential for bank 
risk increases, as they enter into riskier activities with securities and insurance businesses 
(Lown et. al. 2000; Boyd et. al. 1993). There are two arguments that suggest BHCs could 
result in less stable firms (Santomero and Eckles, 2000). One argument indicates that if 
the correlation between lines of business is stronger than what it is assumed under the 
initial activity expansion, the potential for increase in risk is significant, especially in 
downturn economic cycles.  The second argument by Santomero and Eckles (2000) 
suggests that the “consolidated entity has a franchise value and brand name that are 
intimately intertwined with all of its businesses”.  As financial firms engage in a number 
of financial activities (anticipated to occur with the passage of the Act), they argue that 
there is an increase in the probability that financial distress within the conglomerate will 
extend to the holding company and its subsidiaries, which could destabilize the firm as 
well as the sector and the economy at large. The perception that financial conglomerates 
have increased systemic risk could in turn increase the bank risk in general (Akhigbe and 
Whyte, 2004). 
 
     On the other hand, the bank risk could either decrease or remain unchanged based on 
tradeoffs between diversification and risk. The potential for diversification to new lines 
of business through expansion to securities and insurance activities may reduce the risk. 
Berger and Mester (1999) provide evidence that the expanded product array and cross-
selling opportunities have enabled banks to benefit from revenue gains, resulting from 
offering multiple products and services, increasing revenue potential and improved risk-
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returns trade-offs. In addition, bank risk could be controlled as a response to active 
regulatory oversight which would prevent financial institutions from excessive risk-
taking (Freixas and Santomero, 2002). Considering that the Act establishes functional 
regulation (such as banking activities overviewed by banking regulators, securities 
activities overviewed by securities regulators, insurance activities overviewed by 
insurance regulators, and the Federal Reserve Board serving as the supervisor for holding 
companies), the supervisory function could maintain integrity of the system and prevent 
excessive risk-taking by banks expanding into nontraditional activities. Thus, the barriers 
removed for U.S banks regarding universal banking could be safer and less susceptible to 
bank risk. 
 
     With the potential impact of universal banking on bank risk as well as the important 
role of regulatory oversight in the prevention of excessive risk-taking by banks, the final 
effect on risk is determined to a large extent by the risk preferences of each institution. 
Accordingly, the regulation induced risk-taking hypotheses to be tested are: 
 
     H01:  The risk profile of BHCs has not change after the passage of the GLBA in 1999. 
     Ha1:  The risk profile of BHCs has changed after the passage of the GLBA in 1999.  
 
3.2 Hypothesis 2: Managerial Risk Incentives 
 
     Saunders et. al (1990) argue that the ability of a bank’s stockholders to maximize the 
value of their call option by increasing risk depends on bank managers’ preferences.  As 
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such, the risk-taking behavior of bank managers is in part determined by the extent to 
which their interests and preferences coincide with those of shareholders. The alignment 
of preferences is achieved by giving managers stock or stock options in the banking firm. 
The potential for bank increase comes from managers having the incentive to engage in 
higher risk activities to maximize the value of their call option to the extent that 
management-ownership is not too large, or their wealth would be extremely sensitive to 
bank risk (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  As stockholders take advantage of a wider set of 
investment prospects (post GLBA), additional risk-taking could occur after a period of 
deregulation. In addition, if the moral hazard related to bank regulating structure and the 
FDIC’s deposit insurance dominates, bank managers may engage in excessive risk-taking 
despite the potential for increase in their non-diversifiable risk. As such, shareholders 
may have the incentive to increase risk because they do not assume the costs of financial 
institution failures and institutional arrangements such as deposit insurance may weaken 
debtholder discipline (Erkens et. al., 2012) 
 
     The potential for bank risk decrease can be explained by the incentive bank managers 
have to reduce risk behavior in order  to protect their undiversifiable risk as both  human 
and financial capital are tied to the firm’s fortunes. In addition, as regulators have the 
responsibility to ensure the safety and soundness of banks and issue prompt corrective 
actions when financial or managerial weaknesses surface, this threat could be the driving 
force for managers to operate within moderate risk levels. Thus, the incentive alignment 
between shareholders and managers via management ownership would reduce or not 
relate to the risk-taking behavior of banks.  
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      As a result, the managerial risk incentive hypotheses are: 
     H02: Banks’ risk-taking behavior does not differ according to levels of insider stock 
ownership. 
     Ha2:  Banks’ risk-taking behavior differs according to levels of insider stock 
ownership. 
     And, 
     H03: For a given level of insider ownership structure, banks’ risk-taking behavior 
does not differ according to the regulatory environment. 
     Ha3:  For a given level of insider ownership structure, banks’ risk-taking behavior 
differs according to the regulatory environment. 
 
3.3 Hypothesis 3: Blockholder Ownership  
 
     Large shareholders tend to have the financial means and incentives to monitor and 
control management so that they are likely to act in the best interest of the stockholders. 
The potential for change in BHC risk is defined by the degree of blockholders’ wealth 
diversification. Well diversified blockholders could influence managerial action towards 
riskier investments to maximize their value of the call option, and this behavior could be 
accentuated with the expansion into riskier activities with the passage of the Act. While 
Blockholders with concentrated wealth have the interest that managers follow a less risky 
investment strategy. In addition, bank managers may have incentive to reduce risk to 
protect their non-diversifiable risk (employment). 
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    Therefore, the hypotheses relating to blockholder ownership are as follows: 
     H04: Banks’ risk-taking behavior does not differ according to the level of blockholder 
stock ownership. 
     Ha4:  Banks’ risk-taking behavior differs according to the level of blockholder stock 
ownership. 
     And, 
     H05: For a given level of blockholder ownership structure, banks’ risk-taking 
behavior does not differ according to the regulatory environment. 
     Ha5:  For a given level of blockholder ownership structure, banks’ risk-taking 
behavior differs according to the regulatory environment. 
 
3.4 Hypothesis 4: Outsider on the Board  
 
     Empirical evidence regarding bank board composition indicates that a higher 
proportion of outside directors is detrimental to the performance of banking firms 
(Adams and Mehran, 2008).  Research that focuses on the monitoring and advising roles 
of inside and outside directors argues that inside managers are an important source of 
firm-specific information, that can in turn be effective for decision making, but they may 
have distorted incentives with private benefits and lack of independence from the CEO, 
while outsiders provide a more independent monitoring role, but have less information 
than insiders regarding firm constraints and opportunities (Raheja, 2005). De Andres and 
Vallelado (2008) argue that bank board composition is related to a director’s ability to 
monitor and advice management and those larger and not excessively independent boards 
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might prove more efficient in monitoring and advising issues. Wang et. al. (2012) also 
find a negative impact of non-executive directors on BHCs’ performance and argue that 
outside directors have less understanding of the banking sector. As the financial services 
industry expands into new lines of business, the monitoring and advising roles of the 
board of directors become more important, given the complexities of the industry 
increase with deregulation. However, as large and higher independent boards might not 
prove to be more effective in monitoring and advising functions for creating value, it is 
possible that a lack of  banking business comprehension by outside directors may cause 
their associated monitoring role to be ineffective. As a consequence, the risk in bank has 
the potential to increase with a higher proportion of outside members in the board. 
 
     There is a possibility that a higher proportion of outside directors may decrease bank 
risk profile because independent boards are considered to have fewer conflicts of interests 
when monitoring managers, regardless of regulatory oversight. Therefore, effective 
monitoring from independent board members could limit the risk-taking behavior of bank 
managers. Also, reputational concerns that affect outside directors could also provide the 
right incentive for effective monitoring, thus reducing bank risk-taking.  
 
     Based on these arguments, the outsiders on the board hypotheses are: 
     H06: Banks’ risk-taking behavior does not differ according to the proportion of 
outside directors. 
     Ha6:  Banks’ risk-taking behavior differs according to the proportion of outside 
directors. 
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     And, 
     H07: For a given proportion of outside directors, banks’ risk-taking behavior does not 
differ according to the regulatory environment. 
     Ha7:  For a given proportion of outside directors, banks’ risk-taking behavior differs 
according to the regulatory environment. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
IV. VARIABLES, METHODOLOGY AND MODEL 
 
4.1 Risk Measures 
 
     This dissertation examines three standard book-based risk measures and three market 
risk measures. An additional risk measure is constructed in the form of an index, based 
on the six different measures of risk. 
 
4.1.1 Book Based Risk Measures 
 
     Bank risk is measured using accounting-based risk measures. Primarily, the risk of 
bank failure is measured by the Insolvency Risk, or the Z-Score, which takes into account 
rates of return, the variability of rates of return and level of capitalization. The Z-Score 
equals the return on assets, plus the capital-asset ratio, divided by the standard deviation 
of asset returns. The measure describes the likelihood that a firm’s earnings will become 
low enough for its capital base to be reduced, or the number of standard deviations that 
profits must fall in order to drive a firm into bankruptcy.  Higher values of Z are 
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consistent with higher values of capital asset ratios. For a given level of earnings, a 
higher Z-Score is indicative of less likelihood of insolvency, while a lower Z-score is 
associated with a higher probability of insolvency. The Z-Score is appropriate to consider 
from the regulators point of view since policymakers are concerned about bank failures 
and downside risk. 
 
     Since the score is highly skewed (Laeven and Levin, 2009), the Z-Score estimated is 
the log of Insolvency Risk as used by Iannotta et. al. (2007):  
     

 )/( AE
Z

 ,           
where  and  are the mean and standard deviation of the bank’s return on assets, 
respectively, over a three-year period, with (E/A) being the capital to asset ratio.  
 
     The other three risk measures are 1) volatility of the return on assets (ROA), and 2) 
volatility of the return on equity (ROE). For a given year, the standard deviation is 
calculated over a three-year period using quarterly data and including the year-end 
quarter. 
 
     The volatility of ROA (SDROA) and volatility of ROE (SDROE) are measures that 
reveal bank risk, and are measures likely to be used by directors and stockholders when 
judging performance (Sullivan and Spong, 2007).  
 
 
 
38 
 
4.1.2 Market Based Risk Measures 
 
     Total risk is a concern to regulators, managers, investors and borrowers. While all are 
concerned with the bank’s risk of failure and potential bankruptcy costs, regulators are 
particularly concerned with the impact on the Systemic Risk and the insurance fund 
(Stiroh, 2006).  Idiosyncratic risk or Firm Risk is relevant to investors who care about the 
volatility of revenues, such that they measure the level of diversification within a BHC 
(Stiroh, 2006). As Total and Firm Risk measures are relevant, a market model 
differentiates the variance of total returns into these two components. The variance of 
equity market returns estimates Total Risk, where as the variance of the market model 
residuals measures Firm Risk.  
 
     The market model equation is: 
tit
MKT
ti
RET
,1,
       ,           
 
where RET is measured as the firm’s monthly equity return minus the risk-free rate and 
MKT is the return on the market in excess of the risk-free rate.  Total Risk is the standard 
deviation of RET, Systematic Risk, or BETA, is the coefficient of MKT (), and the 
idiosyncratic risk, or Firm Risk, is estimated by the standard deviation of the residuals 
().  The return data is calculated based on CRSP database and the excess return on the 
market is sourced from the excess return on the market (Rm-Rf) as calculated by Kenneth 
R. French and is available at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. Based on 
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Dimson (1979), monthly returns are used to reduce the bias in BETA as a result of 
infrequent trading. In the case of market risk measures, higher beta () values are 
indicative of higher risk. 
 
4.1.3 Risk Index Measure 
 
     A Risk Index is constructed to capture an overall view of a bank’s risk profile. Based 
on the decile distribution of this risk measure, each bank is assigned into a decile, with 1 
indicating the lowest risk and 10 indicating the highest risk. A simple average is 
calculated of the aggregated risk measures in order to assign a nominal measure to each 
bank per year.   
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Table 1: Bank Risk Measures 
Book Based Risk Measures 
ROA
AEROA
ScoreZ

)/(

 


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
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

Assets
NetIncome
ROA   







Equity
NetIncome
ROE   
Market Based Risk Measures 
Firm Risk = Standard Deviation of residuals from the equation 
tit
MKT
ti
RET
,
1
,
   
Systematic Risk =    
 
 from the equation  
tit
MKT
ti
RET
,
1
,
 
 
Total  Risk =  RET), 
Index 
Risk Index =  (Z score Decile + (ROA), Decile + (ROE), Decile+ Firm Risk Decile + 
                     Systematic Risk Decile  + Total Risk Decile)/6 
 
4.2 Corporate Governance Variables 
 
     Ownership data of BHCs are derived from LionsShare FactSet Research, a provider of 
financial data and analytics, from SEC filings and proxy statements. Ownership structure 
variables in this study are Insider and Blockholder Ownership. The degree of Insider 
Ownership is measured as the percentage of shares owned by bank managers divided by 
41 
 
outstanding shares. Blockholders are individuals who own 5% or more of the outstanding 
shares. The percentage of blockholders is measured as the sum of ownership by all 
blockholders, divided by outstanding shares. Board of Directors data are collected from 
proxy statements and directors are classified as insiders or independent depending on 
their relationship to the bank as described in the proxy statements. Directors classification 
is based on relationship criteria developed by the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC), described in the Appendix. 
 
4.3 Methodology  
 
     The hypotheses are tested using univariate analysis and multivariate regression 
analysis.  
 
4.3.1 Univariate Analysis 
 
     The first set of hypotheses testing consists of performing t-tests on the means of risk 
measures and governance measures for the periods before and after the passage of the 
GLBA. Specifically, t-tests with Bonferroni correction are performed as this is a 
multiple-comparison correction used when several dependent or independent statistical 
tests are performed simultaneously.  This approach is typically used for multiple 
comparisons, as it accounts for the fact that while a given confidence level  may be 
appropriate for individual comparison, the same is not appropriate for the entire set. 
The method corrects the alpha value by the number of comparisons being performed.  
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     To further examine the impact of deregulation in risk-taking behavior of banks, this 
study examines individual components of a bank’s assets, liabilities, income, and off-
balance sheet positions to identify how bank performance ratios are linked to risk 
characteristics, and how these variables changed with the passage of the GLBA. In 
examining the differential impact of accounting ratios pre- and post- GLBA, the sample 
is divided into groups based on total assets. Matching sample banks into these size 
characteristics facilitates comparison of risk profiles to their peer group. 
 
     Three performance and measures for banks used by Cornett et. al. (2002) are included: 
capital risk ratios, asset quality ratios, and liquidity risk ratios. In addition, funding 
composition ratios, off-balance sheet composition ratios, and income structure ratios are 
also examined to explore whether bank-funding structure has shift towards more risky 
products. This would also explore how the use of derivatives by banks has helped to 
hedge their risk, and identify the change in income structure based on traditional and 
nontraditional banking activities, respectively.   
 
     Capital ratios measure the bank’s ability to meet regulatory capital standards.  Three 
ratios are considered: 1) Core Capital ratio, measured as shareholder’s equity  as a 
percentage of book value of total assets; 2) Loans to Capital, measured as total loans as a 
percentage of the book value of total capital; and 3) Deposits to Capital, measured as total 
deposits as a percentage of book value of total capital. As banks expand into riskier 
nontraditional activities, greater regulatory capital standards should follow. Similarly, as 
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banks expand into the securities and underwriting activities, one should observe a greater 
emphasis as sources of revenue and income nontraditional banking products.  
 
     An asset quality ratio measures quality of bank’s loan portfolio and risk, and is 
proxied by the ratio of Net Charge-Offs to Total Loans. Another proxy, the Provision for 
Loan Losses is also included as a forward looking measure.  These measures reflect the 
overall credit quality of bank’s loan portfolio.  
 
     A bank’s liquidity reflects its ability to fund its contractual obligations, such as 
lending and investment commitments as well as potential deposit withdrawals. Liquidity 
risk is defined as the bank’s risk of loss resulting from inability to meet its cash needs, 
which must be covered by higher cost of funding sources. Two ratios are used: Loans to 
Deposits and Total Loans to Assets. Higher Total Loans to Deposits ratio reflects an 
increase in liquidity risk. A decrease in the Total Loans to Assets ratio reflects increase 
liquidity and could be explained by a shift from lending activities to underwriting 
activities after the GLBA. Funding composition is measured as the ratio of Transaction 
accounts to Assets and alternatively as Non-transaction accounts to Assets. Transaction 
accounts to Assets capture a low cost source of funds for banks, and Non-transaction 
accounts to Assets represent a higher source of costs of funds, which include the sum of 
the following accounts held in domestic offices: money market deposit accounts 
(MMDAs), other savings deposits and all time deposits. The funding structure indicates 
how the bank funds its loan portfolio between relatively cheap and more expensive 
sources of funds.  
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     Off-balance sheet activity is measured by the extent of bank’s use of derivative 
instruments. Banks engage in derivative contracts as intermediaries and end-users. 
Purnanandam (2007) notes that banks acting as financial intermediaries use derivatives 
for business purposes, and not for hedging. Reichert and Shyu (2002) show that banks 
use derivatives to effectively reduce their portfolio risk.  The measure used to examine 
how banks rely on the use of derivatives for hedging purposes is the notional amount of 
derivatives that is reported under the non-trading purposes divided by the total assets of 
the bank. The notional principal amount is commonly used since it reflects the scale of 
derivative activities; however, the measure does not represent the marked to market value 
of risks associated with those contracts. 
 
     Income structure is determined by the difference between the interest income 
produced by traditional activities, and non-interest income produced by nontraditional 
activities. This study considers the ratio of Interest Income to Total Income, Non-interest 
income to Total Income, and Trading Revenue to Total Income.  
 
4.3.2 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 
     Next, the hypotheses tests are examined with a multivariate regression analysis, where 
the hypotheses remain unchanged except they are tested by controlling variables. 
Specifically, panel data are used to regress risk measures on the corporate governance 
variables, along with a set of control variables. Panel data analysis is a method of 
studying a set of cross-sectional data, discretely observed over a period of time. 
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1) Regression Specification 
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     Risk corresponds to its seven associated measures: Z-score, ROA standard deviation 
(SDROA), ROE standard deviation (SDROE), Total Risk, Systematic Risk, Firm Risk, 
and the Risk Index. Insider Ownership is the lag of percentage of management 
ownership, Blockholder Ownership is the lag of percentage of Blockholder Ownership, 
Outside Director is the percentage of outside directors. Following Cornett et. al. (2007), 
insider and blockholder measures are lagged by one year to allow for the effect of 
changes in governance structure to affect bank performance and risk profile. Cornett et. 
al. (2007) indicate that lagging ownership and governance measures also mitigates 
simultaneity issues. They also argue that to the extent that the firm has control over board 
membership, board composition is less subject to the endogeneity problem similar to that 
of blockholder or insider ownership.  
 
     GLBA is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for observations after 1999, the 
year of the Act’s passage, SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for 
observations after 2002, the year of the SOX Act passage. M&A is a variable that 
controls for mergers and acquisitions that takes the value of 1 if the bank is involved in 
any M&A activity. In cases of M&A, the acquiring bank’s code is maintained and the 
target is dropped from the sample. 
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      The control variables are included in the term Z
'
, where 
'
 is a vector of 
parameters, and  Z  is a vector of bank-specific portfolio characteristics. Bank control 
variables include firm Size, measured as the natural log of the book value of total assets. 
Size and risk could be directly or inversely related according to the following arguments. 
An inverse relationship could exist if larger banks are better able to diversify their risks, 
have more developed risk management techniques, and thus are less likely to fail 
(McAllister and McManus, 1993). If this argument holds, the sign of the coefficient for 
Size would be positive with respect to the Insolvency Risk (Z-Score), while a negative 
sign is expected for the other risk measures. Alternatively, it is argued that larger banks 
operate with riskier loan portfolios and operate with more leverage. In this case, a 
negative sign is expected with respect to Insolvency Risk, while a positive sign is 
expected with respect to remaining risk variables (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997).    
 
     Following the study by Saunders et. al. (1990), a financial leverage (Leverage) 
variable is also included based on the argument that highly leveraged firms tend to 
exhibit greater risk. Leverage is measured as the ratio of total assets relative to equity. 
Banks are characterized by high financial leverage, which magnifies their profits at the 
cost of increased risk. Higher leverage (lower capitalization) would be associated with 
higher risk. (i.e., the higher the capital the lower the bank’s risk). A negative sign for the 
Leverage coefficient is expected with respect to Insolvency Risk and a positive sign is 
expected with respect to the other risk measures. In addition, the Tier1 capital ratio 
measured as Tier 1 Capital to Risk Weighted Assets is considered for robustness check. 
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     Annual growth rate of total assets (Growth) is included to capture the effect of growth 
strategies of the bank in the period considered. High growth banks tend to be exposed to 
greater risk, greater capital needs, lower margins, and lower capital ratios. As a result, it 
is likely that the coefficient of Growth is negative with respect to Insolvency Risk and 
positive with respect to the other risk measures (Carrillo and Bathala, 2009). Growth is 
calculated as the compounded annual growth rate in assets over a three-year period. 
 
     Bank portfolio characteristics are captured in an index of loan concentration, 
represented with the variable Concentration. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is 
calculated following Demsetz and Strahan (1997), with the HHI equaling sum of the 
squared share of each loan category, relative to total loans. A large value indicates a 
greater degree of concentration.  
Loan Concentration Index: 
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     Loanj is the exposure of loan category j and Loanj is the total exposure of loans to 
different segments, such as commercial and industrial, real estate, agriculture, individuals 
and others.  
 
     The Non-Interest Income to Total Income ratio is included to capture the impact of 
nontraditional banking activities in bank’s risk profile. Non-Interest Income and risk 
could be directly or inversely associated according to the following arguments. With the 
passage of the GLBA, an anticipated benefit for financial institutions was to make use of 
revenue efficiencies and economies that was not possible before deregulation, which in 
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turn would lead to more diversified income sources and loan portfolios making bank 
failure less likely (Hughes et. al., 1999, Saunders and Walters, 1994). Under this 
argument, the sign of the coefficient for Non- Interest Income is expected to be positive 
for Insolvency Risk (Z-Score) and negative for the other risk measures. On the other 
hand, critics of the Act indicated that the GLBA creates potential for an increase in bank 
risk as BHCs enter into riskier activities with securities and insurance businesses (Lown 
et. al., 2000; Boyd et. al., 1993).  Under this argument, a negative sign is expected with 
respect to Insolvency Risk (Z-Score) and a positive sign is expected with respect to the 
other risk measures. To check for robustness, Trading Revenue to Total Income is 
considered. Trading Revenue includes revenue from trading cash instruments, off-
balance contracts and mark-to-market changes in the carrying value of assets and 
liabilities.  
 
     To control for a bank’s asset quality, the ratio of Net Charge-Offs to Total Loans (Net 
Charge-Offs) is included. The higher the charge-off rate the greater the bank’s risk. 
Another measure, the ratio of Loan Loss Provisions to Total Loans (Loan Loss 
Provisions) is also used to check for robustness; with higher Loan Loss Provisions values 
being associated with greater forward looking credit risk. 
 
     Bank liquidity is proxied by an approximation of the bank’s Cost of Funds as the ratio 
of Interest Expense to Total Liabilities. A higher Cost of Funds is indicative of a bank 
needing to pay a premium for funds, especially as illiquidity problems arise. Higher Cost 
of Funds suggests that a bank takes higher risk, increasing the risk profile of the bank. A 
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negative sign is expected with respect to Insolvency Risk (Z-Score) and a positive sign is 
expected with respect to other risk measures. To check for robustness, liquidity is also 
measured as the ratio of Jumbo Deposits to Assets.  To the extent that Jumbo Deposits 
are viewed to be more expensive source of funding than core deposits, a higher ratio may 
signal higher funding risk and higher riskiness of the bank.  
 
     The efficiency measure (Inefficiency) is calculated as the ratio of Non-Interest 
Expense to Total Revenue and is introduced to account for the incidence of operating 
costs in bank profits. A higher ratio is indicative of relative inefficiency and a lower value 
is indicative of greater efficiency.  
 
4.3.3 Economic Environment Variables 
 
     The Real GDP Growth rate is the economic environment variable used to capture 
economic cycle effects. It is measured as the average annual growth rate of Real GDP for 
each year. The Federal Funds Rate is considered for robustness.  
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 Table 2: Summary of Variables used in Base Model and Robustness Checks 
 
 
 
Corporate Governance Measures 
Blockholders =  5% or more of the outstanding shares 
Insider Ownership =    Management Ownership 
      Outstanding Shares 
Outside Director = 
Control Variables 
Size = Log(Assets) 
Leverage =  Assets        ; Tier1 
Equity RWA 
Growth = Compounded annual growth rate in assets over a three year period 
Loan Concentration  =  Herfinhadhl-Hirschman Index 
Non Interest Income  = ; 
Asset Quality = 
Net Charge Offs  
  ; 
Loan Loss Provisions 
Total Loans Total Loans 
Liquidity  = Interest Expense   ; Jumbo Deposits 
Total Loans Total Assets 
Efficiency Measure = 
Non-Interest Expense 
Total Revenue 
Economic Environment = Real GDP Growth Rate; Federal Funds Rate 
Total Income Total Income 
Non Interest Income Trading Revenue 
Outside Director  
Total Board of Directors 
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   CHAPTER  V 
 
V. RESULTS 
 
     This section describes the data and results from univariate means tests and regression 
analysis. 
 
5.1 Data 
 
     The effect of corporate governance variables and passage of the GLBA on bank risk 
profile is examined using a sample of 146 banks over the period 1997-2009. The sample 
is drawn from the FRY-9C reports that BHCs file with the Federal Reserve Bank, FactSet 
LionShares Research, CRSP tape and SEC website. To be included in the final sample, a 
BHC has to have 13 years of consecutive data in all of the four sources indicated above. 
This condition results in a final sample of 146 BHCs.  In addition, a second full sample of 
BHCs is used for the analysis, which includes the surviving BHCs from the period 1997-
2009 and the non- surviving sample. The latter includes active banks one year before the 
implementation of the GLBA that exited sometime during the period of study. Non-
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surviving BHCs increase the sample to 196 banks. Table 3 and Table 4 report summary 
statistics for the variables used by the entire period and by each year, respectively. 
 
     Total assets range from $162 Million to $2,224 Billion, with an average of $37.5 
Billion. During the 13-year period, BHCs experienced an average of 7.2% growth rate, 
and report a mean ROA and mean ROE of 1% and 11.4%, respectively. Stock ownership 
by managers ranges from a minimum of 0.1% to a maximum of 57.9%, with an average 
of 5.8%. Blockholder Ownership ranges from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of 84.2%, 
with an average of 13.6%.  The Board of directors in BHCs is comprised largely by 
Outside Directors with a mean of 84.1%. 
 
     On the performance side, the sample includes both low and high performing BHCs. 
Mean ROE was 11.4%, ranging from -2.1% to 19.3%; while the mean ROA was 1%,  
ranging from -0.2% to 1.7%. Risk variables also reflect a sample that includes important 
variations across BHCs risk profiles. For example, the Z-Score or insolvency measure 
ranges from 10 to 148, with a mean of 75; SDROA has a mean of 0.4% and a range from 
0.1% to 3%; SDROE has a mean of 4.8% and a range from 1.2% to 20.1%, Total Risk 
has a mean of 7.8% and a range from 3.2% to 16.8%, while Firm Risk has a mean of 
7.2% and a range from 3.8% to 12.6%.  Market Beta (Systematic Risk) has a mean of 
0.51, and a range from 0.1 to 1.34. 
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     The 13-year period reflects a complete economic cycle where Real GDP Growth is as 
high as 4.8% in 1999 and as low as -2.7% in 2009, with an average growth of 2.45 for the 
entire period. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for a sample of 146 BHCs over the period 1997-2009 
 
Source:  FRY9-C Reports, FactSet LionsShare, SEC Reports 
 
 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation
Min Max
Assets ($ In millions) 1,898          37,599         187,983         162         2,224,539         
ROA 1,898          1.0% 0.5% -0.2% 1.7%
ROE 1,898          11.4% 5.3% -2.1% 19.3%
Z-Score 1,898          75.5             2.6                 10.8        148.4                
SDROA 1,898          0.4% 0.3% 0.1% 3.0%
SDROE 1,898          4.8% 7.8% 1.2% 20.1%
Total Risk 1,898          7.8% 3.7% 3.2% 16.8%
Systematic Risk 1,898          0.51             0.41               0.14        1.34                  
Firm Risk 1,898          7.2% 2.4% 3.8% 12.6%
Risk Index 1,898          5.5               1.6                 1.2          10.0                  
Insider Ownership 1,898          5.8% 8.7% 0.1% 57.9%
Blockholder Ownership 1,898          13.6% 14.6% 0.0% 84.2%
Outside Director 1,898          84.1% 9.4% 28.0% 96.0%
Size 1,898          15.1             1.7                 12.0        21.5                  
Leverage 1,898          11.6             2.3                 8.1          16.9                  
Growth 1,898          7.2% 5.6% -14.7% 47.3%
Concentration 1,898          53.5% 13.5% 32.1% 79.0%
Non Interest Income 1,898          18.8% 9.0% 5.9% 39.7%
Net Charge Offs 1,898          0.4% 0.4% 0.0% 1.6%
Cost of Funds 1,898          3.7% 1.4% 1.4% 6.5%
Ineffeciency 1,898          43.1% 8.6% 28.9% 60.6%
Real GDP Growth 1,898          2.3% 2.2% -3.5% 4.8%
Board Size 1,898          13 4 4 31
Outside Directors 1,898          10 4 2 26
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for a sample of 146 BHCs over the period 1997-2009 
 
Source: FRY9-C Reports, FactSet LionsShare, SEC Reports 
 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Assets ($ In millions) 12,350        19,052          20,509        24,992        27,137        29,164        31,973        40,211        43,214        49,232        56,503        66,977        67,467        
ROA 1.2% 1.1% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 0.9% 0.5% 0.3%
ROE 13.1% 12.9% 14.1% 12.9% 12.2% 13.3% 12.8% 12.5% 13.0% 12.3% 10.1% 5.3% 3.5%
Z-Score 85               85                 81               92               86               75               77               95               94               96               71               34               26               
SDROA 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.5% 0.7%
SDROE 4.1% 3.9% 4.1% 4.1% 4.2% 4.1% 4.2% 4.3% 4.4% 3.9% 3.9% 5.3% 12.1%
Total Risk 7% 9% 7% 10% 8% 7% 6% 5% 5% 5% 6% 12% 14%
Systematic Risk 0.41            0.64              0.55            0.41            0.15            0.25            0.38            0.46            0.84            0.77            0.70            0.35            0.77            
Firm Risk 6% 7% 8% 8% 9% 8% 7% 6% 5% 5% 5% 9% 11%
Risk Index 5.1              5.7                5.6              5.9              5.5              5.4              5.1              4.8              5.0              4.4              5.0              6.4              7.7              
Insider Ownership 6.3% 6.1% 6.2% 6.3% 6.0% 5.7% 5.9% 5.8% 5.7% 5.6% 5.7% 5.5% 5.1%
Blockholder Ownership 13.8% 13.3% 12.4% 12.2% 11.8% 11.9% 11.9% 12.5% 13.8% 14.8% 15.8% 16.2% 16.3%
Outside Director 83.0% 83.3% 84.3% 83.7% 80.9% 84.1% 83.7% 84.3% 85.0% 84.8% 85.3% 85.3% 85.4%
Size (Log of Assets) 14.4            14.6              14.7            14.8            14.9            15.0            15.1            15.2            15.3            15.4            15.5            15.5            15.6            
Leverage 11.4            11.6              12.5            12.1            11.9            11.6            11.7            11.4            11.6            11.3            11.2            11.2            11.3            
Growth 7.6% 8.3% 6.3% 8.7% 10.4% 8.7% 7.3% 6.3% 6.5% 7.0% 5.0% 5.6% 6.4%
Concentration 48.2% 48.7% 50.6% 50.1% 51.3% 52.3% 52.9% 54.6% 55.7% 56.8% 57.2% 57.7% 58.9%
Non Interest Income 14.3% 15.4% 16.2% 15.9% 17.8% 20.4% 22.7% 22.6% 20.5% 18.8% 18.3% 19.4% 22.0%
Net Charge Offs 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.7% 1.1%
Cost of Funds 5.0% 5.0% 4.7% 5.3% 4.7% 3.1% 2.4% 2.1% 2.8% 3.7% 4.1% 3.0% 2.3%
Inefficiency 38.1% 38.7% 39.2% 37.0% 39.8% 44.6% 48.2% 49.1% 44.8% 40.9% 40.5% 46.5% 52.2%
Real GDP Growth 4.5% 4.4% 4.8% 4.1% 1.1% 1.8% 2.5% 3.5% 3.1% 2.7% 1.9% -0.3% -3.5%
Board Size 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 12 13 12 12
Outside Directors 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 10 10 10
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5.1.1 BHC Balance Sheet Analysis 1997-2009 
 
     To perform the analysis at the peer group level, BHCs are grouped as large, medium 
and small based on total book assets. Large banks have greater than $100B in book 
assets; medium banks have book assets between $10B and $100B; and, small banks have 
book assets lower than $10B. Throughout the 13-year period of analysis, the U.S Banking 
Industry has shifted away from traditional banking activities towards activities that 
generate more fee income and other types of non-interest revenue. This shift is prevalent 
in large BHCs, where over 37% of the interest share is derived from non-interest earnings 
activities in the year 2009 (Table 5). Consistent with the banking regulatory changes, in 
the case of medium and small BHCs, the largest shift occurs in the years following the 
passage of the GLBA (Tables 6 and 7). This change is not as evident in large BHCs 
probably because many of them were already conducting securities activities before 1999 
authorized by Section 20 exemptions. 
 
     Aside from expansion into more nontraditional activities, BHCs have become better 
capitalized as reflected by an increase in the core capital and Tier1 regulatory capital 
ratios (Tables 5 and 6). The shift from traditional banking activities, such as deposits and 
loans, is reflected by lower Loans to Capital and Deposits to Capital ratios (Tables 5 and 
6). 
 
     Credit quality remained stable up until the sub-prime financial crisis of 2007, and it 
carried over until 2009. The banking industry apparently anticipating the deterioration of 
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their loan portfolios doubled the provisions for loan losses in 2007. Consistent with 
expectations, higher Net Charge Offs ratios prevailed in the industry following the two 
years, through 2009. 
 
     The liquidity and funding structure for medium and small BHCs considerably differs 
from their large BHC counterparts. Large BHCs have higher Loan to Deposit ratios, 
which indicates lower liquidity and higher reliability on borrowed funds that are more 
expensive than deposits. 
 
     Off-balance sheet activities, measured as the ratio of notional principal amount to total 
assets, has oscillated between 13% and 18% in large BHCs, indicative of their superior 
derivative use for hedging purposes. The level of off-balance sheet activity of medium 
sized BHCs has ranged between 6-8%, while the highest level of off-balance sheet 
activity for Small BHCs was in 2006 and 2008, with a ratio of 2%. 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for a sample of 11 Large BHCs over the period 1997-2009 (Assets> $ 100B) 
Source: FRY9-C Reports, FactSet LionsShare, SEC Reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Assets ($In millions) 122,342 204,644 219,549 273,757 297,945 320,414 350,921 453,484 486,126 559,777 648,149 780,651 787,826 
Capital 
Core Capital Ratio (Equity/Assets) 7.8% 8.0% 7.8% 8.2% 8.2% 8.4% 8.4% 9.4% 9.0% 9.3% 8.9% 9.3% 10.1%
Loans to Capital 7.9 7.5 7.5 7.1 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.0 6.3 6.1 6.6 6.2 5.5
Deposits to Capital 8.6 8.1 8.2 7.6 8.3 8.3 8.3 7.4 7.7 7.5 8.1 7.5 7.2
Tier1 Capital Ratio 9.3% 9.4% 9.3% 9.3% 9.2% 9.4% 9.5% 9.2% 8.7% 9.2% 8.3% 10.9% 11.8%
Asset Quality 
Net Charge Offs 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 1.1% 1.6%
Loan Loss Provisions 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 1.0% 0.9% 0.6% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.8% 1.6% 2.0%
Liquidity and Funding 
Loans to Deposits 130% 178% 184% 217% 215% 228% 244% 303% 319% 370% 430% 530% 509%
Loans to Assets 63.0% 62.1% 60.9% 62.1% 59.2% 58.7% 58.1% 59.0% 59.3% 60.0% 60.1% 59.9% 58.1%
Transaction Accounts to Assets 42.3% 42.5% 41.7% 43.4% 45.0% 46.5% 46.5% 47.4% 47.5% 48.1% 45.4% 46.9% 50.1%
Non-Transaction Accounts to Assets 15.6% 14.6% 11.8% 10.9% 10.6% 9.2% 8.5% 8.3% 7.7% 7.2% 7.2% 7.8% 7.7%
Off Balance Sheet
Derivatives to Total Assets 13.9% 15.8% 14.5% 13.3% 13.0% 16.2% 15.0% 14.9% 16.3% 15.2% 15.6% 17.6% 18.2%
Income Structure
Interest Income 75.3% 72.4% 69.7% 70.3% 70.0% 66.1% 63.6% 63.5% 65.6% 67.1% 69.7% 70.7% 62.3%
Non Interest Income 24.7% 27.6% 30.3% 29.7% 30.0% 33.9% 36.4% 36.5% 34.4% 32.9% 30.3% 29.3% 37.7%
Trading Revenue 1.3% 1.5% 1.6% 1.8% 2.0% 1.8% 1.7% 1.8% 1.9% 1.9% 1.2% 0.8% 2.0%
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for a sample of 29 Medium BHCs over the period 1997-2009 ($10B < Assets <= $100B)  
 
Source: FRY9-C Reports, FactSet LionsShare, SEC Reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Assets ($In millions) 11,679   13,339   14,436   15,938   16,941   17,996   19,852   21,691   23,649   25,185   27,498   28,973   28,358   
Capital 
Core Capital Ratio (Equity/Assets) 8.3% 8.3% 8.1% 8.4% 8.8% 9.0% 9.1% 9.2% 9.2% 9.5% 9.5% 10.3% 10.1%
Loans to Capital 7.9 8.0 8.3 8.2 7.6 7.4 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.2 7.3 6.6 6.4
Deposits to Capital 8.9 8.9 8.7 8.8 8.5 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.3 8.0 7.8 7.3 7.8
Tier1 Capital Ratio 11.1% 10.5% 10.0% 10.0% 10.5% 10.8% 10.8% 10.7% 10.4% 10.1% 9.6% 11.4% 12.2%
Asset Quality 
Net Charge Offs 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.8% 1.3%
Loan Loss Provisions 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 1.2% 1.6%
Liquidity and Funding 
Loans to Deposits 222.5% 136.3% 172.4% 93.5% 90.3% 89.0% 87.7% 90.6% 91.4% 94.3% 98.3% 98.4% 87.6%
Loans to Assets 64.8% 65.7% 67.0% 67.4% 65.1% 64.0% 62.3% 64.3% 65.6% 67.2% 68.0% 68.0% 64.9%
Transaction Accounts to Assets 56.9% 56.9% 56.1% 57.5% 57.2% 57.8% 57.1% 57.5% 59.0% 59.0% 57.0% 57.0% 60.7%
Non-Transaction Accounts to Assets 17.3% 16.0% 14.0% 13.3% 13.5% 12.3% 12.4% 11.3% 10.6% 9.3% 8.8% 9.3% 10.3%
Off Balance Sheet
Derivatives to Total Assets 6.6% 6.2% 6.4% 6.2% 6.2% 6.6% 7.0% 7.3% 7.9% 7.7% 7.6% 8.3% 7.4%
Income Structure
Interest Income 82.1% 81.3% 79.8% 79.5% 77.0% 74.5% 72.2% 72.6% 74.8% 77.0% 78.3% 76.2% 73.7%
Non Interest Income 17.9% 18.7% 20.2% 20.5% 23.0% 25.5% 27.8% 27.4% 25.2% 23.0% 21.7% 23.8% 26.3%
Trading Revenue 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 1.2%
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for a sample of 106 Small BHCs over the period 1997-2009 (Assets < $10B) 
Source:  FRY9-C Reports, FactSet LionsShare, SEC Reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Assets ($In millions) 1,120     1,356     1,515     1,654     1,824     1,995     2,190     2,390     2,604     2,829     3,041     3,315     3,412     
Capital 
Core Capital Ratio (Equity/Assets) 9.5% 9.2% 8.5% 8.7% 8.7% 8.9% 8.8% 8.9% 8.8% 9.1% 9.1% 9.0% 9.0%
Loans to Capital 6.9 7.1 8.0 7.9 7.7 7.4 7.4 7.6 7.9 7.8 7.9 8.1 7.9
Deposits to Capital 8.1 8.6 9.1 9.0 8.9 8.7 8.8 8.7 8.9 8.7 8.5 8.6 9.1
Tier1 Capital Ratio 13.8% 13.1% 12.4% 12.1% 12.1% 12.2% 12.3% 11.9% 11.6% 11.7% 11.1% 11.4% 12.0%
Asset Quality 
Net Charge Offs 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.6% 1.1%
Loan Loss Provisions 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 1.0% 1.5%
Liquidity and Funding 
Loans to Deposits 106.2% 97.8% 107.4% 103.5% 111.0% 101.2% 85.7% 88.6% 89.5% 90.1% 94.6% 96.0% 87.0%
Loans to Assets 63.6% 62.8% 65.2% 66.4% 65.9% 64.6% 64.4% 66.5% 67.6% 68.8% 70.2% 70.6% 67.5%
Transaction Accounts to Assets 59.0% 58.4% 58.3% 60.8% 60.4% 60.1% 58.8% 59.6% 61.4% 63.6% 62.5% 62.7% 65.3%
Non-Transaction Accounts to Assets 19.6% 19.8% 17.9% 16.2% 16.5% 16.1% 16.2% 15.5% 14.5% 13.2% 12.0% 11.2% 11.9%
Off Balance Sheet
Derivatives to Total Assets 1.1% 1.3% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 1.3% 1.5% 1.7% 2.0% 1.9% 2.0% 1.7%
Income Structure
Interest Income 87.8% 86.8% 86.3% 86.8% 84.9% 82.4% 80.1% 80.1% 82.2% 83.9% 83.9% 82.9% 80.8%
Non Interest Income 12.2% 13.2% 13.7% 13.2% 15.1% 17.6% 19.9% 19.9% 17.8% 16.1% 16.1% 17.1% 19.2%
Trading Revenue 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
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     Table 8 reports the mean differences for selected financial ratios for periods before 
and after the passage of GLBA. For both large and medium BHCs, the Core Capital ratio 
is significantly higher after the passage of the Act, while the ratio of Loans to Capital 
ratio is significantly lower. The combination of these two capital ratios shows that as 
banks expanded into nontraditional activities greater capital standards followed and as 
banks expanded into security and underwriting activities, a shift from traditional banking 
activities to non traditional banking activities followed. 
 
     Credit risk is higher after the passage of GLBA, as reflected by a positive and 
significant difference for Net Charge Offs and Loan Loss Provisions ratios, regardless of 
bank size. Turning into the liquidity and funding structure, large banks experienced a 
significant increase in liquidity risk with higher Total Loans to Deposits ratios, and 
higher reliability on borrowed funds. Liquidity risk in medium and small size banks is 
lower after the passage of the Act as reflected by significantly lower Total Loans to 
Deposits Ratios. The Transaction Accounts to Assets ratio and Non-transaction Accounts 
to Assets ratio show that BHCs continued to favor relatively cheaper sources of funds. 
 
     Even though Off-balance sheet ratios are higher after the passage of the Act, the 
difference is not significant in the peer group analysis. The ratios confirm higher 
derivative activity in large banks followed by medium sized banks, while derivative 
activity has been marginal in small banks. The significant differences in the income 
structure as measured by the ratios of Interest and Non-Interest Income to Total Income 
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reflect the shifts from deregulation of the banking industry and BHCs expansion into 
nontraditional activities after the implementation of the Act. 
 
Table 8: Mean BHCs Financial Ratios before and after the passage of the GLBA, over the 
entire period 
 
 
5.2 Univariate Means Analysis 
 
     The risk implications that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 presented in the 
banking sector are shown in the following sections.  
 
5.2.1 Regulation induced risk-taking hypothesis 
     The regulation induced risk-taking hypotheses states: 
 
     H01:  The risk profile of BHCs did not change after the passage of the GLBA in 1999.  
     Ha1:  The risk profile of BHCs has changed after the passage of the GLBA in 1999.  
Capital 
Core Capital Ratio (Equity/Assets) 7.8% 8.9% 1.1% ** 8.2% 9.3% 1.1% ** 9.1% 8.9% -0.1%  
Loans to Capital 7.6             6.4             -1.29 ** 8.1              7.2              -0.90 ** 7.3             7.8             0.4     **
Deposits to Capital 8.3 7.8 -0.49  8.8 8.1 -0.66 ** 8.6 8.8 0.2      
Tier1 Capital Ratio 9.3% 9.6% 0.2%  10.5% 10.7% 0.1%  13.1% 11.8% -1.3% **
Asset Quality 
Net Charge Offs 0.6% 0.7% 0.2%  0.3% 0.5% 0.2% ** 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% **
Loan Loss Provision 0.6% 0.9% 0.3% ** 0.4% 0.6% 0.2% ** 0.3% 0.5% 0.2% **
Liquidity and Funding 
Loans to Deposits 164% 337% 172% ** 177% 92% -85% ** 104% 95% -9.1% **
Loans to Assets 62.0% 59.5% -2.6% ** 65.8% 65.7% -0.2%  63.9% 67.3% 3.4% **
Transaction Accounts to Assets 42.2% 46.7% 4.5% ** 56.7% 58.0% 1.3%  58.6% 61.5% 2.9% **
Non-Transaction Accounts to Assets 14.0% 8.5% -5.5% ** 15.8% 11.1% -4.7% ** 19.1% 14.3% -4.8% **
Off Balance Sheet
Derivatives to Total Assets 14.7% 15.5% 0.8%  6.4% 7.2% 0.9%  1.1% 1.5% 0.4%  
Income Structure
Interest Income 72.5% 66.9% -5.6% ** 81.1% 75.6% -5.5% ** 87.0% 82.8% -4.2% **
Non Interest Income 27.5% 33.1% 5.6% ** 18.9% 24.4% 5.5% ** 13.0% 17.2% 4.2% **
Trading Revenue 1.5% 1.7% 0.2%  0.8% 1.0% 0.2%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  
** Significant at the 5% 
Financial Ratios
Before               
(1997-1999)
After             
(2000-2009)
Difference Before               
(1997-1999)(After-Before) (After-Before) (After-Before)
Large Medium Small
After             
(2000-2009)
Difference
 (Assets  between $10$-$100B) (Assets >$100B)  (Assets < $10B)
Before               
(1997-1999)
After             
(2000-2009)
Difference
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     Table 9 shows the mean difference by risk measure for the surviving BHC sample and 
the full sample (surviving and non-surviving BHCs). Results for the surviving sample 
(Panel A) indicate that the risk profile in BHCs changed in the post-GLBA period, with 
BHCs showing higher risk profiles after the passage of the Act. By including the non-
surviving banks (Panel B), the initial significant variables remain unchanged; and in 
addition, mean Total and Systematic Risk differences become significant.  
  
 
Table 9: Mean Differences in BHC Risk Before and After the Passage of the GLBA, over 
the entire period 
 
 
 
     Table 10 shows results by peer group for verifying the regulation induced risk-taking 
hypothesis. BHCs are grouped as large, medium and small based on total book assets. 
Large banks have greater than $100B in book assets; medium banks have book assets 
between $100B and $10B; and, small banks have book assets lower than $10B. The 
results confirm the initial findings that the risk profile of BHCs did change after the 
passage of the GLBA in 1999, albeit the statistical significance of risk measures is 
somewhat different across peer groups. Large and Medium BHCs results indicate that 
market risk measures tend to be lower after the passage of the GLBA, while book risk 
measures tend to be higher. A possible explanation for the differing effects between 
Panel A: Surviving  BHCs Panel B: Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs 
Before After Before After
(1997-1999) (2000-2009) (1997-1999) (2000-2009)
(n) 438 1460 (n) 587 1770
Z-Score 4.59           4.24           -0.35 *** Z-Score 4.51      4.24      -0.27 ***
SDROA 0.36% 0.40% 0.04% *** SDROA 0.38% 0.41% 0.03% **
SDROE 4.04% 5.05% 1.01% *** SDROE 4.15% 5.00% 0.85% ***
Total Risk 7.91% 7.77% -0.14% Total Risk 8.06% 7.65% -0.41% ***
Systematic Risk 0.53 0.51 -0.03 Systematic Risk 0.56 0.49 -0.07 ***
Firm Risk 6.91% 7.28% 0.4% *** Firm Risk 7.00% 7.29% 0.29% ***
Risk Index 5.46           5.50           0.05     Risk Index 5.59      5.50      -0.09
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Difference
After-Before After-Before
Difference
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market based risk and book based risk measures can be attributed to the information 
previously captured in the stock price returns. Prior to the passage of the Act, a series of 
announcements were made before its enacting, thus the market could have incorporated 
this information in the stock price well before BHCs were allowed to expand into 
nontraditional banking activities. 
 
     Table 10 indicates  that after the passage of  GLBA, book risk measures (Insolvency 
Risk and SDROA) have increased for BHCs regardless of bank size, while market risk 
measures (Total Risk and Systematic Risk) have turned significantly lower for large and 
medium BHCs (Panels A,B,C and D).  SDROE and Firm Risk are only significantly 
different for small BHCs between the two periods.  
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Table 10: Mean BHC Risk Before and After the Passage of the GLBA Surviving and 
Non-surviving by Large, Medium and Small BHCs, over the entire period 
 
     An additional comparison of the risk measures is made between banks that did not 
diversify into nontraditional banking activities and those that did, choosing 2004 as the 
reference year given that a complete breakdown of Investment Banking and Insurance 
Activities are publicly available only after 2003. The ratio of Investment Banking (IB) to 
Total Income is used to examine the differences in risk profile of banks due to expansion 
into nontraditional banking activities. BHCs are classified as Universal Banks if 
Investment Banking Income is greater than zero, and BHCs are classified as Traditional 
Banks if Investment Banking is equal to zero after 2004. 
Panel A: Large Surviving  BHCs Panel B: Large Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
Before After Before After
(1997-1999) (2000-2009) (1997-1999) (2000-2009)
(n) 33 110 (n) 42 130
Z-Score 4.15            3.85            -0.31 * Z-Score 4.24      3.78      -0.46 ***
SDROA 0.38% 0.44% 0.05% *** SDROA 0.39% 0.44% 0.05% *
SDROE 5.04% 5.04% 0.00% SDROE 5.07% 5.11% 0.04%
Total Risk 9.40% 7.92% -1.48% * Total Risk 9.24% 7.74% -1.50% **
Systematic Risk 1.12 0.66 -0.46 *** Systematic Risk 1.12 0.66 -0.46 ***
Firm Risk 6.12% 6.95% 0.83% Firm Risk 5.95% 6.96% 1.01%
Risk Index 6.98            6.31            -0.68 ** Risk Index 6.72      6.38      -0.34
Panel C: Medium Surviving  BHCs Panel D: Medium Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
Before After Before After
(1997-1999) (2000-2009) (1997-1999) (2000-2009)
(n) 87 290 (n) 108 333
Z-Score 4.59            4.22            -0.37 *** Z-Score 4.55      4.26      -0.29 ***
SDROA 0.36% 0.42% 0.06% ** SDROA 0.37% 0.41% 0.04% *
SDROE 4.35% 4.64% 0.29% SDROE 4.45% 4.68% 0.23%
Total Risk 8.40% 7.39% -1.01% ** Total Risk 8.46% 7.25% -1.21% **
Systematic Risk 0.85 0.57 -0.28 *** Systematic Risk 0.86 0.56 -0.30 ***
Firm Risk 6.48% 6.90% 0.42% Firm Risk 6.54% 6.86% 0.32%
Risk Index 5.94            5.62            -0.32 Risk Index 6.01      5.56      -0.45 ***
Panel E: Small Surviving  BHCs Panel F: Small Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
Before After Before After
(1997-1999) (2000-2009) (1997-1999) (2000-2009)
(n) 318 1060 (n) 437 1307
Z-Score 4.64            4.29            -0.35 *** Z-Score 4.53      4.28      -0.24 ***
SDROA 0.36% 0.39% 0.04% ** SDROA 0.38% 0.41% 0.03%
SDROE 3.86% 5.16% 1.30% ** SDROE 3.99% 5.07% 1.08% **
Total Risk 7.62% 7.86% 0.24% Total Risk 7.85% 7.75% -0.10%
Systematic Risk 0.39 0.48 0.09 Systematic Risk 0.44 0.46 0.02
Firm Risk 7.11% 7.42% 0.31% *** Firm Risk 7.21% 7.44% 0.23% *
Risk Index 5.16            5.38            0.22         ** Risk Index 5.38      5.40      0.02        
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Difference Difference
Difference Difference
After-Before After-Before
After-Before After-Before
Difference Difference
After-Before After-Before
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     Results remain unchanged when the risk profile of Universal BHCs are examined 
(Panel A and B of Table 11). However, statistical significance of the mean differences for 
Traditional banks is reduced, especially when considering the full sample. Panels E and F 
in Table 11 reveal a significant increase in the Systematic Risk for Universal BHCs 
relative to Traditional BHCs after the Passage of the Act. 
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Table 11: Mean Differences in BHC Risk Before and After the Passage of the GLBA 
Universal and Traditional BHCs, over the entire period 
 
 
     To ensure that the results are not impacted by the crisis period, the univariate means 
test is performed excluding years 2007 through 2009. Results in Table 12 show that the 
risk profiles of BHCs changed based on the mean differences for 5 out of the 7 risk 
measures considered, closely resembling the results covering the entire period.  While the 
Insolvency Risk and SDROA are higher after the passage of the GLBA, the mean 
Table 7
Panel A: Universal Surviving  BHCs Panel B: Universal Surviving and Non-surviving  BHCs 
(BHCs with Investment Banking share >0 ) (BHCs with Investment Banking share >0 )
Before After Before After
(1997-1999) (2000-2009) (1997-1999) (2000-2009)
(n) 387 1290 (n) 500 1517
Z-Score 4.60            4.25            -0.35 *** Z-Score 4.52      4.23      -0.28 ***
SDROA 0.36% 0.40% 0.04% *** SDROA 0.38% 0.41% 0.03% **
SDROE 4.09% 4.91% 0.82% *** SDROE 4.20% 4.93% 0.73% ***
Total Risk 7.93% 7.77% -0.16% Total Risk 8.11% 7.68% -0.43% ***
Systematic Risk 0.55 0.52 -3.26% Systematic Risk 0.57 0.50 -6.73% ***
Firm Risk 6.86% 7.24% 0.38% *** Firm Risk 6.98% 7.27% 0.29% ***
Risk Index 5.48            5.50            0.02         Risk Index 5.62      5.53      -0.09
Panel C: Traditional Surviving  BHCs Panel D: Traditional Surviving and Non-surviving  BHCs
(BHCs with Investment Banking  share = 0) (BHCs with Investment Banking share = 0)
Before After Before After
(1997-1999) (2000-2009) (1997-1999) (2000-2009)
(n) 51 170 (n) 87 253
Z-Score 4.51            4.17            -0.34 *** Z-Score 4.48      4.29      -0.19
SDROA 0.37% 0.43% 0.07% *** SDROA 0.36% 0.39% 0.04%
SDROE 3.68% 6.11% 2.43% *** SDROE 3.89% 5.40% 1.51% *
Total Risk 7.73% 7.83% 0.10% Total Risk 7.80% 7.51% -0.29%
Systematic Risk 0.43 0.44 0.01 Systematic Risk 0.53 0.45 -0.08
Firm Risk 7.28% 7.58% 0.30% Firm Risk 7.10% 7.40% 0.30%
Risk Index 5.28            5.53            0.24         Risk Index 5.43      5.35      -0.09
Panel E: Traditional  and Universal Surviving  BHCs Panel F: Traditional and Universal Surviving and Non-surviving  BHCs
After After After After
Universal Traditional Universal Traditional
(n) 1290 170 (n) 1517 253
Z-Score 4.25 4.17 0.08 Z-Score 4.23 4.29 -0.06
SDROA 0.40% 0.43% -0.04% SDROA 0.41% 0.39% 0.02%
SDROE 4.91% 6.11% -1.20% SDROE 4.93% 5.40% -0.47%
Total Risk 7.77% 7.83% -0.06% Total Risk 7.68% 7.51% 0.17%
Systematic Risk 0.52 0.44 0.07 ** Systematic Risk 0.50 0.45 0.05 ***
Firm Risk 7.24% 7.58% -0.34% Firm Risk 7.27% 7.40% -0.13%
Risk Index 5.50            5.53            -0.03 Risk Index 5.53      5.35      0.18
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Difference
After-Before
Difference
After-Before
Difference
After-Before
Difference
After-Before
Difference Difference
Universal-Traditional Universal-Traditional
67 
 
differences in Total Risk, Systematic Risk and the Risk Index show that the risk in BHCs 
became lower after the passage of the Act. 
Table 12: Mean Differences in BHC Risk Before and After the Passage of the GLBA, 
1997-2006 (Excluding the 2007-2009 crisis period)   
 
 
 
5.2.2 Managerial Risk Incentives 
 
     The Managerial Risk Incentives Hypothesis states:  
     H02: Banks’ risk-taking behavior does not differ according to levels of insider stock 
ownership. 
     Ha2:  Banks’ risk-taking behavior differs according to levels of insider stock 
ownership. 
     And, 
     H03: For a given level of insider ownership structure, banks’ risk-taking behavior 
does not differ according to the regulatory environment. 
     Ha3:  For a given level of insider ownership structure, banks’ risk-taking behavior 
differs according to the regulatory environment. 
 
Panel A: Surviving  BHCs Panel B: Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
Before After Before After
(1997-1999) (2000-2006) (1997-1999) (2000-2006)
(n) 438 1022 (n) 587 1319
Z-Score 4.59      4.49      -0.11 ** Z-Score 4.51      4.44      -0.07 ***
SDROA 0.36% 0.40% 0.04% * SDROA 0.38% 0.41% 0.03% **
SDROE 4.04% 4.17% 0.13% SDROE 4.15% 4.26% 0.11%
Total Risk 7.91% 6.48% -1.43% * Total Risk 8.06% 6.58% -1.48% *
Systematic Risk 0.53 0.47 -0.07 * Systematic Risk 0.56 0.45 -0.11 *
Firm Risk 6.91% 6.86% -0.1% Firm Risk 7.00% 6.98% -0.02%
Risk Index 5.46      5.14      -0.32 * Risk Index 5.59      5.21      -0.38 *
* Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 10%
DifferenceDifference
After-Before After-Before
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     Insider Ownership is classified into three levels: low, medium, and high, based on the 
33
rd
 percentile distribution of BHC Insider Ownership, where the 33
rd
 percentile is 1.2%, 
the 66
th
 percentile is 4.4% and the 100
th
 percentile is 57.9%. Table 13 shows the means of 
all risk measures by the three levels for the surviving sample and the full sample 
(surviving and non-surviving), respectively. 
 
Table 13: Summary of Risk Measures by levels of Insider Ownership, over the entire 
period 
  
      
     Table 14 shows the differences in mean risk measures shown in Table 13. Results in 
Table 14 indicate that for a given regulatory environment, bank risk-taking behavior 
differs according to managerial stock ownership only for SDROA, Systematic Risk and 
the Risk Index. Based on the sign of the difference, BHCs with high levels of Insider 
Ownership have lower risk than their counterparts with medium and low levels of 
concentration. The direction of the differences indicates that bank managers in BHCs 
with high ownership concentration have the incentive to reduce risk to protect their non-
diversifiable risk, while bank managers in BHCs with medium and lower levels of stock 
Panel A: Surviving BHCs
High (n=634) 4.35        0.36% 4.66% 7.72% 0.48 7.25% 5.29      
Medium (n=624) 4.36        0.40% 5.08% 7.85% 0.50 7.28% 5.47      
Low (n=640) 4.27        0.41% 4.72% 7.85% 0.56 7.05% 5.70      
Panel B: Surviving and Non Surviving BHCs
High (n=800) 4.33        0.36% 4.60% 7.73% 0.48 7.33% 5.38      
Medium (n=779) 4.35        0.44% 5.04% 7.76% 0.48 7.28% 5.47      
Low (n=778) 4.24        0.41% 4.73% 7.78% 0.57 7.04% 5.74      
Risk 
Index
Firm 
Risk
Z-Score
Z-Score SDROA SDROE
Total 
Risk
Systematic 
Risk
SDROA SDROE
Total 
Risk
Systematic 
Risk
Firm 
Risk
Risk 
Index
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ownership seem to be more closely aligned with those of stockholders, and are likely 
engage in higher risk activities to maximize their value of their call option. 
 
Table 14: Mean Differences in BHC Risk according to levels of Insider Ownership, over 
the entire period 
 
 
     Table 15 shows the mean difference in risk measures among levels of Insider 
Ownership by peer groups. Large BHCs with low levels of Insider Ownership are 
associated with higher risk measures. The frequency of significant differences in means 
increases when looking at the medium size peer group.  The sign of the differences are 
also in line with previous findings that BHCs with lower inside ownership concentration 
have a higher risk profile than their counterparts with higher levels of ownership 
concentration. On the other hand, results for BHCs in the small peer group do not provide 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis, indicating that for a given regulatory environment, 
bank risk-taking behavior in small BHCs does not differ according to managerial stock 
ownership levels. 
 
Panel A: Surviving BHCs
High - Medium -0.01 -0.04% ***-0.41% -0.13% -0.02 -0.03% -0.18
High - Low 0.08 -0.04% ***-0.05% -0.13% -0.08 ** 0.20% -0.41 **
Medium - Low 0.08 -0.01% 0.36% 0.00% -0.06 ** 0.24% -0.23 **
Panel B: Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
High - Medium -0.02 -0.08% ***-0.44% -0.04% 0.00 0.05% -0.09
High - Low 0.09 -0.04% ***-0.14% -0.05% -0.09 ** 0.30% -0.36 **
Medium - Low 0.11 0.03% 0.30% -0.01% -0.09 ** 0.25% -0.27 **
**Significance at 5% level #
Risk 
Index
Z-Score SDROA SDROE Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
 Firm 
Risk 
Risk 
Index
Z-Score SDROA SDROE Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
 Firm 
Risk 
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Table 15: Mean Differences in BHC Risk according to levels of Insider Ownership by 
Large, Medium and Small BHCs, for the entire period 
 
 
 
     To test the second part of the Managerial Risk Incentive hypothesis, the mean of each 
risk measure is calculated by the defined levels of ownership concentration considering 
the passage of the GLBA (Table 16). 
Panel A: Large Surviving BHCs
High - Medium -0.29 0.05% 1.05% 1.19% 0.25 -0.82% 0.46 a
High - Low 0.16 0.01% 0.23% -0.16% 0.05 -1.33% -0.65 a
Medium - Low 0.45 *** -0.04% -0.82% *** -1.35% -0.19 -0.51% -1.10 ***a
Panel B: Large Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
High - Medium -0.29 0.05% 1.05% 1.19% 0.25 -0.82% 0.46
High - Low 0.17 0.01% 0.20% 0.10% 0.05 -1.23% -0.59
Medium - Low 0.46 *** -0.04% -0.85% *** -1.09% -0.20 -0.41% -1.05 ***a
Panel C: Medium Surviving BHCs
High - Medium 0.27 -0.05% -0.61% -1.14% 0.00 -0.93% *** -0.79 ***a
High - Low 0.41 *** -0.13% *** -1.40% *** -1.26% *** -0.14 *** -0.77% -1.28 ***a
Medium - Low 0.14 -0.08% -0.80% *** -0.12% -0.15 *** 0.16% -0.49 ***a
Panel D: Medium Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
High - Medium 0.31 *** -0.06% -0.77% *** -1.02% -0.02 -0.81% *** -0.85 ***a
High - Low 0.38 *** -0.12% *** -1.15% *** -0.91% -0.13 *** -0.60% -1.09 ***a
Medium - Low 0.07 -0.06% *** -0.38% 0.11% -0.11 *** 0.21% -0.24
Panel E: Small Surviving BHCs
High - Medium -0.07 -0.04% -0.48% 0.04% -0.01 0.12% -0.04
High - Low -0.12 -0.01% 0.40% 0.31% 0.01 0.40% *** 0.08
Medium - Low -0.05 0.03% 0.88% 0.26% 0.02 0.28% 0.12
Panel F: Small Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
High - Medium -0.08 -0.08% *** -0.46% 0.10% 0.01 0.17% 0.06
High - Low -0.09 -0.01% 0.23% 0.22% 0.01 0.38% *** 0.09
Medium - Low 0.00 0.07% *** 0.69% 0.12% 0.00 0.22% 0.02
**Significance at 5% level
Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
 Firm Risk 
Risk 
Index
Risk 
Index
 Firm Risk Z-Score SDROA SDROE Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
Z-Score SDROA
Z-Score SDROA SDROE
SDROE
Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
 Firm Risk 
Z-Score SDROA SDROE Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
 Firm Risk 
Risk 
Index
Risk 
Index
Risk 
Index
Risk 
Index
Z-Score SDROA SDROE Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
 Firm Risk 
Z-Score SDROA SDROE Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
 Firm Risk 
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Table 16: Summary of Mean BHC Risk Measures according to levels of Insider 
Ownership Before and After the Passage of the GLBA, over the entire period 
 
 
     Table 17 shows the mean differences by ownership level for periods before and after 
the passage of the Act. The results indicate that except for the Insolvency Risk, bank risk-
taking behavior did not differ according to the regulatory environment for any of the 
ownership levels. In case of Insolvency Risk, for the surviving BHCs, the risk has 
increased during the post GLBA period for the BHCs with high and low Insider 
Ownership levels. For the entire sample, the mean difference in Insolvency Risk is 
significant only for low levels of Insider Ownership. The lack of significance in the 
results may be explained by managers’ behavior complying with the pre-existing 
regulations such as the issuance of prompt corrective actions when financial or 
managerial weakness surfaces. The results remain unchanged when doing the comparison 
by peer group (Table 18).  
 
 
Panel A: Surviving BHCs 
Z Score SDROA SDROE
Total 
Risk
Systematic 
Risk
Firm 
Risk
Risk 
Index
Pre GLBA High Level (n=156 ) 4.59      0.34% 3.82% 7.42% 0.45 6.91% 5.07
Pre GLBA Medium Level (n=138) 4.54      0.37% 4.11% 8.23% 0.57 7.15% 5.70
Pre GLBA Low Level (n=144 ) 4.65      0.37% 4.23% 8.13% 0.59 6.69% 5.64
Post GLBA High Level (n=478 ) 4.27      0.37% 4.94% 7.82% 0.49 7.36% 5.36
Post GLBA Medium Level (n=486) 4.31      0.41% 5.35% 7.74% 0.48 7.32% 5.41
Post GLBA Low Level (n=496) 4.16      0.42% 4.86% 7.77% 0.55 7.15% 5.72
Panel B: Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
Pre GLBA High Level (n=212 ) 4.49      0.35% 3.84% 7.73% 0.50 7.08% 5.37
Pre GLBA Medium Level (n=193) 4.50      0.40% 4.22% 8.16% 0.56 7.10% 5.67
Pre GLBA Low Level (n=182 ) 4.54      0.38% 4.43% 8.34% 0.63 6.82% 5.76
Post GLBA High Level (n=588) 4.27      0.36% 4.87% 7.72% 0.47 7.43% 5.38
Post GLBA Medium Level (n=585) 4.31      0.45% 5.29% 7.64% 0.46 7.34% 5.41
Post GLBA Low Level (n=597) 4.14      0.41% 4.83% 7.59% 0.55 7.11% 5.73
Systematic 
Risk
Total 
Risk
Risk 
Index
Firm 
Risk
SDROEZ Score SDROA
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Table 17: Mean Differences in BHC Risk according to levels of Insider Ownership 
Before and After the Passage of the GLBA, over the entire period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.32 ** 0.03% 1.12% 0.40% 0.04 0.46% 0.29
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.23 0.04% 1.24% -0.49% -0.10 0.18% -0.28
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.49 ** 0.05% 0.63% -0.36% -0.04 0.46% 0.08
Panel B: Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.22 0.01% 1.03% 0.00% -0.03 0.35% 0.02
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.19 0.04% 1.06% -0.51% -0.10 0.24% -0.27
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.40 ** 0.04% 0.40% -0.75% -0.08 0.29% -0.03
**Significance at the 5% level
Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
Firm 
Risk
Risk 
Index
Z-Score
Z-Score
Systematic 
Risk
Firm 
Risk
Risk 
Index
Total RiskSDROESDROA
SDROA SDROE
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Table 18: Mean Differences in BHC Risk according to levels of Insider Ownership 
Before and After the Passage of the GLBA by Large, Medium and Small BHCs, over the 
entire period 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Large Surviving BHCs****
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.01 -0.02% -0.67% -0.98% -0.60 2.21% -0.94
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.39 0.07% 0.12% -1.77% -0.45 0.54% -0.63
Panel B: Large Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.01 -0.02% -0.67% -0.98% -0.60 2.21% -0.94
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.57 ***0.06% 0.14% -1.72% -0.45 0.85% -0.21
Panel C: Medium Surviving BHC
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.24 0.02% -0.23% -0.99% -0.13 0.07% -0.32
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.23 0.06% 0.40% -1.28% -0.36 0.44% -0.43
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.64 ***0.10% 0.60% -0.73% -0.33 0.73% -0.21
Panel D: Medium Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.19 0.01% -0.18% -0.89% -0.13 0.16% -0.35
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.21 0.05% 0.25% -1.35% -0.36 0.39% -0.45
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.45 0.07% 0.55% -1.20% -0.34 0.42% -0.41
Panel E: Small Surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.34 ***0.04% 1.41% 0.45% 0.06 0.48% 0.41
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.26 0.04% 1.61% 0.42% 0.03 0.53% -0.17
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.48 ***0.03% 0.79% 0.54% 0.18 0.40% 0.39
Panel F: Small Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.23 0.01% 1.32% 0.16% -0.03 0.47% 0.08
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.20 0.04% 0.76% -0.26% 0.00 0.07% -0.16
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.34 ***0.02% 0.94% -0.29% 0.13 0.08% 0.18
**Significance at the 5% level
****Large BHCs do  not have a Pre-Post GLBA data with high levels of insider ownership 
Z-Score SDROA
Risk 
Index
Z-Score SDROA SDROE Total Risk
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Risk
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Risk
Risk 
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5.2.3 Blockholder Ownership Hypothesis  
 
     The Blockholder Ownership hypothesis states: 
      H04: Banks’ risk-taking behavior does not differ according to the level of blockholder 
stock ownership. 
     Ha4:  Banks’ risk-taking behavior differs according to the level of blockholder stock 
ownership. 
     And, 
     H05: For a given level of blockholder ownership structure, banks’ risk-taking 
behavior does not differ according to the regulatory environment. 
     Ha5:  For a given level of blockholder ownership structure, banks’ risk-taking 
behavior differs according to the regulatory environment. 
 
     Blockholder Ownership is classified into three levels: low, medium, and high based on 
the 33
rd
 percentile distribution of BHC Blockholder Ownership, where the 33
rd
 percentile 
is 5.4%, the 66
th
 percentile is 14.1% and the 100
th
 percentile is 44.5%. Table 19 shows 
the means of risk measures, by the three levels indicated for the surviving sample and full 
sample (surviving and non-surviving), respectively. 
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Table 19: Summary of Risk Measures by levels of Blockholder Ownership, over the 
entire period 
 
 
 
 
      Table 20 shows the differences in mean risk measures shown in Table 19. Results in 
Table 20 indicate that for a given regulatory environment, bank risk-taking behavior 
differs according to blockholder stock ownership only in terms of Insolvency Risk, Total 
Risk, and Firm Risk. BHCs with medium levels of Blockholder Ownership tend to have 
lower Insolvency Risk compared to BHCs with high levels of blockholder concentration 
(Panel B). In this case, a moderate level of Blockholder Ownership influences managers 
to follow a less risky investment strategy, likely explained by lower blockholder wealth 
concentration. On the other hand, risk is consistently higher in BHCs with higher 
concentration of Blockholder Ownership as revealed by Total Risk and Firm Risk, where 
large and well diversified blockholders could influence managerial action towards riskier 
investments in the search of greater returns. 
 
 
Panel A: Surviving BHCs
High (n=676) 4.32       0.39% 4.75% 8.11% 0.52 7.43% 5.47      
Medium (n=622) 4.39       0.38% 4.81% 7.55% 0.52 7.04% 5.44      
Low (n=600) 4.26       0.40% 4.91% 7.72% 0.50 7.09% 5.57      
Panel B: Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
High (n=798) 4.28       0.39% 4.72% 8.11% 0.51 7.47% 5.56      
Medium (n=775) 4.40       0.42% 4.77% 7.46% 0.52 7.05% 5.41      
Low (n=784) 4.25       0.40% 4.88% 7.69% 0.50 7.13% 5.61      
SDROA SDROE
Total 
Risk
Systematic 
Risk
Firm 
Risk
Risk 
Index
Risk 
Index
Firm 
Risk
Z-Score
Z-Score SDROA SDROE
Total 
Risk
Systematic 
Risk
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Table 20: Differences in BHC Risk according to levels of Blockholder Ownership, over 
the entire period 
 
 
 
     Table 21 shows the mean differences in risk measures by levels of Blockholder 
Ownership by different sized peer groups. The results suggest that greater presence of 
blockholders in the case of large BHCs is associated with higher Systematic Risk relative 
to peers with lower blockholder concentration, while no significant difference is found in 
the case of medium size BHCs. On the other hand, the significance of mean differences is 
more notably in the small peer group, indicating that for a given regulatory environment, 
bank risk-taking behavior in small BHCs differs according to blockholder stock 
ownership levels. The differences suggest that BHCs with medium concentration of 
Blockholder Ownership have lower Insolvency Risk, Total Risk and Firm Risk than their 
counterparts with larger concentrations of Blockholder Ownership. At the same time, 
BHCs with low concentration of Blockholder Ownership have lower Systematic Risk 
than their counterparts with greater concentrations. 
 
 
Panel A: Surviving BHCs
High - Medium -0.08 0.01% -0.06% 0.56% *** 0.00 0.39% *** 0.03
High - Low 0.06 -0.02% -0.16% 0.40% 0.03 0.35% ***-0.10
Medium - Low 0.13 ***-0.02% -0.10% -0.16% 0.02 -0.05% -0.13
Panel B: Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
High - Medium -0.12 ***-0.02% -0.05% 0.64% ***-0.01 0.42% *** 0.15
High - Low 0.03 0.00% -0.16% 0.42% 0.01 0.35% ***-0.06
Medium - Low 0.15 *** 0.02% -0.11% -0.22% 0.02 -0.07% -0.20 ***a
**Significance at 5% level #
Risk 
Index
Z-Score SDROA SDROE Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
 Firm Risk 
Risk 
Index
Z-Score SDROA SDROE Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
 Firm Risk 
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Table 21: Mean Differences in BHC Risk according to levels of Blockholder Ownership 
by Large, Medium and Small BHCs, over the entire period 
 
Panel A: Large Surviving BHCs
High - Medium 0.74 -0.05% 0.16% 0.59% 0.52 *** 0.29% -0.07
High - Low 0.40 0.02% 0.20% 1.79% 0.55 *** 1.01% 0.74
Medium - Low -0.34 0.07% 0.04% 1.20% 0.03 0.72% 0.81
Panel B: Large Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
High - Medium 0.83 *** -0.01% 0.34% 0.42% 0.43 ***-0.53% -0.38
High - Low 0.48 0.04% 0.50% 0.61% 0.43 ***-0.22% 0.20
Medium - Low -0.35 0.05% 0.16% 0.19% 0.00 0.31% 0.58
Panel C: Medium Surviving BHCs
High - Medium 0.11 -0.01% -0.35% 0.12% -0.01 0.11% -0.35
High - Low -0.03 0.03% -0.10% 1.01% 0.05 0.29% -0.16
Medium - Low -0.15 0.04% 0.26% 0.89% 0.06 0.18% 0.20
Panel D: Medium Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
High - Medium 0.12 -0.01% -0.38% 0.21% 0.01 0.16% -0.31
High - Low -0.07 0.01% -0.27% 0.86% 0.06 0.20% -0.08
Medium - Low -0.19 0.02% 0.11% 0.66% 0.05 0.04% 0.23
Panel E: Small Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
High - Medium -0.16 *** 0.01% 0.03% 0.74% *** 0.01 0.48% *** 0.20
High - Low -0.01 -0.03% -0.15% 0.31% 0.09 *** 0.21% 0.14
Medium - Low 0.15 -0.04% -0.18% -0.43% 0.08 ***-0.27% -0.06
Panel F: Small Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
High - Medium -0.23 *** -0.03% 0.04% 0.78% *** -0.01 0.48% *** 0.33 ***a
High - Low -0.02 0.00% -0.11% 0.35% 0.06 *** 0.23% 0.13
Medium - Low 0.21 0.02% -0.15% -0.43% 0.07 ***-0.25% -0.21
**Significance at 5% level #
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     To test the second part of the Blockholder Ownership Hypothesis, the mean of each 
risk measure is calculated by the defined levels of ownership concentration for the 
periods before and after the passage of the GLBA (Table 22). 
 
Table 22: Summary of Mean BHC Risk Measures by levels Blockholder Ownership 
Before and After the Passage of the GLBA, over the entire period 
 
 
 
     Table 23 shows the mean differences by Blockholder Ownership level before and after 
the passage of the GLBA. The results indicate that BHC Insolvency Risk differs 
according to the regulatory environment for a given level of ownership structure, 
specifically for BHCs with High and Low blockholder concentration. The magnitude of 
the difference indicates that the Insolvency Risk is higher after the passing of the Act.  In 
this sense, well diversified blockholders tend to influence managerial action towards 
riskier investments. The Lack of significance in other risk variables is more consistent 
Panel A: Surviving BHCs
Pre GLBA High (n=146) 4.70     0.35% 3.77% 7.80% 0.50 7.20% 5.26
Pre GLBA Medium (n=115) 4.59     0.36% 4.15% 7.35% 0.53 6.67% 5.39
Pre GLBA Low (n=177) 4.51     0.36% 4.20% 8.36% 0.57 6.83% 5.66
Post GLBA High (n=530) 4.21     0.40% 5.02% 8.20% 0.53 7.50% 5.53
Post GLBA Medium (n=507) 4.35     0.39% 4.96% 7.60% 0.52 7.12% 5.45
Post GLBA Low (n=423) 4.16     0.42% 5.20% 7.45% 0.47 7.19% 5.53
Panel B: Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
Pre GLBA High (n=185) 4.56     0.38% 3.79% 8.07% 0.51 7.31% 5.51
Pre GLBA Medium (n=160) 4.49     0.38% 4.19% 7.60% 0.57 6.82% 5.56
Pre GLBA Low (n=242) 4.48     0.37% 4.41% 8.36% 0.60 6.88% 5.67
Post GLBA High (n=613) 4.19     0.39% 5.00% 8.12% 0.51 7.52% 5.57
Post GLBA Medium (n=615) 4.38     0.42% 4.92% 7.43% 0.51 7.11% 5.37
Post GLBA Low (n=542) 4.15     0.41% 5.08% 7.38% 0.46 7.24% 5.59
Firm Risk
Total 
Risk
Systematic 
Risk
Risk 
Index
Firm Risk
Z-Score SDROA SDROE
Z-Score SDROA SDROE
Risk 
Index
Total 
Risk
Systematic 
Risk
79 
 
with effective regulatory oversight to prevent excessive risk-taking behavior during 
periods of regulatory stringency and regulatory leniency.  
Table 23: Mean Differences in BHC Risk according to levels of Blockholder Ownership 
Before and After the Passage of the GLBA, over the entire period 
 
 
     By looking at the peer group, results in Panel E and F in Table 24 indicate that the 
initial findings are only consistent for the Small BHCs peer group.  By separating the 
sample into their peer groups, new evidence indicates that the Systematic Risk is lower 
after the passage of the Act in the presence of medium and low concentration of 
blockholder for both large and medium size BHCs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.49 *** 0.05% 1.24% 0.40% 0.03 0.30% 0.26
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.24 0.03% 0.81% 0.25% -0.01 0.45% 0.06
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.35 *** 0.06% 1.00% -0.91% -0.10 0.36% -0.13
Panel B: Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.37 *** 0.01% 1.21% 0.04% 0.00 0.21% 0.06
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.12 0.04% 0.73% -0.17% -0.07 0.30% -0.19
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.33 *** 0.04% 0.68% -0.98% -0.14 0.36% -0.09
**Significance at 5% level
SDROA SDROE Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
Firm Risk
Risk 
Index
Z-Score
Z-Score
Systematic 
Risk
Firm Risk
Risk 
Index
Total RiskSDROESDROA
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Table 24: Mean Differences in BHC Risk according to levels of Blockholder Ownership 
Before and After the Passage of the GLB, by Large, Medium and Small BHCs, over the 
entire period 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Large Surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.30 -0.17% 0.63% -1.70% 0.06 0.64% -1.42
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.57 0.07% 0.17% 1.31% -0.54 1.88% -0.04
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.24 0.06% -0.04% -1.87% -0.46 *** 0.70% -0.73
Panel B: Large Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.76 -0.09% 0.23% -1.15% 0.07 1.16% 0.08
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.62 0.06% 0.31% 0.03% -0.53 *** 1.90% 0.31
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.36 0.06% -0.01% -1.93% -0.45 *** 0.76% -0.54
Panel C: Medium Surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.54 0.10% 0.50% -0.79% -0.18 -0.05% -0.06
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.22 0.07% 0.21% -0.71% -0.28 *** 0.57% -0.47
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.34 0.01% 0.16% -1.87% -0.41 *** 0.68% -0.44
Panel D: Medium Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.53 0.09% 0.47% -0.83% -0.16 -0.07% -0.04
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.04 0.05% 0.09% -0.84% -0.29 *** 0.45% -0.76
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.30 0.00% 0.23% -2.06% -0.42 *** 0.44% -0.49
Panel E: Small Surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.48 *** 0.04% 1.45% 0.75% 0.09 0.40% 0.38
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.25 0.01% 1.03% 0.54% 0.12 0.33% 0.28
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.35 *** 0.07% 1.50% -0.43% 0.03 0.26% 0.01
Panel F: Small Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.34 *** 0.00% 1.41% 0.25% 0.04 0.26% 0.10
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.12 0.04% 0.94% 0.02% 0.03 0.14% -0.03
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.31 *** 0.04% 0.94% -0.49% -0.02 0.33% 0.04
** Significance at 5% level
Firm 
Risk
Risk 
Index
Z-Score SDROA SDROE Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
Firm 
Risk
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5.2.4 Outsider in the Board Hypothesis  
 
     The Outsider on the Board hypothesis states: 
     H06: Banks’ risk-taking behavior does not differ according to the proportion of 
outside directors. 
     Ha6:  Banks’ risk-taking behavior differs according to the proportion of outside 
directors. 
     And, 
     H07: For a given proportion of outside directors, banks’ risk-taking behavior does not 
differ according to the regulatory environment. 
     Ha7:  For a given proportion of outside directors, banks’ risk-taking behavior differs 
according to the regulatory environment 
 
     Proportion of Outside Directors is classified in three levels: low, medium, and high 
based on the distribution of Outside Directors in the board, where the 33
rd
 percentile is 
82.44%, the 66
th
 percentile is 88.9% and the 100
th
 percentile is 93.8%. Table 25 shows 
the mean of all risk measures by the three levels for the surviving sample and full sample 
(surviving and non-surviving), respectively. 
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Table 25: Summary of Mean BHC Risk Measures by levels Outside Director, over the 
entire period 
 
 
     Table 26 shows the difference in means for the measures reported in Table 25. Results 
in Table 26 indicate that for a given regulatory environment, bank risk-taking behavior 
differs according to the levels of Outside Directors presence only in regards to two risk 
measures. BHCs with medium presence level of Outside Directors have lower Insolvency 
Risk compared to those with higher presence levels (panel A and B), while Systematic 
Risk is significantly higher in BHCs with more independent board members. Higher risk 
profile in BHCs with larger presence of Outside Directors in the board is in line with the 
argument that lack of banking business comprehension by Outside Directors may cause 
their associated monitoring role to be ineffective.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Surviving BHCs
High (n=622) 4.25    0.39% 4.63% 7.94% 0.54 7.18% 5.58      
Medium (n=629) 4.40    0.39% 4.61% 7.64% 0.52 7.09% 5.39      
Low (n=647) 4.33    0.39% 5.20% 7.84% 0.48 7.32% 5.50      
Panel B: Surviving  and Non-surviving BHCs
High (n=795) 4.23    0.40% 4.77% 7.83% 0.55 7.14% 5.62      
Medium (n=770) 4.37    0.40% 4.56% 7.68% 0.50 7.17% 5.45      
Low (n=792) 4.33    0.41% 5.02% 7.75% 0.48 7.34% 5.50      
Firm 
Risk
Risk 
Index
Risk 
Index
Firm 
Risk
Z-Score
Z-Score SDROA SDROE
Total 
Risk
Systematic 
Risk
SDROA SDROE
Total 
Risk
Systematic 
Risk
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Table 26: Mean differences in BHC Risk according to levels of Outside Director, over 
the entire period 
 
 
     Table 27 shows the mean differences in risk measures among levels of Outside 
Directors in the board by peer groups. The peer group comparison shows that given a 
regulatory environment, bank’s risk-taking behavior does not differ by the proportion of 
Outside Directors in the board for large and small BHCs. Systematic Risk remains 
significantly higher only in medium size BHCs with larger presence of Outside Directors 
in the board than in those with lower presence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Surviving BHCs
High - Medium -0.15 *** 0.01% 0.01% 0.30% 0.03 0.09% 0.19
High - Low -0.07 0.00% -0.58% 0.10% 0.06 *** -0.14% 0.08
Medium - Low 0.07 -0.01% -0.59% -0.19% 0.03 -0.23% -0.11
Panel B: Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
High - Medium -0.13 *** 0.00% 0.22% 0.15% 0.05 -0.03% 0.17
High - Low -0.09 -0.01% -0.25% 0.08% 0.07 *** -0.20% 0.12
Medium - Low 0.04 -0.01% -0.47% -0.07% 0.02 -0.17% -0.05
**Significance at 5% level #
Risk 
Index
Z-Score SDROA SDROE Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
 Firm Risk 
Risk 
Index
Z-Score SDROA SDROE Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
 Firm Risk 
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Table 27: Mean Differences in BHC Risk according to levels of Outside Director by 
Large, Medium and Small BHCs, over the entire period 
 
 
Panel A: Large Surviving BHCs
High - Medium -0.23 0.06% -0.04% 0.98% 0.02 0.19% 0.72
High - Low -0.35 0.08% 0.59% 2.09% -0.05 1.17% 0.22
Medium - Low -0.11 0.02% 0.63% 1.11% -0.07 0.98% -0.51
Panel B: Large Surviving and Non Surviving BHCs
High - Medium -0.15 0.05% 0.02% 0.77% 0.05 -0.05% 0.08
High - Low -0.26 0.07% 0.64% 1.78% -0.05 1.04% 0.56
Medium - Low -0.11 0.02% 0.63% 1.02% -0.10 1.10% 0.48
Panel C: Medium Surviving BHCs
High - Medium -0.09 0.06% 0.68% 0.25% 0.09 -0.14% 0.29
High - Low -0.18 0.06% 0.65% 0.48% 0.16 ***-0.34% 0.14
Medium - Low -0.09 0.00% -0.03% 0.23% 0.07 -0.20% -0.15
Panel D: Medium Surviving and Non Surviving BHCs
High - Medium -0.04 0.06% *** 0.61% 0.20% 0.09 -0.22% 0.24
High - Low -0.16 0.07% *** 0.46% 0.44% 0.17 ***-0.49% 0.14
Medium - Low -0.11 0.00% -0.15% 0.23% 0.07 -0.28% -0.10
Panel E: Small Surviving BHCs
High - Medium -0.11 -0.02% -0.24% 0.15% -0.01 0.16% 0.05
High - Low 0.03 -0.03% -0.99% -0.19% 0.00 -0.08% -0.15
Medium - Low 0.14 -0.01% -0.74% -0.34% 0.00 -0.24% -0.20
Panel F: Small Surviving and Non Surviving BHCs
High - Medium -0.11 -0.03% 0.07% 0.01% 0.01 0.05% 0.05
High - Low -0.01 -0.04% -0.50% -0.16% 0.01 -0.10% -0.06
Medium - Low 0.10 -0.01% -0.58% -0.17% 0.00 -0.15% -0.11
**Significance at 5% level #
Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
 Firm Risk 
Risk Index
Risk Index
 Firm Risk Z-Score SDROA SDROE Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
Z-Score SDROA
Z-Score SDROA SDROE
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Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
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     To test the second part of the Outside Directors Hypothesis, the mean of each risk 
measure is calculated by the defined levels of Outside Directors considering the periods 
before and after the passage of the GLBA (Table 28). 
Table 28: Summary of Mean BHC Risk Measures by levels of Outside Director Before 
and After the Passage of the GLBA, over the entire period 
 
 
     Table 29 shows the mean difference by the proportion of Outside Directors in the 
board for the periods before and after the passage of the Act. The results indicate that for 
a given level of Outside Directors in the board, Insolvency Risk is the only risk measure 
that differs according to the regulatory environment. Further, the peer group results 
(Table 30, panels E and F) show that Insolvency Risk is higher only for small BHCs. 
With expansion into riskier nontraditional activities, lack of banking business knowledge 
from the part of Outside Directors in Small BHCs would limit the effective advising and 
monitoring functions, resulting in an increase of bank risk- taking by managers. The 
Surviving BHCs throughout 1997-2009
Pre GLBA High (n=148) 4.56      0.36% 4.29% 8.22% 0.56 6.89% 5.66
Pre GLBA Medium (n=131) 4.70      0.35% 3.82% 7.82% 0.56 6.97% 5.31
Pre GLBA Low (n=159) 4.54      0.36% 4.01% 7.69% 0.49 6.89% 5.39
Post GLBA High (n=474) 4.16      0.40% 4.73% 7.85% 0.54 7.27% 5.55
Post GLBA Medium (n=498) 4.32      0.39% 4.82% 7.60% 0.50 7.12% 5.41
Post GLBA Low (n=488) 4.25      0.40% 5.59% 7.88% 0.48 7.46% 5.54
Surviving and Non Surviving BHCs throughout 1997-2009
Pre GLBA High (n=211) 4.48      0.37% 4.58% 8.29% 0.61 6.88% 5.72
Pre GLBA Medium (n=178) 4.56      0.38% 3.80% 8.08% 0.55 7.04% 5.53
Pre GLBA Low (n=198) 4.49      0.38% 4.01% 7.81% 0.52 7.08% 5.51
Post GLBA High (n=584) 4.14      0.40% 4.84% 7.67% 0.53 7.24% 5.58
Post GLBA Medium (n=592) 4.31      0.40% 4.79% 7.56% 0.49 7.21% 5.43
Post GLBA Low (n=594) 4.27      0.42% 5.36% 7.73% 0.46 7.43% 5.50
Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
Z-Score SDROA SDROE
Z-Score SDROA SDROE
Risk 
Index
Firm Risk
Risk 
Index
Firm Risk
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Systematic Risk is lower after the passage of the Act in large and medium BHCs with 
higher proportion of Outside Directors.  
 
Table 29: Mean Differences in BHC Risk according to levels of Outside Director Before 
and After the Passage of the GLBA, over the entire period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.40 *** 0.04% 0.44% -0.37% -0.02 0.38% -0.11
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.38 *** 0.05% 1.01% -0.22% -0.05 0.15% 0.10
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.29 *** 0.04% 1.58% 0.19% -0.01 0.57% 0.15
Panel B: Surviving and Non Surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.34 *** 0.03% 0.26% -0.62% -0.08 0.36% -0.13
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.25 *** 0.02% 0.98% -0.52% -0.07 0.17% -0.10
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.23 0.04% 1.35% -0.07% -0.06 0.35% -0.01
**Significance at 5% level
Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
Firm 
Risk
Risk 
Index
Z-Score
Z-Score
Systematic 
Risk
Firm 
Risk
Risk 
Index
Total RiskSDROESDROA
SDROA SDROE
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Table 30: Mean Differences in BHC Risk according to levels of Outside Director Before 
and After the Passage of the GLBA by Large, Medium and Small BHCs, over the entire 
period 
 
 
 
Panel A: Large Surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.22 0.08% 0.15% -0.72% -0.42 *** 0.97% -0.62
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.25 0.03% -0.20% -2.55% -0.58 *** 0.71% -0.84
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.44 0.00% -0.45% -3.22% -0.43 0.05% -1.07
Panel B: Large Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.49 0.07% 0.17% -0.82% -0.43 *** 1.25% -0.10
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.32 0.03% -0.19% -2.63% -0.58 *** 0.79% -0.75
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.53 0.00% -0.43% -3.17% -0.40 0.01% -0.92
Panel C: Medium Surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.54 *** 0.11% 0.86% -0.50% -0.15 0.69% -0.04
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.55 0.06% 0.47% -0.55% -0.25 *** 0.12% 0.01
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low 0.09 0.01% -0.54% -2.46% -0.50 *** 0.30% -1.22
Panel D: Medium Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.36 0.08% 0.46% -0.96% -0.17 0.37% -0.38
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.52 *** 0.06% 0.57% -0.72% -0.29 *** 0.23% -0.04
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low 0.07 0.02% -0.33% -2.30% -0.47 *** 0.12% -1.11
Panel E: Small Surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.38 *** 0.02% 0.39% -0.30% 0.11 0.10% -0.03
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.33 *** 0.04% 1.29% 0.09% 0.05 0.12% 0.21
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.35 *** 0.05% 2.08% 0.81% 0.10 0.62% 0.44
Panel F: Small Surviving and Non-surviving BHCs
Post GLBA High - Pre GLBA High -0.30 *** 0.01% 0.23% -0.50% 0.03 0.13% -0.05
Post GLBA Medium - Pre GLBA Medium -0.15 0.01% 1.17% -0.33% 0.02 0.13% -0.10
Post GLBA Low - Pre GLBA Low -0.27 *** 0.05% 1.73% 0.43% 0.02 0.39% 0.19
**Significance at 5% level
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5.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 
     The hypotheses are also tested performing a multivariate regression analysis. 
Specifically, risk measures are regressed on the measures of percentage of insider 
holdings, percentage of blockholder holdings and percentage of outside directors in the 
board, variables controlling for regulatory changes, interaction variables, bank specific 
variables and variables reflecting economic conditions. Extreme values in bank control 
variables and bank risk measures were set to a 95% Winsorization, where data below the 
5
th
 percentile is set to the 5
th
 percentile and data above 95
th
 percentile is set to the 95
th
 
percentile. 
  
     The linear equations are run using panel data techniques on a balanced sample 
consisting of 1,898 data points in bank-years, over the period 1997-2009.  The Haussman 
test was conducted in order to specify whether the fixed effects or random effects model 
best fits the data under the null that individual effects (error components) are uncorrelated 
with the other explanatory variables. The null hypothesis is not rejected, indicating that 
the random-effects model is more consistent and efficient relative to the fixed effects 
model.  
 
     Possible collinearity among the explanatory variables is examined with the matrix of 
correlation and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). The pairwise correlations of the 
regressors (Table 31), indicates that the correlations between variables are in general not 
indicative of potential multicollinearity problems. However, there are a few cases where 
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correlation is higher than 50%. Therefore, the variance inflation factors (VIFs) are 
examined (Table 32) to check for the degree of multicollinearity.  Since the VIFs score 
for the regressor variables are in the range of 1.2 and 6.2, it is concluded that there is no 
high degree of multicollinearity. As a result, all the regressor variables are retained in the 
base model. 
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Table 31: Correlation Matrix Explanatory Variables 
Insider Ownership 1.00
Blockholder Ownership 0.42 *** 1.00
Outside Director Ownership -0.26 *** -0.19 *** 1.00
GLBA -0.01 0.02 0.03 1.00
SOX -0.01 0.07 *** 0.09 *** 0.59 *** 1.00
CRISIS -0.01 0.10 *** 0.07 *** 0.30 *** 0.51 *** 1.00
Insider*GLBA 0.84 *** 0.34 *** -0.22 *** 0.28 *** 0.16 *** 0.07 *** 1.00
Blockholder*GLBA 0.33 *** 0.77 *** -0.16 *** 0.42 *** 0.31 *** 0.22 *** 0.48 *** 1.00
Outside Director*GLBA -0.07 *** -0.03 0.22 *** 0.98 *** 0.59 *** 0.31 *** 0.21 *** 0.37 *** 1.00
M&A =1 if Acquisition -0.04 * -0.08 *** 0.03 -0.02 0.04 ** -0.03 -0.03 -0.09 *** -0.02 1.00
Size -0.04 * -0.19 *** 0.20 *** 0.17 *** 0.19 *** 0.15 *** 0.02 -0.08 *** 0.20 0.25 *** 1.00
Leverage 0.09 *** -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 ** -0.10 *** -0.08 *** 0.06 *** -0.05 ** -0.06 *** -0.04 *** 0.01 1.00
Growth -0.01 -0.12 *** -0.15 *** -0.02 -0.18 *** -0.16 *** 0.00 -0.11 -0.05 ** 0.11 *** 0.10 *** 0.11 *** 1.00
Concentration -0.02 0.13 *** -0.11 *** 0.17 *** 0.22 *** 0.18 *** 0.03 0.17 *** 0.15 *** -0.11 *** -0.44 *** -0.02 *** 0.09 *** 1.00
Non Interest Income 0.04 * 0.00 0.10 *** 0.21 *** 0.22 *** 0.07 *** 0.09 *** 0.08 *** 0.22 *** 0.05 ** 0.54 *** -0.08 *** -0.11 *** -0.32 *** 1.00
Net Charge Offs 0.02 -0.03 0.06 ** 0.16 *** 0.15 *** 0.41 *** 0.05 ** 0.05 *** 0.16 *** -0.08 *** 0.31 *** 0.03 -0.06 ** -0.13 *** 0.17 *** 1.00
Cost of Funds 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.45 *** -0.59 *** -0.22 *** -0.14 *** -0.18 *** -0.45 *** -0.02 -0.08 *** 0.22 *** 0.08 *** -0.11 *** -0.28 *** -0.11 *** 1.00
Inefficiency 0.11 0.09 *** 0.02 0.28 *** 0.38 *** 0.21 *** 0.17 *** 0.19 *** 0.28 *** -0.11 *** 0.04 ** 0.03 -0.16 *** 0.06 *** 0.49 *** 0.28 *** -0.54 *** 1.00
Real GDP Growth 0.02 -0.06 *** -0.03 -0.59 *** -0.40 *** -0.70 *** -0.16 *** -0.31 *** -0.58 *** 0.08 *** -0.15 *** 0.07 *** 0.04 *** -0.17 *** -0.11 *** -0.42 *** 0.30 -0.25 *** 1.00
***Significant at 1%
**Significant at 5%
*Significant at 10%
Real GDP 
Growth
Growth Concentration
Non Interest 
Income
Net Charge 
Offs
Cost of 
Funds
InefficiencyLeverage
Insider 
Ownership
Blockholder 
Ownership
Outside 
Director 
Ownership
GLBA SOX CRISIS Insider*GLBA
Blockholder*
GLBA
Outside 
Director*GLB
A
M&A =1 if 
Acquisition
Size
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  Table 32: Variance Inflation Factor Summary 
 
 
 
     Table 33 presents the results from the panel data regressions of each of the risk 
measures on the hypothesized determinants of risk. The estimated equations have 
Adjusted R-squared values in the range of 16% and 53%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable VIF
Insider Ownership 5.74                         
Blockholder Ownership 4.30                         
Outside Director 4.06                         
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 3.43                         
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) 2.90                         
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) 3.17                         
Insider*GLBA 6.22                         
Blockholder*GLBA 5.25                         
OutsideDirector*GLBA 2.57                         
M&A =1 if Acquisition 1.15                         
Size 2.50                         
Leverage (Assets/Equity) 1.16                         
Growth 1.25                         
Concentration 1.61                         
NonI nterest Income 2.37                         
Net Charge Offs 1.80                         
Cost of Funds 2.35                         
Inefficiency 2.31                         
Real GDP 4.42                         
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Table 33: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model based on pooled data for the 
years 1997 – 2009 Surviving BHCs  
(n=1,898) 
 
     The estimated coefficient Insider Ownership is negative and significant at the 1% 
level with SDROA as the dependent variable, rejecting the null hypothesis that bank risk-
taking behavior does not differ according to levels of insider stock ownership (H02). The 
sign of the coefficient suggests that management ownership is negatively related to the 
risk profile of banks. The results support the argument that when Insider Ownership is 
Expected 
Sign
Expected 
Sign
Intercept 7.536 *** -0.005 *** -0.194 *** 0.031 ** -1.852 *** 0.069 *** 0.261
(15.16) (-2.97) (-4.19) (1.92) (-7.2) (5.33) (0.28)
Insider Ownership -0.317 -0.002 *** -0.001 0.009 0.060 -0.006 -0.914
(-0.83) (-1.9) (-0.02) (0.74) (0.29) (-0.57) (-1.23)
Blockholder Owenrship 0.311 0.000 -0.010 0.018 *** 0.078 0.010 * 0.211
(1.4) (0.43) (-0.49) (2.41) (0.71) (1.88) (0.56)
Outside Director 0.542 0.000 0.006 0.016 0.136 0.004 0.724
(1.47) (-0.3) (0.17) (1.24) (0.78) (0.47) (1.23)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.753 ** 0.000 0.053 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.615
(2.12) (0.08) (1.48) (0.27) (0.03) (1.14) (1.09)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) 0.014 0.000 -0.001 -0.017 *** -0.270 * -0.026 *** -0.776 ***
(0.23) (-0.31) (-0.17) (-8.08) (-9.54) (-19.5) (-8.11)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) -0.339 *** 0.000 0.010 0.023 *** 0.078 ** 0.009 *** 0.713 ***
(-5.08) (0.69) (1.44) (9.42) (2.5) (6.09) (6.79)
Insider Owenrship*GLBA 0.279 -0.001 -0.016 -0.019 * -0.189 -0.010 -0.698
(0.93) (-1.13) (-0.55) (-1.79) (-1.3) (-1.4) (-1.42)
Blockholder Ownerhsip*GLBA -0.192 -0.001 -0.011 -0.020 ** 0.016 -0.001 -0.399
(-0.8) (-0.83) (-0.47) (-2.32) (0.14) (-0.25) (-1.05)
Outside Director*GLBA -0.815 ** 0.000 -0.061 -0.021 -0.153 -0.003 -0.999
(-1.96) (-0.25) (-1.47) (-1.4) (-0.78) (-0.37) (-1.52)
M&A =1 if Acquisition 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.005 *** -0.030 * -0.002 ** -0.155 ***
(0.03) (-1.12) (-0.44) (-3.57) (-1.66) (-2.27) (-2.51)
Size -/+ -0.070 *** -/+ 0.000 *** 0.003 * 0.000 0.105 *** 0.002 *** 0.140 ***
(-3.07) (2.61) (1.6) (0.2) (8.3) (3.22) (2.89)
Leverage - -0.041 *** + 0.000 *** 0.007 *** 0.000 0.010 ** 0.000 0.070 ***
(-4.45) (3.78) (8.02) (1.41) (2.26) (1.22) (4.59)
Growth - -1.964 *** + 0.002 *** 0.069 * 0.080 *** 0.299 * 0.052 *** 2.132 ***
(-5.38) (2.12) (1.94) (6.24) (1.7) (6.19) (3.58)
Concentration - -0.899 *** + 0.003 *** 0.069 *** 0.024 *** 0.613 *** 0.017 *** 1.761 ***
(-4.34) (4.74) (3.64) (3.57) (5.8) (3.26) (4.74)
Non Interest Income -/+ 1.300 *** -/+ -0.005 *** -0.098 *** -0.016 *** -0.188 0.012 0.048
(3.66) (-4.58) (-2.93) (-1.35) (-1.06) (1.35) (0.08)
Net Charge Offs - -0.805 *** + 0.002 *** 0.049 *** 0.033 *** 0.152 *** 0.025 *** 1.695 ***
(-14.71) (14.78) (9.21) (17.11) (5.79) (19.48) (19.01)
Cost of Funds - -4.432 ** + 0.002 0.067 0.088 1.730 * 0.113 *** 8.106 *
(-2.18) (0.28) (0.35) (1.27) (1.73) (-2.32) (2.35)
Inefficiency - -3.073 *** + 0.008 *** 0.157 *** 0.049 *** -0.117 0.046 *** 1.883 ***
(-8.85) (7.54) (4.71) (4.09) (-0.69) (5.61) (3.23)
Real GDP + 9.175 * - 0.015 0.738 -1.939 *** 24.938 *** -0.763 *** -2.225
(1.7) (0.97) (1.35) (-9.69) (9.89) (-6.38) (-0.26)
Adjusted RSQ 38% 27% 16% 51% 24% 53% 40%
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
Z-Score Risk IndexSDROA SDROE Total Risk Systematic Risk Firm Risk
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high, the manager’s behavior tends to be more prudent motivated by the need to protect 
personal wealth at risk or to reduce their non-diversifiable risk (employment).  However, 
the results from the linear specifications with respect to the other risk measures do not 
show that Insider Ownership has an effect on the book based or market risk based 
measures.  
 
     The coefficient for the Blockholder Ownership is positive and significant at the 1% 
level when risk is measured by Total Risk and is marginally significant in the regression 
for Firm Risk. With this evidence, the null hypothesis that bank risk-taking behavior does 
not differ according to blockholder stock ownership is rejected (H04). Furthermore, 
higher levels of Blockholder Ownership levels are unfavorable to BHC Total Risk. These 
results are consistent with the argument that presence of blockholders motivates 
managers to follow riskier investment strategies, similar to the results of Laeven and 
Levine (2009). 
 
     Outside Directors does not seem to have a significant effect on risk-taking by 
managers, hence the null hypothesis that banks’ risk-taking behavior does not differ 
according to the proportion of outside directors cannot be rejected (H06). While the 
corporate governance literature has found evidence of a relationship between board 
independence and firm performance, it is possible that the presence of regulation in the 
banking industry might be the mitigating factor for the agency problem, nullifying the 
effectiveness of independent board members in controlling the risk profile of banks. 
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     The coefficient for GLBA, a dummy variable that controls for the passage of the Act, 
indicates that after the passage of the GLBA, banks on average have a lower Insolvency 
Risk (Z-Score), allowing to reject the null hypothesis that the average risk profile of 
BHCs has not change after the passage of the GLBA in 1999 (H01). However, the GLBA 
dummy is not statistically significant in other regressions. 
 
     The coefficient for SOX, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after the 
implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley regulation, indicates that the tighter corporate 
governance legislation has decreased the risk profile of banks. The coefficient is negative 
and significant in regressions for the Risk Index and the market risk measures (Total 
Risk, Systematic Risk, and Firm Risk). 
 
     The coefficient for Crisis, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the subprime 
financial crisis of 2007-2009, reflects that during the crisis period banks' operations 
became more risky. The coefficient is significant across all risk measures, except for 
SDROA and SDROE. 
 
     The interaction term, (Insider Ownership*GLBA) is significant only for Total Risk, 
allowing to reject the Managerial Risk Incentive hypothesis (H03). The sign indicates 
that after the passage of the Act, the presence of Insider Ownership is favorable to BHC 
Total Risk. Based on the results, in the deregulated environment managers are motivated 
by the need to protect their personal wealth or reduce their non-diversifiable risk. 
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     The interaction term (Blockholder Ownership*GLBA) has a negative coefficient and 
is significant only for Total Risk, allowing to reject the hull hypothesis that for a given 
level of blockholder ownership structure bank risk-taking behavior does not differ 
according to the regulatory environment (H05).  The negative sign indicates that in the 
deregulated environment blockholders became more concern with personal wealth at risk 
and pressured managers to have a more prudent behavior as the industry expanded into 
riskier activities.  
 
     The interaction between Outside Directors and GLBA is only significant in the 
regression with the Insolvency Risk measure (Z-Score). The sign of the coefficient 
indicates that subsequent to the passage of the Act, Insolvency Risk increases at BHCs 
with a higher percentage of Outside Directors in the board, which rejects the null 
hypothesis that for a given proportion of outside directors bank risk-taking behavior does 
not differ according to the regulatory environment (H07). This could be the result of 
expansion into riskier nontraditional activities, lack of banking business comprehension 
in the presence of more complex products or ineffective risk monitoring and advising by 
the outsider dominated boards. In this sense, higher presence Outside Directors in the 
board becomes unfavorable for BHCs in a deregulated industry environment.   
 
     To control for mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity, the M&A variable takes the 
value of 1 if a bank engages in such an activity. Its coefficient is negative and significant 
for Total, Systematic and Firm Risk, as well as the Risk Index, indicating that banking 
expansion through bank mergers or acquisitions decreases the risk profile of banks.    
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     The coefficient of Size indicates that larger banks are consistently associated with 
higher risk profiles (6 out of the 7 risk measures). This is consistent with Demsetz and 
Strahan (1997), who report that large BHC adopt riskier loan portfolios and operate with 
more leverage. A negative and significant sign observed for the log of Z indicates that 
larger banks tend to have higher Insolvency Risk. A positive and significant sign for 
SDROA and ROE, Systematic Risk and Risk Index measures further confirms the notion 
that risk is an increasing function of Size.  
 
     The coefficient for Leverage is negative and significant with respect to Insolvency 
Risk (Z-Score), and positive and significant with respect to SDROA and SDROE, 
Systematic Risk, and the Risk Index measures. These results support the argument that 
banks that have higher leverage (lower capitalization) tend to exhibit higher risk profiles.  
 
     Results for the Growth coefficient are consistent with the expectation that higher 
growth banks are associated with higher risk as a result of exposure to greater 
uncertainties associated with growth, for example, financial risks not anticipated by bank 
managers seeking growth in new markets or via increasingly complex products.  The 
coefficient is negative and significant with respect to Insolvency Risk, and positive and 
significant with respect to the other risk measures except for Systematic Risk (6 out of 
the 7 risk measures).  
  
     Level of loan portfolio concentration (Concentration) measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, indicates that specialization in a given loan category is associated with 
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higher bank-risk profile. As such, BHCs can achieve risk reductions through loan 
diversification. These results are consistent across all risk measures considered. 
 
     The coefficient for Non Interest Income is significant in regressions for Insolvency 
Risk, SDROA and SDROE, and Total Risk, and it indicates that the non-interest income 
stream of a bank has the effect of reducing bank risk by allowing banks to have a more 
diversified source of revenues. These results contradict a prior study by Stiroh (2006) 
which finds banks that rely on activities that generate non-interest income incur greater 
risks. The difference in results can be explained by the sample period considered, or 
greater risks associated with the real estate and other high risk lending practices of BHCs 
during the recent period.   
 
     The consistent statistical significance and sign of the Net Charge Offs ratio across all 
regressions confirms that credit quality deterioration is associated with a higher risk 
profile. 
 
     Consistent with expectations, Cost of Funds correlates inversely and significantly with 
respect to Insolvency Risk, while it correlates positively with respect to Systematic Risk, 
Firm Risk and the Risk Index measures. One interpretation is that banks with higher cost 
of funds may be engaging in higher risk activities to cover its higher funding costs 
9
. 
                                                 
9
 The Hausman test was performed to test for the endogeneity of Cost of Funds.  A new 
exogenous Cost of Funds variable was created by regressing exogenous variables (bank size, the 
federal funds rate, and the money supply) on Cost of Funds, and taking the fitted value as the new 
variables. The insignificance statistic of the residual coefficient in the base model indicates that 
there is no evidence of endogeneity.  
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     The quality of management is proxied by a cost efficiency measure (Inefficiency) 
defined by the ratio of non-interest expense to total revenue. The higher the Inefficiency 
ratio the more a bank loses its income to expenses. The results indicate that inefficient 
banks are associated with higher risks. The coefficient of the ratio is negative and 
significant with respect to Insolvency Risk and positive and significant with respect to 
SDROA and SDROE, Total Risk, Systematic Risk and Firm Risk, as well as the Risk 
Index measure, leading to conclusion that better managed banks are less risky than 
inefficient banks. 
 
     Banks’ operations depend to a large extent on the economic environment. As such, 
Real GDP Growth is used as a variable to control for economic condition. Its coefficient 
turns out to be significant in explaining the risk profile in banks in the majority of the risk 
measures. The sign of Real GDP Growth coefficient indicates that in general banks are 
exposed to less uncertainties in a growing economic environment (contributing to a lower 
risk profile), with the exception of Systematic Risk. Since Systematic Risk measures the 
portion of a bank’s total risk that is explained by its connection to the economic system in 
which it operates, a positive and significant sign of Real GDP Growth suggests that the 
uncertainties associated with economic growth have a detrimental effect on the 
systematic portion of a bank’s Total Risk.  
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5.4 Robustness Tests 
 
 
     A number of robustness tests are performed to further evaluate the results shown in 
the base empirical model.  
 
5.4.1 Surviving and Non-surviving Sample 
 
     The sample is extended to include BHCs that exited the industry during the 13-year 
analysis period and the regression is run with unbalanced panel data analysis technique. 
Increasing the sample to 196 BHCs does not change the surviving sample results in any 
meaningful way. Table 34 indicates that the impact of the control variables on the risk 
measures remains unchanged. With regards to the hypothesis variables, minor change in 
results compared to the base model is shown. The coefficient for the Outside Directors 
variable becomes significant when regressed on the Insolvency Risk of banks, indicating 
that a larger portion of Outside Directors in the board is associated with lower Insolvency 
Risk.  
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Table 34: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model based on pooled data for the 
years 1997 – 2009, Surviving and Non-Surviving BHCs 
(n=2,548) 
 
 
5.4.2 Economic Environment 
 
     To test for the robustness of the economic control variable, the average annual Federal 
Funds Rate is included in the model as a substitute for the Real GDP Growth rate. The 
Federal Funds Rate is a reflection of the monetary policy in place to maintain a healthy 
economic environment, with high rate levels are associated with a contractionary 
Expected Sign
Expected 
Sign
Intercept 7.732 *** -0.004 ** -0.145 *** 0.027 * -1.750 *** 0.062 *** -0.361
(15.5) (-2.45) (-3.94) (1.8) (-8.12) (5.12) (-0.43)
Insider Ownership -0.382 -0.003 * 0.003 0.014 0.138 -0.002 -0.044
(-0.95) (-2.01) (0.12) (1.23) (0.8) (-0.24) (-0.06)
Blockholder Ownership 0.213 0.000 -0.012 0.017 ** 0.023 0.008 * 0.169
(0.97) (0.04) (-0.7) (2.43) (0.24) (1.7) (0.46)
Outside Director 0.894 *** 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.089 -0.007 -0.347
(2.6) (-0.41) (-0.01) (0.91) (0.58) (-0.88) (-0.61)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.940 *** -0.001 0.030 0.001 -0.103 0.003 -0.334
(2.88) (-0.89) (1.03) (0.07) (-0.7) (0.36) (-0.62)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) 0.042 0.000 0.000 -0.017 *** -0.260 *** -0.027 *** -0.759 ***
(0.76) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-8.8) (-10.52) (-22.05) (-8.31)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) -0.328 *** 0.000 0.010 0.025 *** 0.112 *** 0.009 *** 0.773 ***
(-5.11) (0.61) (1.65) (10.81) (3.85) (6.5) (7.28)
Insider Ownership*GLBA 0.205 -0.001 -0.017 -0.019 * -0.124 -0.009 -0.551
(0.67) (-1.3) (-0.65) (-1.85) (-0.9) (-1.31) (-1.08)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA 0.012 -0.001 -0.011 -0.023 *** -0.009 -0.004 -0.681 *
(0.06) (-0.83) (-0.52) (-2.91) (-0.09) (-0.8) (-1.83)
Outside Director*GLBA -1.106 ** 0.001 -0.039 -0.015 -0.056 0.006 0.245
(-2.9) (0.61) (-1.13) (-1.11) (-0.33) (0.69) (0.39)
M&A =1 if Acquisition -0.006 0.000 -0.001 -0.005 *** -0.020 -0.003 ** -0.143 **
(-0.16) (-1.17) (-0.36) (-3.9) (-1.16) (-3.22) (-2.3)
Size -/+ -0.094 * -/+ 0.000 0.003 * 0.000 0.101 *** 0.001 * 0.198 ***
(-3.95) (1.48) (1.67) (0.53) (10.14) (1.74) (4.79)
Leverage - -0.041 *** + 0.000 *** 0.006 *** 0.001 ** 0.010 ** 0.000 ** 0.062 ***
(-4.81) (5.24) (8.38) (1.97) (2.53) (2.24) (4.34)
Growth - -0.572 *** + 0.001 ** 0.041 ** 0.033 *** 0.055 0.013 *** 0.640 *
(-2.84) (2.15) (2.38) (4.83) (0.61) (2.86) (1.91)
Concentration - -0.912 *** + 0.002 *** 0.049 * 0.027 *** 0.478 *** 0.020 *** 1.862 ***
(-4.52) (3.88) (3.4) (4.65) (5.47) (4.3) (5.46)
Non Interest Income -/+ 1.402 *** -/+ -0.005 *** -0.102 *** -0.017 -0.171 0.003 -0.557
(3.95) (-4.47) (-3.74) (-1.53) (-1.1) (0.37) (-0.94)
Net Charge Offs - -0.771 *** + 0.002 *** 0.047 *** 0.031 *** 0.137 *** 0.022 *** 1.607 ***
(-14.86) (14.68) (10.61) (17.44) (5.89) (19.41) (18.65)
Cost of Funds - -8.148 ** + 0.010 * 0.042 0.183 * 2.629 *** 0.079 * 2.683
(-4.24) (1.74) (0.28) (2.99) (3.09) (1.82) (0.84)
Inefficiency - -3.379 *** + 0.009 *** 0.152 *** 0.052 *** -0.014 0.047 *** 2.927 ***
(-10.27) (9.51) (5.75) (4.89) (-0.1) (6.37) (5.33)
Real GDP + 11.127 * - -0.005 0.277 -1.734 *** 24.132 *** -0.759 *** 1.309
(2.13) (-0.35) (0.57) (-9.08) (10.21) (-6.67) (0.15)
Adjusted RSQ 33% 25% 15% 46% 24% 50% 34%
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
Risk IndexZ-Score SDROA SDROE Total Risk Systematic Risk Firm Risk
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monetary policy, and low rate levels are associated with an expansionary monetary 
policy. Table 35 reports the base model results hold for Total Risk, Systematic Risk and 
Firm Risk. As higher Federal Rates are predominant in periods of economic growth, the 
results are in line with the base model results that indicated higher levels of GDP Growth 
Rate are favorable to lower the Total Risk and Firm Risk of BHCs. Similar to the base 
model, economic growth has an unfavorable effect on the Systematic Risk of BHCs. 
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Table 35: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model based on pooled data for the 
years 1997 through 2009. Robustness check for Economic Variable: Replacing GDP 
Growth Rate with Average Annual Fed Funds Rate 
(n=1,898) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expected 
Sign
Expected 
Sign
Intercept 7.630 *** -0.004 *** -0.181 *** 0.014 -1.853 *** 0.073 * 0.220
(15.35) (-2.91) (-3.95) (0.86) (-7.2) (5.93) (0.24)
Insider Ownership -0.318 -0.002 *** 0.001 0.010 -0.029 -0.002 -0.921
(-0.83) (-1.92) (0.03) (0.8) (-0.14) (-0.18) (-1.24)
Blockholder Ownership 0.317 0.000 -0.009 0.017 ** 0.051 0.011 ** 0.206
(1.42) (0.43) (-0.41) (2.18) (0.47) (2.19) (0.55)
Outside Director 0.555 0.000 0.006 0.014 0.210 0.001 0.726
(1.5) (-0.27) (0.17) (1.05) (1.22) (0.12) (1.23)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.706 ** 0.000 0.048 0.013 -0.072 0.010 0.630
(1.99) (0.02) (1.35) (0.96) (-0.44) (1.33) (1.13)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) 0.045 0.000 0.002 -0.024 *** -0.319 *** -0.027 *** -0.785 ***
(0.8) (-0.06) (0.31) (-11.72) (-11.99) (-21.64) (-8.6)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) -0.411 *** 0.000 0.004 0.039 *** -0.105 *** 0.014 *** 0.731 ***
(-7.94) (0.12) (0.76) (20.03) (-4.35) (12.65) (8.88)
Insider Ownership*GLBA 0.270 -0.001 -0.018 -0.017 * -0.179 -0.011 -0.694
(0.9) (-1.13) (-0.6) (-1.62) (-1.25) (-1.6) (-1.41)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA -0.216 -0.001 -0.016 -0.015 * 0.062 -0.005 -0.386
(-0.9) (-0.84) (-0.65) (-1.7) (0.56) (-0.89) (-1.02)
Outside Director*GLBA -0.825 ** 0.000 -0.062 -0.019 -0.216 -0.001 -1.000
(-1.98) (-0.27) (-1.48) (-1.2) (-1.12) (-0.07) (-1.52)
M&A =1 if Acquisition 0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.005 *** -0.046 ** -0.001 -0.157 ***
(0.07) (-1.13) (-0.31) (-3.74) (-2.54) (-1.35) (-2.53)
Size -/+ -0.072 *** -/+ 0.000 ** 0.003 0.001 0.099 *** 0.002 *** 0.140 ***
(-3.15) (2.56) (1.55) (0.77) (7.67) (3.05) (2.88)
Leverage - -0.040 *** + 0.000 *** 0.007 *** 0.000 0.017 *** 0.000 0.070 ***
(-4.32) (3.86) (7.98) (0.88) (3.73) (-0.04) (4.58)
Growth - -1.971 *** + 0.002 ** 0.072 ** 0.084 *** -0.108 0.042 *** 2.146 ***
(-5.37) (2.07) (2.02) (6.48) (-0.61) (5.08) (3.57)
Concentration - -0.910 *** + 0.003 *** 0.067 *** 0.026 *** 0.625 *** 0.017 *** 1.767 ***
(-4.38) (4.72) (3.55) (3.97) (5.93) (3.36) (4.76)
Non Interest Income -/+ 1.339 *** -/+ -0.005 *** -0.096 *** -0.023 *** 0.019 0.002 0.042
(3.76) (-4.49) (-2.89) (-1.98) (0.11) (0.28) (0.07)
Net Charge Offs - -0.810 *** + 0.002 *** 0.047 *** 0.034 *** 0.215 *** 0.021 *** 1.702 ***
(-14.2) (14.26) (8.5) (16.66) (7.94) (16.59) (18.37)
Cost of Funds - -4.828 ** + -0.001 0.142 0.146 6.695 *** 0.282 *** 8.402 *
(-1.92) (-0.1) (0.61) (1.8) (5.33) (4.71) (1.91)
Inefficiency - -3.073 *** + 0.008 *** 0.153 *** 0.046 *** 0.181 0.031 *** 1.908 ***
(-8.74) (7.52) (4.58) (3.88) (1.06) (3.83) (3.22)
Federal Funds Rate + 0.784 - 0.003 -0.064 -0.168 *** 9.271 *** -0.415 *** 0.263
(0.5) (0.66) (-0.42) (-3.07) (12.37) (-11.67) (0.1)
Adjusted RSQ 38% 27% 16% 48% 26% 55% 40%
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
Z Score Risk IndexSDROA SDROE Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
Firm Risk
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5.4.3 Leverage, Income Structure, Asset Quality and Liquidity 
 
 
     Tables 36 through 39 report robustness checks for bank control variables: BHCs 
capital ratio, income structure, asset quality and liquidity. Results in Table 36 report that 
when substituting the Leverage measure with the Tier1 Ratio (Tier1 Capital divided by 
Total Assets) the effect of Leverage in the risk profile of BHCs remains unchanged. 
BHCs with higher regulatory capital ratios have a lower risk profile. 
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Table 36: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model based on pooled data for the 
years 1997 through 2009. Robustness check for Leverage: Replacing Capital Ratio with 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
(n=1,898) 
 
      
 
Expected 
Sign
Expected 
Sign
Intercept 6.553 *** -0.005 * -0.063 0.016 -1.455 *** 0.046 *** -0.159
(12.28) (-3) (-1.33) (0.89) (-5.19) (3.29) (-0.15)
Insider Ownership -0.395 -0.002 * 0.017 0.011 0.064 -0.003 -0.684
(-1.06) (-1.69) (0.52) (0.87) (0.32) (-0.29) (-0.91)
Blockholder Ownership 0.339 0.000 -0.014 0.018 ** 0.074 0.009 * 0.134
(1.53) (0.38) (-0.69) (2.31) (0.68) (1.78) (0.35)
Outside Director 0.465 0.000 0.012 0.017 0.157 0.004 0.845
(1.26) (-0.22) (0.33) (1.25) (0.9) (0.48) (1.43)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.721 ** 0.000 0.060 0.005 0.007 0.010 0.762
(2.02) (0.29) (1.56) (0.37) (0.04) (1.3) (1.35)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.017 *** -0.274 *** -0.027 *** -0.770 ***
(-0.03) (-0.37) (0.17) (-8.08) (-9.67) (-19.69) (-8.01)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) -0.303 *** 0.000 0.006 0.023 *** 0.068 ** 0.009 *** 0.693 ***
(-4.52) (0.64) (0.86) (9.5) (2.18) (6.29) (6.59)
Insider Ownership*GLBA 0.215 -0.001 -0.010 -0.019 * -0.167 -0.011 -0.696
(0.72) (-1.15) (-0.36) (-1.83) (-1.15) (-1.53) (-1.4)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA -0.233 -0.001 -0.006 -0.021 ** 0.032 -0.003 -0.457
(-0.97) (-0.98) (-0.26) (-2.46) (0.28) (-0.5) (-1.2)
Outside Director*GLBA -0.750 * -0.001 -0.073 -0.022 -0.170 -0.004 -1.130
(-1.8) (-0.41) (-1.73) (-1.44) (-0.87) (-0.42) (-1.72)
M&A =1 if Acquisition 0.017 0.000 -0.004 -0.005 *** -0.036 ** -0.002 ** -0.155 ***
(0.44) (-1.09) (-1.03) (-3.43) (-1.97) (-1.98) (-2.5)
Size -/+ -0.052 ** -/+ 0.000 *** 0.002 0.001 0.096 *** 0.001 *** 0.166 ***
(-2.27) (3.23) (0.84) (0.94) (7.38) (2.08) (3.25)
Leverage (Tier1/RWA) + 3.651 *** - 0.004 -0.413 *** -0.078 ** -1.484 *** 0.096 2.469
(3.97) (1.49) (-4.84) (-2.45) (-3.27) (1.36) (1.57)
Growth - -1.955 *** + 0.002 * 0.057 0.084 *** 0.311 0.056 *** 2.389 ***
(-5.36) (1.65) (1.62) (6.54) (1.77) (6.63) (3.99)
Concentration - -0.922 *** + 0.003 *** 0.068 *** 0.023 *** 0.610 *** 0.019 *** 1.886 ***
(-4.54) (4.98) (3.8) (3.47) (5.78) (3.61) (5.02)
Non Interest Income -/+ 1.357 *** -/+ -0.005 *** -0.112 *** -0.021 * -0.178 0.006 -0.397
(3.88) (-5.13) (-3.57) (-1.76) (-1) (0.69) (-0.64)
Net Charge Offs - -0.828 *** + 0.002 *** 0.050 *** 0.033 *** 0.159 *** 0.024 *** 1.696 ***
(-15.16) (14.81) (9.4) (17.09) (6.06) (19.28) (18.88)
Cost of Funds - -6.494 *** + 0.004 0.379 ** 0.107 2.131 ** 0.098 ** 4.614
(-3.3) (0.69) (2.1) (1.59) (2.17) (2.06) (1.35)
Inefficiency - -3.203 *** + 0.008 *** 0.185 *** 0.055 *** -0.107 0.052 *** 2.534 ***
(-9.43) (8.24) (5.88) (4.68) (-0.64) (6.42) (4.35)
Real GDP + 9.912 * - 0.019 0.651 -1.893 *** 24.542 *** -0.720 *** 0.057
(1.82) (1.21) (1.16) (-9.47) (9.73) (-6.02) (0.01)
Adjusted RSQ 38% 27% 14% 51% 24% 54% 39%
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
Z-Score Risk IndexSDROA SDROE Total Risk Systematic Risk Firm Risk
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     The use of Trading Revenue income (Trading Revenue to Total Income) in place of 
Non-Interest Income does not change the results in the base model (Table 37). 
Nontraditional banking activities, reflected in Trading Revenue, suggest a potential 
source of diversification in the income structure of BHCs, lowering their risk profile.  
Table 37: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model based on pooled data for the 
years 1997 through 2009. Robustness check for Income Structure: Replacing Non-
Interest Income with Trading Revenue 
(n=1,898) 
 
Expected 
Sign
Expected 
Sign
Intercept 7.527 ** -0.005 *** -0.202 *** 0.040 ** -1.837 *** 0.069 *** -0.177
(14.39) (-3.14) (-4.17) (2.36) (-6.92) (5.3) (-0.18)
Insider Ownership -0.234 -0.003 ** -0.009 0.009 0.050 -0.004 -0.968
(-0.6) (-2.17) (-0.25) (0.75) (0.25) (-0.43) (-1.29)
Blockholder Ownership 0.318 0.000 -0.011 0.018 *** 0.077 0.010 ** 0.206
(1.41) (0.39) (-0.5) (2.34) (0.7) (1.88) (0.55)
Outside Director 0.545 0.000 0.007 0.017 0.137 0.004 0.733
(1.47) (-0.3) (0.19) (1.29) (0.78) (0.46) (1.25)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.813 ** 0.000 0.047 0.004 -0.002 0.009 0.582
(2.28) (-0.18) (1.3) (0.28) (-0.01) (1.15) (1.04)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) 0.009 0.000 0.000 -0.017 *** -0.271 *** -0.026 *** -0.787 ***
(0.14) (-0.22) (-0.06) (-7.96) (-9.57) (-19.52) (-8.22)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) -0.343 ** 0.000 0.010 0.023 *** 0.079 *** 0.009 *** 0.705 ***
(-5.13) (0.67) (1.41) (9.47) (2.51) (6.05) (6.73)
Insider Ownership*GLBA 0.233 -0.001 -0.010 -0.019 -0.185 -0.010 -0.673
(0.77) (-0.9) (-0.33) (-1.77) (-1.27) (-1.42) (-1.37)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA -0.205 0.000 -0.010 -0.021 *** 0.017 -0.001 -0.362
(-0.85) (-0.69) (-0.43) (-2.38) (0.15) (-0.27) (-0.96)
Outside Director*GLBA -0.856 ** 0.000 -0.057 -0.022 -0.149 -0.003 -0.962
(-2.05) (-0.09) (-1.35) (-1.43) (-0.76) (-0.36) (-1.47)
M&A =1 if Acquisition -0.005 0.000 -0.001 -0.005 *** -0.029 -0.002 ** -0.156 **
(-0.13) (-0.92) (-0.33) (-3.47) (-1.61) (-2.34) (-2.54)
Size -/+ -0.056 ** -/+ 0.000 ** 0.003 -0.001 0.102 *** 0.002 *** 0.167 ***
(-2.35) (2.21) (1.22) (-0.72) (7.96) (3.09) (3.33)
Leverage - -0.046 *** + 0.000 *** 0.008 *** 0.001 * 0.011 ** 0.000 0.070 ***
(-4.95) (4.44) (8.51) (1.6) (2.42) (1.1) (4.59)
Growth - -2.068 *** + 0.002 * 0.063 * 0.082 *** 0.283 0.052 *** 2.079 ***
(-5.66) (1.82) (1.77) (6.45) (1.62) (6.19) (3.5)
Concentration - -0.970 *** + 0.003 *** 0.076 *** 0.025 *** 0.625 *** 0.017 *** 1.739 ***
(-4.64) (5.18) (3.94) (3.84) (5.95) (3.3) (4.69)
Tradign Revenue -/+ 7.424 ** -/+ -0.038 *** -0.709 ** 0.062 -0.755 0.046 -11.124 *
(2.02) (-3.37) (-2.09) (0.53) (-0.41) (0.51) (-1.7)
Net Charge Offs - -0.825 *** + 0.002 *** 0.052 *** 0.033 *** 0.156 *** 0.024 *** 1.700 ***
(-15.13) (15.46) (9.7) (17.55) (5.96) (19.48) (19.17)
Cost of Funds - -5.677 ** + 0.008 0.188 0.084 1.905 * 0.128 *** 7.443 **
(-2.76) (1.23) (0.95) (1.2) (1.91) (2..66) (2.18)
Inefficiency - -2.727 *** + 0.007 *** 0.131 *** 0.039 *** -0.171 0.048 *** 2.035 ***
(-8.33) (6.76) (4.23) (3.67) (-1.06) (6.17) (3.65)
Real GDP + 9.770 * - 0.014 0.709 -1.955 *** 24.839 *** -0.758 *** -1.485
(1.81) (0.89) (1.3) (-9.77) (9.85) (-6.31) (-0.18)
Adjusted RSQ 37% 27% 16% 51% 24% 53% 40%
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
SDROA SDROE Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
Firm RiskZ-Score Risk Index
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     The asset quality dimension is tested for robustness with a forward looking view of 
credit quality of the bank’s loans by replacing the ratio of Net Charge Offs with the ratio 
of Loan Loss Provisions. Results in Table 38 confirm that expectations of deterioration in 
the credit quality of a bank’s loan portfolio would increase the BHC’s risk profile. 
 
Table 38: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model based on pooled data for the 
years 1997 through 2009. Robustness check for Asset Quality: Replacing Net Charge 
Offs with Loan Loss Provisions  
(n=1,898) 
 
      
Expected Sign
Expected 
Sign
Intercept 7.784 *** -0.006 *** -0.216 *** 0.025 -1.930 *** 0.060 *** -0.449
(15.73) (-3.74) (-4.66) (1.53) (-7.54) (4.65) (-0.48)
Insider Ownership -0.322 -0.002 * -0.002 0.009 0.059 -0.005 -0.903
(-0.84) (-1.91) (-0.06) (0.78) (0.29) (-0.52) (-1.21)
Blockholder Ownership 0.440 0.000 -0.018 0.013 * 0.058 0.006 -0.032
(1.57) (-0.04) (-0.82) (1.67) (0.53) (1.19) (-0.08)
Outside Director 0.467 0.000 0.009 0.020 0.146 0.006 0.870
(1.27) (-0.16) (0.25) (1.53) (0.83) (0.72) (1.47)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.634 ** 0.000 0.058 0.009 0.023 0.013 0.856
(1.79) (0.35) (1.62) (0.69) (0.14) (1.57) (1.52)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) 0.005 0.000 -0.002 -0.017 *** -0.268 *** -0.026 *** -0.770 ***
(0.08) (-0.52) (-0.26) (-7.81) (-9.43) (-19.32) (-8)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) -0.272 *** 0.000 0.008 0.020 *** 0.073 ** 0.007 *** 0.597 ***
(-4.02) (0.29) (1.18) (7.99) (2.28) (4.78) (5.57)
Insider Ownership*GLBA 0.257 -0.001 -0.016 -0.017 * -0.191 -0.010 -0.698
(0.85) (-1.15) (-0.53) (-1.65) (-1.31) (-1.37) (-1.41)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA -0.315 0.000 -0.005 -0.015 * 0.038 0.003 -0.132
(-1.32) (-0.34) (-0.19) (-1.76) (0.34) (0.47) (-0.35)
Outside Director*GLBA -0.726 * -0.001 -0.066 -0.025 * -0.169 -0.006 -1.192 *
(-1.75) (-0.45) (-1.56) (-1.68) (-0.86) (-0.66) (-1.8)
M&A =1 if Acquisition -0.006 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 *** -0.031 * -0.002 ** -0.150 **
(-0.15) (-1.27) (-0.52) (-3.21) (-1.7) (-2.13) (-2.42)
Size -/+ -0.078 *** -/+ 0.000 *** 0.004 ** 0.000 0.108 *** 0.002 *** 0.161 ***
(-3.42) (3.33) (2.16) (0.4) (8.59) (2.83) (3.31)
Leverage - -0.035 *** + 0.000 *** 0.007 *** 0.000 0.009 ** 0.000 0.059 ***
(-3.82) (3.27) (7.65) (0.59) (2.07) (0.47) (3.85)
Growth - -1.563 *** + 0.003 *** 0.093 ** 0.062 *** 0.364 ** 0.041 *** 1.366 **
(-4.28) (3.03) (2.59) (4.84) (2.07) (4.85) (2.28)
Concentration - -0.860 *** + 0.003 *** 0.065 *** 0.022 *** 0.607 *** 0.017 *** 1.740 ***
(-4.16) (4.5) (3.38) (3.27) (5.74) (3.21) (4.65)
Non Interest Income -/+ 1.186 *** -/+ -0.005 *** -0.101 *** -0.010 -0.181 0.015 0.323
(3.33) (-4.46) (-2.99) (-0.88) (-1.01) (1.56) (0.52)
Loan Loss Provisions - -0.649 *** + 0.002 *** 0.034 *** 0.028 *** 0.106 *** 0.019 *** 1.302 ***
(-14.87) (12.47) (7.75) (18.46) (5.06) (19.19) (18.36)
Cost of Funds - -5.867 *** + 0.006 0.151 0.144 ** 2.001 ** 0.066 4.656
(-2.89) (0.94) (0.77) (2.11) (1.99) (1.36) (1.34)
Inefficiency - -3.167 *** + 0.009 *** 0.177 *** 0.048 *** -0.053 0.051 *** 2.312 ***
(-9.18) (8.5) (5.3) (4.08) (-0.31) (6.24) (3.98)
Real GDP + 3.775 - 0.023 0.883 -1.667 *** 25.481 *** -0.614 *** 7.383
(0.69) (1.41) (1.58) (-8.33) (9.95) (-5.04) (0.86)
Adjusted RSQ 38% 25% 15% 52% 24% 53% 39%
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
Z-Score Risk IndexSDROA SDROE Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
Firm Risk
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     Bank Liquidity dimension is tested for robustness by replacing the proxy measure of 
Cost of Funds with the ratio of Jumbo Deposits to Total Assets. Table 39 indicates that 
bank’s use of more expensive deposits to fund their asset base is associated with higher 
risk profile.  
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Table 39: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model based on pooled data for the 
years 1997 through 2009. Robustness check for Liquidity: Replacing Cost of Funds with 
Jumbo Deposits to Total Assets Ratio  
(n=1,898) 
 
 
 
 
 
Expected 
Sign
Expected 
Sign
Intercept 7.502 *** -0.004 *** -0.174 *** 0.036 ** -1.860 *** 0.065 *** -0.138
(15.43) (-2.88) (-3.95) (2.23) (-7.53) (5) (-0.15)
Insider Ownership -0.313 -0.002 ** 0.001 0.010 0.075 -0.007 -0.964
(-0.84) (-1.91) (0.02) (0.81) (0.38) (-0.66) (-1.3)
Blockholder Ownership 0.304 0.000 -0.007 0.020 *** 0.067 0.009 * 0.127
(1.37) (0.51) (-0.32) (2.61) (0.62) (1.76) (0.34)
Outside Director 0.511 0.000 0.003 0.017 0.140 0.003 0.688
(1.39) (-0.32) (0.07) (1.29) (0.8) (0.42) (1.16)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.766 ** 0.000 0.054 0.004 -0.009 0.009 0.574
(2.15) (0.11) (1.52) (0.28) (-0.06) (1.12) (1.02)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) 0.080 0.000 -0.001 -0.018 *** -0.241 *** -0.025 *** -0.681 ***
(1.47) (-0.43) (-0.18) (-9.27) (-9.34) (-20.11) (-7.75)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) -0.366 *** 0.000 0.010 0.024 * 0.093 *** 0.008 *** 0.666 ***
(-5.55) (0.75) (1.56) (9.73) (3.03) (5.73) (6.45)
Insider Ownership*GLBA 0.259 -0.001 -0.017 -0.019 *** -0.166 -0.010 -0.666
(0.87) (-1.15) (-0.61) (-1.85) (-1.15) (-1.4) (-1.35)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA -0.170 -0.001 -0.013 -0.021 ** 0.008 -0.001 -0.339
(-0.71) (-0.86) (-0.54) (-2.36) (0.07) (-0.11) (-0.9)
Outside Director*GLBA -0.810 ** 0.000 -0.063 -0.022 -0.150 -0.003 -0.939
(-1.94) (-0.28) (-1.51) (-1.42) (-0.76) (-0.32) (-1.43)
M&A =1 if Acquisition 0.004 0.000 -0.002 -0.005 *** -0.032 * -0.002 ** -0.151 **
(0.1) (-1.12) (-0.44) (-3.65) (-1.73) (-2.18) (-2.45)
Size -/+ -0.080 *** -/+ 0.000 *** 0.003 0.000 0.109 *** 0.002 *** 0.132 ***
(-3.58) (2.65) (1.55) (0.28) (9.05) (3.37) (2.7)
Leverage - -0.041 *** + 0.000 *** 0.007 *** 0.001 * 0.009 ** 0.000 0.064 ***
(-4.54) (3.69) (8.2) (1.85) (2.1) (1.02) (4.21)
Growth - -1.910 *** + 0.002 ** 0.060 0.080 *** 0.294 * 0.053 *** 2.154 ***
(-5.26) (2.08) (1.73) (6.32) (1.68) (6.2) (3.61)
Concentration - -0.891 *** + 0.003 *** 0.065 *** 0.024 *** 0.568 *** 0.018 *** 1.815 ***
(-4.39) (4.79) (3.67) (3.73) (5.5) (3.38) (4.88)
Non Interest Income -/+ 1.354 *** -/+ -0.005 *** -0.094 *** -0.017 *** -0.211 0.016 0.281
(3.88) (-4.59) (-2.98) (-1.47) (-1.22) (1.81) (0.46)
Net Charge Offs - -0.808 *** + 0.002 *** 0.049 *** 0.033 *** 0.148 *** 0.025 *** 1.689 ***
(-14.8) (14.81) (9.29) (17.15) (5.67) (19.41) (18.91)
Jumbo Deposits to Total Assets - -0.677 ** + 0.000 -0.011 -0.005 0.500 *** -0.010 -0.142
(-2.29) (-0.04) (-0.41) (-0.47) (3.38) (-1.33) (-0.27)
Inefficiency - -2.824 *** + 0.008 *** 0.145 *** 0.041 *** -0.158 0.054 *** 2.446 ***
(-8.89) (8.01) (4.88) (3.81) (-1.02) (7.07) (4.58)
Real GDP + 7.575 - 0.016 0.729 -1.917 *** 25.623 *** -0.798 *** -4.491
(1.41) (0.99) (1.33) (-9.6) (10.2) (-6.71) (-0.54)
Adjusted RSQ 38% 27% 16% 51% 24% 53% 40%
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
SDROA SDROE Total Risk Systematic Risk Firm RiskZ-Score Risk Index
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5.4.4 Investment Banking (IB) Breakdown Reporting  
 
 
     The impact of nontraditional banking activities is further examined by taking into 
consideration the Investment Banking reporting items to include only these three sources:          
1) Fees and commissions from securities brokerage, 2) Investment Banking advisory and 
underwriting fees and commissions, and, 3) Fees and commissions from annuity sales. 
The regression analysis is performed for the period 2004-2009, to account for an 
adjustment period after the passage of the GLBA and the availability of Investment 
Banking reporting breakdown of these three nontraditional activities. IB share is included 
in the model as the proxy for BHC income structure. The results in Table 40 indicate that 
nontraditional banking activities help diversify the income structure of BHCs and thus 
lower the risk profile of banks. While the impact and significance of the control variables 
remain similar to the base model, the impact of the corporate governance variables 
changes by lowering the level of statistical significance found in the base model.  
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Table 40: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model based on pooled data for the 
years 2004 through 2009. Investment Banking Activity Reporting Availability  
(n=876) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expected 
Sign
Expected 
Sign
Intercept 7.872 *** -0.015 *** -0.315 *** 0.009 -0.638 0.025 -1.649
(9.58) (-5.22) (-3.37) (0.4) (-1.6) (1.51) (-1.22)
Insider Ownership -0.597 -0.003 0.018 0.008 0.214 0.015 0.804
(-0.98) (-1.38) (0.28) (0.52) (0.75) (1.25) (0.8)
Blockholder Ownership 0.586 0.000 -0.040 0.006 -0.101 0.009 -0.763
(1.61) (0.07) (-1.09) (0.67) (-0.64) (1.34) (-1.44)
Outside Director 0.256 0.000 -0.080 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.564
(0.69) (0.01) (-1.6) (-0.3) (-0.01) (-0.07) (-0.95)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) -0.234 *** 0.000 0.008 0.018 <.0001*** 0.020 0.008 *** 0.517 ***
(-3.51) (-0.24) (0.79) (8.28) (0.58) (5.74) (4.87)
M&A =1 if Acquisition 0.037 0.000 -0.002 -0.005 *** -0.046 * -0.003 ** -0.210 **
(0.7) (-0.58) (-0.27) (-3.06) (-1.67) (-2.41) (-2.53)
Size -/+ -0.065 * -/+ 0.000 ** 0.006 0.001 0.056 *** 0.000 0.211 ***
(-1.7) (2.45) (1.54) (1.22) (3.08) (0.02) (3.32)
Leverage - -0.040 *** + 0.000 *** 0.014 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.099 ***
(-2.86) (8.07) (7.62) (0.82) (0.04) (-0.09) (4.4)
Growth - -0.313 + 0.003 0.114 0.095 <.0001*** 0.629 ** 0.059 *** 2.594 ***
(-0.49) (1.03) (1.36) (5.18) (1.95) (4.42) (2.55)
Concentration - -1.433 *** + 0.005 *** 0.113 *** 0.044 <.0001*** 0.459 *** 0.033 *** 2.720 ***
(-3.91) (4.16) (2.89) (4.81) (2.62) (4.56) (4.49)
IB Income -/+ -0.308 -/+ -0.019 * -0.532 -0.169 ** -3.054 * -0.150 ** -9.848 *
(-0.1) (-1.65) (-1.42) (-1.99) (-1.94) (-2.31) (-1.9)
Net Charge Offs - -0.868 *** + 0.003 *** 0.061 *** 0.038 <.0001*** 0.258 *** 0.026 *** 2.048 ***
(-12.64) (11) (6.37) (18.26) (7.28) (18.21) (18.65)
Cost of Funds - -8.702 ** + 0.018 0.175 0.374 <.0001*** 2.144 0.380 *** 17.199 ***
(-2.87) (1.55) (0.44) (4.27) (1.39) (5.99) (3.52)
Inefficiency - -2.206 *** + 0.012 *** 0.224 *** 0.035 *** -0.194 0.042 *** 2.553 ***
(-4.82) (6.91) (3.95) (2.78) (-0.85) (4.46) (3.44)
Real GDP + 22.528 * - -0.045 ** -1.589 * -2.783 <.0001*** 30.994 *** -1.095 *** -8.535
(4) (-1.97) (-1.8) (-15.27) (10.41) (-8.96) (-0.96)
Adjusted RSQ 53% 40% 21% 79% 19% 74% 65%
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
Z-Score Risk IndexSDROA SDROE Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
Firm Risk
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5.4.5 Lagged Corporate Governance Variables 
 
 
     Cornett et. al. (2007) suggest that lagging ownership governance variables helps 
mitigate the simultaneity issues as it facilitates to test the hypothesis of how insider or 
blockholder ownership affect the risk profile, which is the main purpose of this model. 
While Cornett et. al. (2007) do not indicate a similar issue with presence of Outside 
Director in the board, the base model is modified to include the lag of Outside Director 
variable. Table 41 shows that the lagged variable of the board structure makes no 
difference to the base model regression results.  
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Table 41: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model based on pooled data for the 
years 2004 through 2009. Lagged Corporate Governance Variables  
(n=1,898) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expected 
Sign
Expected 
Sign
Intercept 7.413 *** -0.004 * -0.188 *** 0.020 ** -1.994 *** 0.066 *** -0.283
Insider Ownership -0.289 -0.002 ** 0.000 0.011 0.078 -0.006 -0.798
Blockholder Ownership 0.307 0.000 -0.009 0.018 ** 0.073 0.010 ** 0.182
Outside Director (Lagged) 0.683 -0.001 0.004 0.032 0.321 0.008 1.465
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.936 ** 0.001 0.083 0.011 0.093 0.011 0.900
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) 0.017 0.000 0.000 -0.017 *** -0.270 *** -0.026 *** -0.778 ***
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) -0.342 *** 0.000 0.010 0.023 *** 0.078 * 0.009 *** 0.711 ***
Insider Ownership*GLBA 0.259 -0.001 -0.020 -0.019 * -0.195 -0.010 -0.712
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA -0.190 -0.001 -0.014 -0.020 ** 0.022 -0.001 -0.364
Outside Director (Lagged)*GLBA -1.031 ** -0.001 -0.097 -0.031 -0.258 -0.006 -1.337
M&A =1 if Acquisition 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.005 *** -0.030 -0.002 *** -0.152 ***
Size -/+ -0.070 *** -/+ 0.000 *** 0.003 * 0.000 0.105 *** 0.002 *** 0.136 ***
Leverage - -0.041 *** + 0.000 *** 0.007 *** 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.070 ***
Growth - -1.951 *** + 0.002 ** 0.068 * 0.082 *** -0.287 0.053 *** 2.213 ***
Concentration - -0.898 *** + 0.003 *** 0.068 *** 0.024 *** 0.612 *** 0.017 *** 1.738 ***
Non Interest Income -/+ 1.299 ** -/+ -0.005 *** -0.096 *** -0.016 -0.189 0.012 0.046
Net Charge Offs - -0.803 *** + 0.002 *** 0.049 *** 0.033 * 0.154 *** 0.025 *** 1.701 ***
Cost of Funds - -4.318 ** + 0.002 0.054 0.086 1.706 * 0.114 *** 8.234 ***
Inefficiency - -3.084 *** + 0.008 *** 0.151 *** 0.048 *** -0.124 0.046 *** 1.845 ***
Real GDP + 8.945 * - 0.014 0.672 -1.937 *** 24.961 *** -0.762 *** -2.205
Adjusted RSQ 38% 27% 16% 51% 24% 53% 40%
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
(-1.06)
(5.83)
(1.7)
(-0.73)
(9.9)
(-1.08)
(-1.62)
(8.19)
(2.24)
(-1.63)
(0.9) (1.23) (-9.69) (-6.37) (-0.26)
(-8.88) (7.52) (4.63) (4.07) (5.6) (3.16)
(1.66)
(-2.12) (0.31) (0.28) (1.25) (2.34) (2.39)
(-14.67) (14.77) (9.22) (17.16) (19.49) (19.08)
(3.66) (-4.57) (-2.96) (-1.34) (1.35) (0.07)
(-4.34) (4.78) (3.67) (3.54) (3.23) (4.68)(5.77)
(-5.35) (2.18) (1.93) (6.38) (6.23) (3.72)
(-4.44) (3.74) (8.03) (1.39) (1.22) (4.59)
(-3.06) (2.68) (1.69) (0.09) (3.25) (2.82)
(0.05) (-1.13) (-0.44) (-3.52) (-2.25) (-2.46)
(-2.04) (-0.65) (-1.52) (-1.57) (-0.52) (-1.57)
(-0.8) (-0.93) (-0.6) (-2.27) (-0.23) (-0.96)(0.19)
(0.86) (-1.22) (-0.69) (-1.8) (-1.42) (-1.44)
(-5.12) (0.68) (1.44) (9.42) (6.1) (6.78)(2.48)
(0.29) (-0.22) (-0.08) (-8.08) (-19.46) (-8.11)
(2.17) (0.5) (1.53) (0.73) (1.16) (1.32)(0.46)
(1.57) (0.76) (1.62)
(0.67)(1.37) (0.5) (-0.4) (2.38) (1.86) (0.48)
(4.8) (-0.29)
(-0.76) (-1.95) (0.01) (0.91) (-0.53) (-1.08)
(13.75) (-2.65) (-3.79) (-7.22)
(0.38)
(1.5)
(1.09)
(1.51) (-0.43) (0.1)
SDROA SDROE Total Risk Systematic Risk Firm Risk Risk IndexZ-Score
(-9.5)
(-1.34)
113 
 
5.4.6 2007-2009 Crisis Period 
 
 
     The impact of the crisis period is analyzed by running the model separately for the 
periods 1997-2006 and 2007-2009. The results are presented by risk measure for the base 
model (1997-2009), the period before the crisis (1997-2006), and the crisis period (2007-
2009). 
 
     With regards to the hypothesis variables, the overall significance levels of the 
coefficients do not change. While in the estimation covering the entire period the lag of 
Insider Ownership was only significant for SDROA, the significance drops when 
considering the sub periods (Table 43). The coefficient for Insider Ownership is 
significant with a negative effect for the Before-Crisis period in the regression with 
SDROE (Table 44). In a similar way, the lag of Blockholder is significant only regressed 
on Total Risk and Firm Risk in the estimation covering the entire period (1997-2009); 
however, the significance drops in the sub-period analysis (Table 45 and 47, 
respectively). The coefficient for Blockholder Ownership is significant with a positive 
sign during the Before-Crisis period for SDROE (Table 43), consistent with the initial 
relation found for this governance variable in the base model for SDROA. The coefficient 
for Outside Directors in the Board continues to lack significance across all models and 
sub-periods. Table 42 shows that the coefficient for the interaction term 
(Blockholder*GLBA) is significant during the Before-Crisis period, suggesting that 
higher levels of Blockholder Ownership increases BHC’s Insolvency Risk. The 
coefficients for both Insider and Blockholder Ownership interaction terms drop the 
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significance in the regression with Total Risk (Table 45). The coefficients for the 
hypotheses variables remain unchanged in the regression with Systematic Risk. 
 
     Turning to the control variables, their impact remains similar to the base model except 
for the Environmental Control Variable. The coefficient for Real GDP Growth has the 
opposite of the expected sign in the Before-Crisis model for Insolvency Risk (Table 42) 
Total Risk (Table 45), Firm Risk (Table 47) and the Risk Index (Table 48) measures. 
These results indicate that the crisis period has influenced to a large extent the initial 
results in the base model with regards to the impact of economic activity and the risk 
profile of banks. While the initial results have lead us to conclude that expansionary 
economic activity decreases the risk of BHCs for the abovementioned variables, the 
robustness tests indicate that BHCs are subject to more uncertainties during economic 
growth cycles, in line with the initial relationship found between Real GDP Growth and 
Systematic Risk. 
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Table 42: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model for Insolvency Risk to 
Examine the Crisis Period Impact  
 
Expected 
Sign
Entire Period 
(1997-2009)
Intercept 7.536 *** 7.855 *** 7.509 ***
(15.16) (13.71) (7.81)
Insider Ownership -0.317 -0.227 0.171
(-0.83) (-0.56) (0.24)
Blockholder Ownership 0.311 0.295 0.613
(1.4) (1.24) (1.62)
Outside Director 0.542 0.575 0.730
(1.47) (1.5) (1.3)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.753 ** 0.677 *
(2.12) (1.78)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) 0.014 0.131 *
(0.23) (1.9)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) -0.339 ***
(-5.08)
Insider Ownerhsip*GLBA 0.279 0.263
(0.93) (0.75)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA -0.192 -0.560 **
(-0.8) (-2.07)
Outside Director*GLBA -0.815 ** -1.006 **
(-1.96) (-2.28)
M&A =1 if Acquisition 0.001 -0.001 -0.089
(0.03) (-0.01) (-1.3)
Size -/+ -0.070 *** -0.070 ** -0.098 ***
(-3.07) (-2.71) (-2.43)
Leverage - -0.041 *** -0.040 *** -0.029 *
(-4.45) (-3.46) (-1.77)
Growth - -1.964 *** -2.136 *** -0.752
(-5.38) (-5.16) (-0.8)
Concentration - -0.899 *** -0.774 *** -1.721 ***
(-4.34) (-3.26) (-3.96)
Non Interest Income -/+ 1.300 *** 1.537 *** 0.285
(3.66) (3.36) (0.49)
Net Charge Offs - -0.805 *** -0.689 *** -0.872 ***
(-14.71) (-8.12) (-11.36)
Cost of Funds - -4.432 ** -5.158 ** -5.067
(-2.18) (-2.19) (-1.28)
Inefficiency - -3.073 *** -3.221 *** -1.935 ***
(-8.85) (-7) (-3.84)
Real GDP + 9.175 * -24.913 ** 22.548 ***
(1.7) (-2.13) (4.44)
n 1898 1606 438
Adjusted RSQ 38% 13% 56%
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
Z-Score
Before Crisis           
(1997-2006)
Crisis Period         
(2007-2009)
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Table 43: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model for SDROA to Examine the 
Crisis Period Impact  
 
Expected 
Sign
Entire Period 
(1997-2009)
Intercept -0.005 *** 0.008 *** -0.021 ***
(-2.97) (10.12) (-4.34)
Insider Ownership -0.002 *** 0.000 -0.005
(-1.9) (0.12) (-1.33)
Blockholder Ownership 0.000 0.000 0.002
(0.43) (0.18) (0.89)
Outside Director 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.3) (0.73) (0.01)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.000 0.000
(0.08) (-0.24)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) 0.000 0.000 **
(-0.31) (-2.28)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) 0.000
(0.69)
Insider Ownerhsip*GLBA -0.001 0.000
(-1.13) (0.21)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA -0.001 0.000
(-0.83) (-1.62)
Outside Director*GLBA 0.000 0.000
(-0.25) (-0.03)
M&A =1 if Acquisition 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000
(-1.12) (-1.87) (-0.98)
Size -/+ 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 **
(2.61) (1.14) (2.35)
Leverage + 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.001 ***
(3.78) (-8.7) (6.62)
Growth + 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.006
(2.12) (5) (1.3)
Concentration + 0.003 *** 0.000 0.006 ***
(4.74) (0.2) (2.82)
Non Interest Income -/+ -0.005 *** -0.003 *** -0.004
(-4.58) (-5.15) (-1.45)
Net Charge Offs + 0.002 *** 0.000 0.002 ***
(14.78) (0.1) (5.54)
Cost of Funds + 0.002 0.022 *** 0.008
(0.28) (8.67) (0.37)
Inefficiency + 0.008 *** 0.005 *** 0.018 ***
(7.54) (9.63) (6.68)
Real GDP - 0.015 -0.004 0.066 ***
(0.97) (-0.38) (2.27)
n 1898 1606 438
Adjusted RSQ 27% 17% 44%
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
SDROA
Before Crisis           
(1997-2006)
Crisis Period         
(2007-2009)
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Table 44: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model for SDROE to Examine the 
Crisis Period Impact  
 
Expected 
Sign
Entire Period 
(1997-2009)
Intercept -0.194 *** 0.039 *** -0.364 ***
(-4.19) (3.22) (-2.16)
Insider Ownership -0.001 -0.024 *** 0.032
(-0.02) (-2.64) (0.27)
Blockholder Ownership -0.010 0.008 ** -0.035
(-0.49) (1.9) (-0.54)
Outside Director 0.006 0.008 -0.171
(0.17) (1.29) (-1.6)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.053 0.003
(1.48) (0.54)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) -0.001 0.000
(-0.17) (-0.01)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) 0.010
(1.44)
Insider Ownerhsip*GLBA -0.016 -0.008
(-0.55) (-1.44)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA -0.011 0.001
(-0.47) (0.3)
Outside Director*GLBA -0.061 -0.005
(-1.47) (-0.79)
M&A =1 if Acquisition -0.002 -0.001 -0.010
(-0.44) (-1.55) (-0.64)
Size -/+ 0.003 * 0.000 0.009
(1.6) (0.66) (1.32)
Leverage + 0.007 *** 0.001 *** 0.019 ***
(8.02) (6.76) (5.86)
Growth + 0.069 * 0.035 ** 0.195
(1.94) (5) (1.11)
Concentration + 0.069 *** 0.001 0.145 **
(3.64) (0.12) (2.02)
Non Interest Income -/+ -0.098 *** -0.025 *** -0.092
(-2.93) (-2.89) (-0.86)
Net Charge Offs + 0.049 *** 0.002 0.052 ***
(9.21) (1.6) (3.26)
Cost of Funds + 0.067 0.177 *** 0.316
(0.35) (4.26) (0.4)
Inefficiency + 0.157 *** 0.047 *** 0.335 ***
(4.71) (5.78) (3.29)
Real GDP - 0.738 -0.251 2.349 *
(1.35) (-1.41) (1.86)
n 1898 1606 438
Adjusted RSQ 16% 8% 24%
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
SDROE
Before Crisis           
(1997-2006)
Crisis Period         
(2007-2009)
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Table 45: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model for Total Risk to Examine 
the Crisis Period Impact  
 
 
Expected 
Sign
Entire Period 
(1997-2009)
Intercept 0.031 ** -0.003 -0.003
(1.92) (-0.14) (-0.1)
Insider Ownership 0.009 -0.005 0.010
(0.74) (-0.34) (0.41)
Blockholder Ownership 0.018 *** -0.002 0.009
(2.41) (-0.18) (0.7)
Outside Director 0.016 0.013 0.008
(1.24) (1.02) (0.4)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.003 0.045 *
(0.27) (3.73)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) -0.017 *** -0.029 *
(-8.08) (-13.04)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) 0.023 ***
(9.42)
Insider Ownerhsip*GLBA -0.019 * 0.003
(-1.79) (0.31)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA -0.020 ** 0.012
(-2.32) (1.43)
Outside Director*GLBA -0.021 -0.024
(-1.4) (-1.73)
M&A =1 if Acquisition -0.005 *** -0.001 -0.007 **
(-3.57) (-0.47) (-2.3)
Size -/+ 0.000 -0.001 0.003 **
(0.2) (-1.25) (1.92)
Leverage + 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.41) (1.2) (-0.16)
Growth + 0.080 *** 0.050 * 0.102 ***
(6.24) (3.6) (2.98)
Concentration + 0.024 *** 0.005 0.053 ***
(3.57) (0.62) (3.73)
Non Interest Income -/+ -0.016 *** 0.000 -0.024
(-1.35) (0) (-1.14)
Net Charge Offs + 0.033 *** 0.012 * 0.040 ***
(17.11) (4.33) (13.1)
Cost of Funds + 0.088 0.556 * 0.413 ***
(1.27) (6.81) (2.74)
Inefficiency + 0.049 *** 0.032 * 0.031
(4.09) (1.98) (1.59)
Real GDP - -1.939 *** 3.138 * -2.688 ***
(-9.69) (8.51) (-11.76)
n 1898 1606 438
Adjusted RSQ 51% 34% 70%
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
Total Risk
Before Crisis           
(1997-2006)
Crisis Period         
(2007-2009)
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Table 46: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model for Systematic Risk to 
Examine the Crisis Period Impact  
 
Expected 
Sign
Entire Period 
(1997-2009)
Intercept -1.852 *** -1.842 *** -0.364
(-7.2) (-6.09) (-0.77)
Insider Ownership 0.060 0.134 -0.113
(0.29) (0.6) (-0.34)
Blockholder Ownership 0.078 0.070 -0.001
(0.71) (0.61) (0)
Outside Director 0.136 0.153 -0.017
(0.78) (0.88) (-0.06)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.004 -0.057
(0.03) (-0.34)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) -0.270 * -0.318 ***
(-9.54) (-10.37)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) 0.078 **
(2.5)
Insider Ownerhsip*GLBA -0.189 -0.238
(-1.3) (-1.52)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA 0.016 0.078
(0.14) (0.65)
Outside Director*GLBA -0.153 -0.157
(-0.78) (-0.81)
M&A =1 if Acquisition -0.030 * -0.017 -0.031
(-1.66) (-0.85) (-0.77)
Size -/+ 0.105 *** 0.131 *** 0.031
(8.3) (8.61) (1.63)
Leverage + 0.010 ** 0.009 0.010
(2.26) (1.65) (1.13)
Growth + 0.299 * 0.707 *** 1.235
(1.7) (3.7) (2.57)
Concentration + 0.613 *** 0.350 *** 0.331
(5.8) (2.86) (1.61)
Non Interest Income -/+ -0.188 -0.631 *** 0.099
(-1.06) (-2.74) (0.33)
Net Charge Offs + 0.152 *** -0.013 0.225 ***
(5.79) (-0.33) (5.41)
Cost of Funds + 1.730 * 3.048 *** 2.190
(1.73) (2.69) (1.05)
Inefficiency + -0.117 -0.161 0.179
(-0.69) (-0.73) (0.66)
Real GDP - 24.938 *** 10.448 *** 35.739 ***
(9.89) (2.07) (11.79)
n 1898 1606 438
Adjusted RSQ 24% 24% 32%
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
Systematic Risk
Before Crisis           
(1997-2006)
Crisis Period         
(2007-2009)
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Table 47: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model for Firm Risk to Examine 
the Crisis Period Impact  
 
 
Expected 
Sign
Entire Period 
(1997-2009)
Intercept 0.069 *** 0.056 *** 0.048 *
(5.33) (4.24) (1.9)
Insider Ownership -0.006 -0.011 0.007
(-0.57) (-1.13) (0.36)
Blockholder Ownership 0.010 * 0.000 0.014
(1.88) (0.05) (1.45)
Outside Director 0.004 0.000 -0.010
(0.47) (0.06) (-0.65)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.009 0.023 ***
(1.14) (3.05)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) -0.026 *** -0.033 ***
(-19.5) (-23.81)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) 0.009 *** 0.000
(6.09) 0.000
Insider Ownerhsip*GLBA -0.010 0.001
(-1.4) (0.1)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA -0.001 0.015 ***
(-0.25) (2.85)
Outside Director*GLBA -0.003 0.002
(-0.37) (0.21)
M&A =1 if Acquisition -0.002 ** 0.000 -0.003
(-2.27) (0.21) (-1.54)
Size -/+ 0.002 *** 0.003 *** 0.000
(3.22) (3.97) (-0.02)
Leverage + 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.22) (1.32) (0.08)
Growth + 0.052 *** 0.038 *** 0.081 ***
(6.19) (4.51) (3.25)
Concentration + 0.017 *** 0.013 ** 0.035 ***
(3.26) (2.39) (3.09)
Non Interest Income -/+ 0.012 0.015 0.002
(1.35) (1.48) (0.1)
Net Charge Offs + 0.025 *** 0.011 *** 0.028 ***
(19.48) (6.5) (13.47)
Cost of Funds + 0.113 *** 0.068 0.605 ***
(-2.32) (1.36) (5.71)
Inefficiency + 0.046 *** 0.030 *** 0.029 **
(5.61) (3.03) (2.13)
Real GDP - -0.763 *** 1.543 *** -0.917 ***
(-6.38) (6.82) (-6.59)
n 1898 1606 438
Adjusted RSQ 53% 48% 72%
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
Firm Risk
Before Crisis           
(1997-2006)
Crisis Period         
(2007-2009)
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Table 48: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model for Risk Index to Examine 
Crisis Period Impact  
 
Expected 
Sign
Entire Period 
(1997-2009)
Intercept 0.261 1.530 0.472
(0.28) (1.44) (0.28)
Insider Ownership -0.914 -0.967 -0.623
(-1.23) (-1.22) (-0.52)
Blockholder Ownership 0.211 -0.028 -0.349
(0.56) (-0.07) (-0.54)
Outside Director 0.724 0.511 -1.703
(1.23) (0.93) 1.580
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.615 1.232 **
(1.09) (2.35)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) -0.776 *** -1.133 ***
(-8.11) (-11.62)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) 0.713 *** 0.000
(6.79) 0.000
Insider Ownerhsip*GLBA -0.698 -0.483
(-1.42) (-0.97)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA -0.399 0.894 **
(-1.05) (2.39)
Outside Director*GLBA -0.999 -0.633
(-1.52) (-1.04)
M&A =1 if Acquisition -0.155 *** -0.069 -0.092
(-2.51) (-1.09) (-0.69)
Size -/+ 0.140 *** 0.117 ** 0.188 ***
(2.89) (2.06) (2.74)
Leverage + 0.070 *** 0.041 ** 0.080 ***
(4.59) (2.27) (2.69)
Growth + 2.132 *** 0.999 1.900
(3.58) (1.63) (1.13)
Concentration + 1.761 *** 0.746 * 2.714 ***
(4.74) (1.83) (3.67)
Non Interest Income -/+ 0.048 1.576 ** -0.115
(0.08) (2.06) (-0.11)
Net Charge Offs + 1.695 *** 0.423 *** 2.097 ***
(19.01) (3.34) (14.74)
Cost of Funds + 8.106 * 3.137 24.526 ***
(2.35) (0.85) (3.39)
Inefficiency + 1.883 *** 1.321 ** 2.663 ***
(3.23) (1.85) (2.87)
Real GDP - -2.225 110.027 *** -3.577
(-0.26) (6.94) (-0.36)
n 1898 1606 438
Adjusted RSQ 40% 17% 66%
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
Risk Index
Before Crisis           
(1997-2006)
Crisis Period         
(2007-2009)
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5.4.7 Non Linear Model Specification 
 
   Table 49 shows the results of the non linear model specification for the risk measures 
that are most relevant to regulators: Z-Score, Total Risk, Systematic Risk and Firm Risk. 
The base model is modified to include the quadratic measures of the corporate 
governance measures. The quadratic model uncovers a U-shaped relationship between 
Firm Risk and Outside Director. The coefficient on the linear term is -0.074 and the 
coefficient on the quadratic term is 0.053. Solving for the level of Outside Director that 
minimizes Firm Risk (by taking the first derivative) it can be concluded that the 
minimum level is achieved at a level of 69.8% of Outside Director. The optimal level is 
lower compared to the 84.1% mean of Outsider Director in BHC during the period of 
analysis.  These results are in accordance with the findings by De Andres and Vallelado 
(2008) and Wang et. al. (2012), who argue that not excessively independent boards might 
prove more efficient in monitoring and advising issues. With regards to Z-Score model, 
the non linear coefficient for Outside Directors is significant indicating that more 
independent boards tend to reduce the Insolvency Risk of BHCs. 
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Table 49: Non Linear Model Specification Transformation of Risk Variables and 
Corporate Governance Measures into Log form 
(n=1,898) 
 
 
Expected 
Sign
Expected 
Sign
Intercept 6.564 *** 0.081 *** -1.275 *** 0.097 ***
(7.74) (2.77) (-3.18) (4.96)
Insider Ownership -0.100 -0.023 -0.154 -0.009
(-0.12) (-0.9) (-0.4) (-0.47)
Insider Ownership Squared -0.792 0.022 0.488 -0.003
(-0.45) (0.38) (0.59) (-0.06)
Blockholder Ownership 0.218 0.034 ** 0.191 0.021 **
(0.48) (2.25) (0.89) (1.98)
Blockholder Ownership Squared 0.309 -0.040 -0.112 -0.016
(0.39) (-1.47) (-0.3) (-0.89)
Outside Director 3.241 * -0.105 -1.188 -0.074 *
(1.66) (-1.52) (-1.29) (-1.67)
Outside Director Squared -1.828 0.082 * 0.895 0.053 *
(-1.38) (1.74) (1.43) (1.76)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.350 -0.013 0.076 0.004
(0.97) (-1.01) (0.45) (0.51)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) 0.016 -0.016 ** -0.269 *** -0.026 ***
(0.27) (-7.18) (-9.44) (-19.18)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) -0.342 *** 0.022 *** 0.086 *** 0.009 ***
(-5.11) (9.13) (2.71) (5.89)
Insider Ownership*GLBA 0.136 -0.032 *** -0.214 -0.017 **
(0.39) (-2.71) (-1.31) (-2.11)
Insider Ownership Squared*GLBA 0.792 0.142 *** 0.459 0.057 *
(0.61) (3.09) (0.75) (1.95)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA -0.062 -0.046 *** 0.076 0.000
(-0.19) (-3.88) (0.5) (0.03)
Blockholder Ownership Squared*GLBA -0.450 0.056 ** -0.269 -0.012
(-0.71) (2.41) (-0.89) (-0.84)
Outside Director*GLBA 0.176 0.021 -0.296 0.013
(0.23) (0.75) (-0.81) (0.73)
Outside Director Squared*GLBA -0.597 -0.030 0.077 -0.012
(-1.03) (-1.4) (0.28) (-0.93)
M&A =1 if Acquisition -0.001 -0.005 *** -0.029 -0.002 **
(-0.01) (-3.57) (-1.58) (-2.32)
Size -/+ -0.068 *** -/+ 0.000 0.099 *** 0.002 ***
(-2.84) (-0.07) (8.8) (3.47)
Leverage - -0.041 *** + 0.000 0.011 ** 0.000
(-4.42) (1.11) (2.49) (1.19)
Growth - -1.975 *** + 0.078 *** -0.211 0.054 ***
(-5.39) (6.08) (-1.22) (6.4)
Concentration - -0.887 *** + 0.024 *** 0.529 *** 0.018 ***
(-4.2) (3.51) (5.31) (3.6)
Non Interest Income -/+ 1.303 *** -/+ -0.015 -0.173 0.007
(3.62) (-1.25) (-1.02) (0.81)
Net Charge Offs - -0.795 *** + 0.034 *** 0.150 * 0.025 ***
(-14.38) (17.33) (5.76) (19.59)
Cost of Funds - -4.578 *** + 0.091 1.623 * 0.127 ***
(-2.22) (1.3) (1.66) (2.66)
Inefficiency - -3.164 *** + 0.050 *** -0.085 0.043 ***
(-9.02) (4.16) (-0.51) (5.28)
Real GDP + 9.496 * - -2.019 *** 25.167 ** -0.761 ***
(1.76) (-10.14) (9.84) (-6.26)
Adjusted RSQ 38% 52% 24% 53%
*** Sgnificant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
Total Risk
Systematic 
Risk
Firm RiskLogZ
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5.4.8 Double Log Model Specification 
 
 
     The risk measures in the base model are transformed to double log specification: Z-
Score, Total Risk, Systematic Risk and Firm Risk. The transformation allows calculating 
the elasticity of the governance measures with respect to each risk measure and eases the 
interpretation of the coefficients. Based on the results presented in Table 50, a 10% 
increase in Insider Ownership initially reduces Total Risk by 0.29%. After the passage of 
the Act the effect is positive, leading to a net increase in Total Risk of 0.02%.  The 
coefficient of Blockholder indicates that a 10% increase of Blockholder Ownership 
increases BHC Firm Risk by 0.06%. 
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Table 50: Double Log Model Specification. Transformation of Risk Variables and 
Corporate Governance Measures into Log form 
(n=1,898) 
 
 
 
Expected 
Sign
Expected 
Sign
Intercept 8.156 *** -2.768 *** -6.184 *** -2.459 ***
(15.91) (-12.64) (-10.72) (-14.36)
Log of Insider Ownership -0.031 -0.029 ** -0.006 -0.005
(-1.04) (-2.16) (-0.18) (-0.57)
Log of Blockholder Ownership 0.008 -0.003 0.000 0.006 *
(0.74) (-0.54) (0.03) (1.77)
Log of Outside Director 0.341 0.076 -0.004 0.054
(1.33) (0.63) (-0.01) (0.66)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.115 -0.059 -0.029 0.043
(0.83) (-0.9) (-0.16) (0.98)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) 0.024 -0.291 *** -0.585 *** -0.408 ***
(0.4) (-10.45) (-7.71) (-21.5)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) -0.354 *** 0.338 *** 0.314 *** 0.135 ***
(-5.35) (10.79) (3.66) (6.42)
Log of Insider Ownership*GLBA 0.037 0.031 ** 0.038 -0.003
(1.33) (2.36) (1.05) (-0.29)
Log of BlockholderOwnership*GLBA -0.001 0.007 0.025 -0.001
(-0.08) (1.24) (1.63) (-0.13)
Log of OutsideDirector*GLBA -0.465 -0.118 -0.045 -0.087
(-1.54) (-0.83) (-0.12) (-0.92)
M&A =1 if Acquisition 0.005 -0.058 *** -0.053 -0.026 **
(0.13) (-3.18) (-1.06) (-2.09)
Size -/+ -0.073 ** -/+ -0.018 0.248 *** 0.034 ***
(-2.5) (-1.46) (7.82) (3.4)
Leverage - -0.042 *** + 0.002 0.025 ** 0.001
(-4.44) (0.38) (2.14) (0.33)
Growth - -1.995 *** + 0.993 *** 1.168 ** 0.729 ***
(-5.35) (5.71) (2.48) (6.13)
Concentration - -0.874 *** + 0.132 1.377 *** 0.180 **
(-3.81) (1.29) (5.03) (2.42)
Non Interest Income -/+ 1.296 *** -/+ -0.043 -0.448 0.163
(3.38) (-0.25) (-0.96) (1.31)
Net Charge Offs - -0.763 *** + 0.345 *** 0.304 *** 0.296 ***
(-13.66) (13.23) (4.3) (16.59)
Cost of Funds - -4.778 ** + 1.816 * 1.874 2.192 ***
(-2.24) (1.86) (0.71) (3.2)
Inefficiency - -3.357 *** + 0.613 *** -0.492 0.626 ***
(-9.22) (3.66) (-1.09) (5.36)
Real GDP + 9.718 * - -20.031 *** 69.580 *** -10.449 ***
(1.85) (-8.01) (10.17) (-6.26)
Adjusted RSQ 38% 47% 21% 51%
*** Sgnificant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
Z-Score
Log of Total 
Risk
Log of 
Systematic Risk
Log of Firm 
Risk
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5.5 Peer Group Analysis 
 
     The impact of Insider Ownership, Blockholder Ownership and Outside Directors on 
the risk profile of banks is examined at the peer group level to further assess how the 
relationships found in the base regression model differ when analyzing BHCs by peer 
group. BHCs are grouped as large, medium and small, based on total assets. Large banks 
have greater than $100B in assets; medium banks have assets between $10B and $100B; 
and, small banks have assets lower than $10B. 
 
Table 51: Mean statistics for sample of 146 BHCs over the period 1997-2009 by peer 
group 
 
Total Number of Banks 146 11 29 106
Assets ($ In millions) 37,599      423,506                   20,426                     2,250                     
ROA 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0%
ROE 11.4% 13.4% 12.0% 11.0%
Z Score 75.55        50.34                       74.33                       79.15                     
SDROA 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
SDROE 4.8% 5.0% 4.6% 4.9%
Total Risk 7.8% 8.3% 7.6% 7.8%
Systematic Risk 0.51          0.77                         0.63                         0.46                       
Firm Risk 7.2% 6.8% 6.8% 7.3%
Risk Index 5.5            6.5                           5.7                           5.3                         
Insider Ownership 5.8% 1.1% 4.9% 6.6%
Blockholder Ownership 13.6% 3.0% 14.4% 14.5%
Outside Director 84.1% 89.2% 84.4% 83.4%
Size 15.1          19.1                         16.5                         14.3                       
Leverage 11.6          12.0                         11.4                         11.6                       
Growth 7.2% 9.8% 6.9% 7.1%
Concentration 53.5% 38.9% 46.5% 56.9%
Non Interest Income 18.8% 31.8% 23.1% 16.2%
Net Charge Offs 0.4% 0.7% 0.4% 0.4%
Cost of Funds 3.7% 4.2% 3.5% 3.7%
Ineffeciency 43.1% 43.1% 43.9% 42.8%
Board Size 13 16 15 12
Outside Directors 10 13 11 9
Source: FRY9-C Reports, Factset LionsShare, SEC Reports
Variable All Large               
(Assets >$100B)
Medium                     
(Assets  between 
$10$-$100B)
Small               
(Assets <$10B)
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     Table 51 presents summary statistics for the three peer groups. Based on the 
classification criteria, large banks have average assets of $423B, medium banks have 
average assets of $20.4B and small banks have average assets of $2.2B. On the risk 
profile side, large banks have greater Insolvency Risk (Z-Score), Total Risk, and 
Systematic Risk, SDROA and ROE. Firm Risk is similar across the peer groups.  On the 
performance side, large banks have a slightly higher ROE, while all banks have a similar 
ROA. Larger banks have a more diversified loan portfolio based on the loan 
concentration index, and generate a larger percent of non-interest income. On the 
corporate governance side, larger banks have larger boards and larger percentage of 
Outside Directors in the board. Small banks have the largest percent of Insider 
Ownership. 
 
     The peer group comparison is made using two approaches. The first approach consists 
on running the original regression model for each peer group sample. The second 
approach includes dummy variables for large and medium banks and interaction 
variables. The results are presented by risk measure, in Tables 50 through 56. The 
regression results of the two approaches slightly differ when compared to the base model. 
Overall, the impact of the control variables on bank risk remains unchanged relative to 
the base regression model. However, some changes occur with regards to the hypothesis 
variables. Results are presented in Tables 52 through 58. 
 
     The frequency of the significance significance for the Insider Ownership coefficient is 
noticeably higher for medium sized banks. In all cases (Tables 52 through 58), the 
128 
 
coefficient is significant and its sign indicates that the greater the presence of Insider 
Ownership the lower the risk profile of medium sized BHCs.  
      
     The coefficient for Insider Ownership is also significant in the regressions for SDROA 
and Systematic Risk of small BHCs (Tables 51 and 54). The positive coefficient indicates 
that higher levels of Insider Ownership are associated with higher Systematic Risk of 
small BHCs, opposite to the effect found in medium sized banks. Insider Ownership does 
not impact the risk profile of large sized BHCs. 
 
     The coefficient and significance of the interaction effect between Insider Ownership 
and the GLBA passage shows that the passage of the Act further decreases the risk of 
medium BHCs when looking at SDROA and SDROE. Similarly, the passage of the Act 
further decreases Total Risk and Firm Risk in large BHCs. 
 
     The coefficient for Blockholder Ownership is significant occasionally for medium and 
large sized BHCs.  Based on the results, the presence of Blockholder Ownership 
increases the risk when measuring Total Risk in medium sized BHCs, Systematic Risk in 
large BHCs, and Firm Risk in large BHCs. However, the passage of the Act decreases the 
initial impact in medium sized BHCs, with a negative net effect in Total Risk (0.034 + (-
0.047)); and reduces the Risk Index measure for medium BHCs.  The presence of 
Blockholder Ownership does not have an impact in small size BHCs. 
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     Outside Directors presence becomes significant when considering large BHCs in the 
case of SDROA and SDROE, as well as for the Risk Index. The sign of the coefficient 
indicates that higher presence of Outside Directors is associated with an increase in these 
three risk measures. Outside Directors has no impact in the risk measures considered for 
medium or small BHCs.  
 
     With regards to the passage of the Act, GLBA seems to have a significant and 
decreasing effect on the Insolvency Risk of small BHCs. On the other hand, the passage 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has a general dampening effect in the market based risk 
measures of medium and small BHCs (Total Risk and Systematic Risk).  Firm Risk and 
the Risk Index are also lower after the passage of SOX, regardless of the peer group.  
 
     The second approach used in the peer group analysis leads to similar findings in the 
base model and the peer sample approach.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
130 
 
Table 52: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model by Peer Group for 
Insolvency Risk 
 
Expected 
Sign
Intercept 7.536 *** 7.744 ** 7.732 *** 7.326 *** 6.863 ***
(15.16) (2.37) (4.52) (10) (12.27)
Insider Ownership -0.317 4.859 1.765 * -0.533 -0.646
(-0.83) (1.03) (1.79) (-1.15) (-1.5)
Large Banks* Insider Ownership 6.550
(1.52)
Medium Banks*Insider Ownership 1.994 **
(2.3)
Blockholder Ownership 0.311 -0.408 0.011 0.268 0.230
(1.4) (-0.3) (0.02) (0.97) (0.87)
Large Banks*Blockholder Ownership -0.424
(-0.35)
Medium Banks*Blockholder Ownership 0.186
(0.38)
Outside Director 0.542 -2.740 0.353 0.606 0.440
(1.47) (-1.3) (0.35) (1.45) (1.13)
Large Banks*Outside Director -1.197
(-0.92)
Medium Banks*Outside Director 0.177
(0.32)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.753 ** -2.216 0.686 0.830 ** 0.672 *
(2.12) (-1.01) (0.71) (2.03) (1.82)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) 0.014 0.041 0.100 -0.043 -0.018
(0.23) (0.17) (0.76) (-0.58) (-0.29)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) -0.339 *** -0.721 * -0.353 ** -0.302 *** -0.331 ***
(-5.08) (-2.94) (-2.38) (-3.79) (-4.83)
Insider Ownership*GLBA 0.279 0.485 0.200 0.193 0.335
(0.93) (0.76) (0.4) (0.37) (0.65)
Insider Ownership*GLBA*Large Banks 0.262
(0.34)
Insider Ownership*GLBA*Medium Banks -0.454
(-0.66)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA -0.192 -0.440 0.200 -0.226 -0.248
(-0.8) (-0.21) (0.44) (-0.69) (-0.77)
Blockholder Owenrship*GLBA*Large Banks 0.429
(0.22)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA*Medium Banks 0.429
(0.8)
Outside Director*GLBA -0.815 ** 2.330 -0.822 -0.898 * -0.717
(-1.96) (0.94) (-0.74) (-1.66) (-1.64)
Outside Director*GLBA*Large Banks -0.031
(-0.16)
Outside Director*GLBA*Medium Banks -0.144
(-1.04)
M&A =1 if Acquisition 0.001 0.001 0.154 * -0.039 -0.010
(0.03) (0) (1.84) (-0.83) (-0.24)
Size -/+ -0.070 *** 0.014 -0.093 -0.034 -0.020
(-3.07) (0.11) (-1.11) (-0.79) (-0.67)
Leverage - -0.041 *** -0.055 -0.021 -0.045 *** -0.040 ***
(-4.45) (-1.23) (-0.87) (-4.12) (-4.46)
Growth - -1.964 *** -2.115 * -1.480 * -2.086 *** -1.920 ***
(-5.38) (-1.69) (-1.96) (-4.54) (-5.36)
Concentration - -0.899 *** 1.339 -1.505 ** -0.861 *** -0.932 ***
(-4.34) (1.12) (-2.55) (-3.8) (-5)
Non Interest Income -/+ 1.300 *** 1.839 2.998 *** 0.744 * 1.446 ***
(3.66) (1.42) (3.88) (1.68) (4.38)
Net Charge Offs - -0.805 *** -0.645 *** -0.613 *** -0.843 *** -0.855 ***
(-14.71) (-2.95) (-5.16) (-12.54) (-15.76)
Cost of Funds - -4.432 ** 1.476 0.768 -8.406 ` -4.144 **
(-2.18) (0.24) (0.17) (-3.22) (-2.12)
Inefficiency - -3.073 *** -2.971 *** -4.086 *** -3.121 *** -2.848 ***
(-8.85) (-2.62) (-4.83) (-7.44) (-8.6)
Real GDP + 9.175 * -5.653 10.419 10.855 * 9.105 *
(1.7) (-0.28) (0.87) (1.69) (1.64)
Large Banks 0.634
(0.55)
Medium Banks -0.347
(-0.73)
Adjusted RSQ 38% 43% 41% 38% 39%
Number of BHCs 146          11         29         106         146        
n 1,898       143       377       1,378      1,898     
Assets >$100B $10B-$100B <$10B
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
Size dummy interacted 
with hypothesys 
variables
Z-Score
Medium SmallBase Large
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Table 53: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model by Peer Group for SDROA  
 
Expected 
Sign
Intercept -0.005 *** 0.006 -0.010 ** -0.007 *** -0.007 ***
(-2.97) (0.91) (-2.19) (-2.67) (-2.74)
Insider Ownership -0.002 *** -0.003 -0.005 * 0.003 ** -0.004 **
(-1.9) (-0.35) (-1.94) (2.15) (-2.42)
Large Banks* Insider Ownership -0.004
(-0.31)
Medium Banks*Insider Ownership 0.004
(0.92)
Blockholder Ownership 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.43) (-0.35) (0.87) (0.59) (-0.02)
Large Banks*Blockholder Ownership 0.002
(0.51)
Medium Banks*Blockholder Ownership 0.000
(-0.07)
Outside Director 0.000 0.007 * 0.001 -0.001 0.000
(-0.3) (1.83) (0.46) (-0.78) (-0.24)
Large Banks*Outside Director 0.009 **
(2.31)
Medium Banks*Outside Director 0.002
(0.9)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.000 -0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.08) (-0.73) (0.62) (-0.15) (0.23)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.31) (0.53) (-0.68) (-0.77) (-0.07)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.69) (0.3) (0.33) (0.6) (0.37)
Insider Ownership*GLBA -0.001 0.001 -0.003 ** 0.001 0.001
(-1.13) (0.67) (-2.13) (0.79) (0.44)
Insider Ownership*GLBA*Large Banks -0.001
(-0.36)
Insider Ownership*GLBA*Medium Banks -0.004 *
(-1.76)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.83) (-0.98) (-0.59) (-1.33) (-1.13)
Blockholder Owenrship*GLBA*Large Banks -0.008
(-1.47)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA*Medium Banks 0.002
(1.09)
Outside Director*GLBA 0.000 0.003 -0.002 0.000 -0.001
(-0.25) (0.7) (-0.52) (-0.16) (-0.55)
Outside Director*GLBA*Large Banks 0.001
(1.2)
Outside Director*GLBA*Medium Banks 0.001 **
(2.1)
M&A =1 if Acquisition 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-1.12) (-0.03) (0.09) (-1.63) (-1.23)
Size -/+ 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000
(2.61) (-1.48) (1.54) (2.48) (1.62)
Leverage + 0.000 *** 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
(3.78) (-2.02) (-0.09) (4.66) (5.28)
Growth + 0.002 *** 0.002 0.001 0.004 ** 0.003 ***
(2.12) (1.02) (0.6) (2.5) (2.75)
Concentration + 0.003 *** 0.000 0.005 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 ***
(4.74) (-0.08) (2.96) (3.87) (4.39)
Non Interest Income -/+ -0.005 *** -0.001 -0.009 *** -0.003 ** -0.005 ***
(-4.58) (-0.23) (-4.48) (-2.41) (-4.52)
Net Charge Offs + 0.002 *** 0.001 ** 0.001 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 ***
(14.78) (2.1) (4.29) (13.74) (14.29)
Cost of Funds + 0.002 0.012 0.011 0.000 0.012 *
(0.28) (0.97) (0.89) (0.04) (1.83)
Inefficiency + 0.008 *** 0.003 0.015 *** 0.006 *** 0.009 ***
(7.54) (1.21) (6.54) (4.91) (8.49)
Real GDP - 0.015 -0.041 0.007 0.026 0.015
(0.97) (-1.06) (0.22) (1.39) (0.96)
Large Banks -0.009 **
(-2.45)
Medium Banks -0.002
(-1.25)
Adjusted RSQ 27% 33% 31% 30% 30%
Number of BHCs 146       11     29         106       146         
n 1,898    143   377       1,378    1,898      
Assets >$100B $10B-$100B <$10B
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
Size dummy 
interacted with 
Hypothesys 
variables
SDROA
SmallBase Large Medium
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Table 54: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model by Peer Group for SDROE 
  
Expected 
Sign
Intercept -0.194 *** 0.032 -0.110 ** -0.277 *** -0.167 ***
(-4.19) (0.49) (-2.3) (-3.82) (-3.46)
Insider Ownership -0.001 -0.053 -0.051 * -0.023 -0.024
(-0.02) (-0.59) (-1.86) (-0.48) (-0.6)
Large Banks* Insider Ownership 0.034
(0.09)
Medium Banks*Insider Ownership -0.030
(-0.41)
Blockholder Ownership -0.010 -0.024 0.007 -0.001 0.002
(-0.49) (-0.91) (0.51) (-0.04) (0.07)
Large Banks*Blockholder Ownership 0.124
(1.09)
Medium Banks*Blockholder Ownership 0.012
(0.26)
Outside Director 0.006 0.074 * 0.007 -0.015 -0.014
(0.17) (1.84) (0.25) (-0.33) (-0.39)
Large Banks*Outside Director 0.088
(0.72)
Medium Banks*Outside Director 0.018
(0.35)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.053 -0.004 0.007 0.046 0.051
(1.48) (-0.11) (0.27) (0.99) (1.41)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) -0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004
(-0.17) (0.36) (-0.8) (-0.65) (-0.61)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) 0.010 -0.001 0.001 0.013 0.012 *
(1.44) (-0.21) (0.34) (1.39) (1.75)
Insider Ownership*GLBA -0.016 0.005 -0.029 ** 0.054 0.049
(-0.55) (0.4) (-2.04) (0.92) (0.96)
Insider Ownership*GLBA*Large Banks -0.119
(-1.62)
Insider Ownership*GLBA*Medium Banks -0.075
(-1.13)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA -0.011 -0.030 -0.010 -0.042 -0.037
(-0.47) (-0.76) (-0.82) (-1.14) (-1.16)
Blockholder Owenrship*GLBA*Large Banks -0.071
(-0.36)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA*Medium Banks 0.012
(0.23)
Outside Director*GLBA -0.061 0.004 -0.005 -0.057 -0.063
(-1.47) (0.08) (-0.17) (-1.04) (-1.46)
Outside Director*GLBA*Large Banks 0.009
(0.47)
Outside Director*GLBA*Medium Banks 0.006
(0.42)
M&A =1 if Acquisition -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.003
(-0.44) (-0.48) (0.24) (-0.87) (-0.66)
Size -/+ 0.003 * 0.003 0.003 0.010 ** 0.005 **
(1.6) (1.25) (1.32) (2.38) (2.03)
Leverage + 0.007 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 ***
(8.02) (0.39) (3.95) (6.51) (8.01)
Growth + 0.069 * 0.039 0.015 0.098 * 0.052
(1.94) (1.62) (0.73) (1.96) (1.56)
Concentration + 0.069 *** -0.012 0.050 *** 0.074 *** 0.062 ***
(3.64) (-0.51) (3.04) (3.24) (3.93)
Non Interest Income -/+ -0.098 *** -0.029 -0.079 *** -0.092 ** -0.085 ***
(-2.93) (-1.17) (-3.62) (-2.02) (-2.93)
Net Charge Offs + 0.049 *** 0.009 ** 0.015 *** 0.063 *** 0.047 ***
(9.21) (2.25) (4.59) (8.53) (9.23)
Cost of Funds + 0.067 0.156 0.062 0.078 -0.163
(0.35) (1.31) (0.5) (0.28) (-0.92)
Inefficiency + 0.157 *** 0.047 ** 0.132 *** 0.164 *** 0.126 ***
(4.71) (2.15) (5.54) (3.68) (4.22)
Real GDP - 0.738 -0.365 -0.068 1.116 0.770
(1.35) (-0.94) (-0.2) (1.5) (1.37)
Large Banks -0.096
(-0.9)
Medium Banks -0.022
(-0.52)
Adjusted RSQ 16% 26% 29% 18% 16%
Number of BHCs 146       11         29         106       146           
n 1,898    143       377       1,378    1,898        
Assets >$100B $10B-$100B <$10B
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
Size dummy interacted 
with hypothesys 
variables
SDROE
SmallBase Large Medium
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Table 55: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model by Peer Group for Total 
Risk 
 
Expected 
Sign
Intercept 0.031 ** 0.085 0.077 -0.006 0.036
(1.92) (0.82) (1.46) (-0.24) (1.23)
Insider Ownership 0.009 0.169 -0.054 ** 0.024 0.019
(0.74) (0.99) (-1.97) (1.5) (0.94)
Large Banks* Insider Ownership 0.020
(0.11)
Medium Banks*Insider Ownership -0.123 **
(-2.51)
Blockholder Ownership 0.018 * 0.063 0.034 ** 0.012 0.010
(2.41) (1.21) (2.21) (1.25) (0.92)
Large Banks*Blockholder Ownership 0.048
(1.02)
Medium Banks*Blockholder Ownership 0.027
(1.28)
Outside Director 0.016 0.067 -0.013 0.007 0.002
(1.24) (0.81) (-0.34) (0.45) (0.11)
Large Banks*Outside Director 0.114 **
(2.25)
Medium Banks*Outside Director 0.028
(1.27)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.003 -0.044 -0.040 0.003 0.003
(0.27) (-0.49) (-1.11) (0.23) (0.22)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) -0.017 * -0.019 ** -0.019 *** -0.017 *** -0.016 ***
(-8.08) (-1.93) (-3.79) (-6.78) (-7.1)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) 0.023 * 0.038 *** 0.019 *** 0.022 *** 0.022 ***
(9.42) (3.68) (3.21) (8) (9.25)
Insider Ownership*GLBA -0.019 -0.042 * 0.007 -0.022 -0.015
(-1.79) (-1.77) (0.38) (-1.22) (-0.85)
Insider Ownership*GLBA*Large Banks -0.029
(-1.01)
Insider Ownership*GLBA*Medium Banks 0.005
(0.18)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA -0.020 * -0.119 -0.047 *** -0.015 -0.017
(-2.32) (-1.43) (-2.72) (-1.3) (-1.5)
Blockholder Owenrship*GLBA*Large Banks -0.125 *
(-1.77)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA*Medium Banks -0.035 *
(-1.81)
Outside Director*GLBA -0.021 0.024 0.025 -0.019 -0.017
(-1.4) (0.24) (0.6) (-1.11) (-1.05)
Outside Director*GLBA*Large Banks -0.016 **
(-2.43)
Outside Director*GLBA*Medium Banks -0.009 *
(-1.89)
M&A =1 if Acquisition -0.005 * -0.003 -0.006 * -0.006 *** -0.005 ***
(-3.57) (-0.58) (-1.84) (-3.4) (-3.4)
Size -/+ 0.000 0.007 ** -0.001 0.003 ** 0.000
(0.2) (1.97) (-0.47) (2.33) (0.14)
Leverage + 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(1.41) (0.79) (-0.61) (0.53) (0.35)
Growth + 0.080 * 0.063 0.078 *** 0.072 *** 0.066 ***
(6.24) (1.27) (2.83) (4.53) (4.72)
Concentration + 0.024 * -0.010 0.042 ** 0.022 *** 0.015 *
(3.57) (-0.27) (2.37) (2.89) (1.71)
Non Interest Income -/+ -0.016 * 0.080 -0.016 -0.018 0.001
(-1.35) (1.64) (-0.61) (-1.22) (0.1)
Net Charge Offs + 0.033 * 0.041 * 0.031 *** 0.032 *** 0.034 ***
(17.11) (4.93) (7.13) (13.64) (16.44)
Cost of Funds + 0.088 0.461 ** 0.249 0.117 0.224 ***
(1.27) (2.06) (1.6) (1.31) (2.75)
Inefficiency + 0.049 * 0.045 0.061 *** 0.058 *** 0.062 ***
(4.09) (1.06) (2.15) (4.02) (4.51)
Real GDP - -1.939 * 2.029 -2.131 *** -1.905 *** -1.962 ***
(-9.69) (1.35) (-4.56) (-8.39) (-10.1)
Large Banks -0.095 **
(-2.07)
Medium Banks -0.015
(-0.78)
Adjusted RSQ 51% 63% 53% 51% 53%
Number of BHCs 146       11         29         106       146           
n 1,898    143       377       1,378    1,898        
Assets >$100B $10B-$100B <$10B
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
Size dummy 
interacted with 
Hypothesys 
variables
Total Risk
Large Medium SmallBase
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Table 56: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model by Peer Group for 
Systematic Risk  
 
Expecte
d Sign
Intercept -1.852 *** -1.455 -0.800 -2.626 *** -2.537 ***
(-7.2) (-1.13) (-1.02) (-6.95) (-6.88)
Insider Ownership 0.060 0.883 -1.411 *** 0.618 *** 0.461 *
(0.29) (0.45) (-3.1) (2.69) (1.78)
Large Banks* Insider Ownership -0.092
(-0.04)
Medium Banks*Insider Ownership -2.608 ***
(-4.13)
Blockholder Ownership 0.078 1.355 ** -0.074 0.075 0.077
(0.71) (2.38) (-0.33) (0.59) (0.59)
Large Banks*Blockholder Ownership 0.852
(1.44)
Medium Banks*Blockholder Ownership -0.111
(-0.42)
Outside Director 0.136 0.631 -0.218 -0.249 -0.259
(0.78) (0.71) (-0.47) (-1.32) (-1.43)
Large Banks*Outside Director 0.761
(1.2)
Medium Banks*Outside Director 0.463
(1.58)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.004 -0.237 -0.659 -0.245 -0.277 *
(0.03) (-0.25) (-1.51) (-1.34) (-1.67)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) -0.270 * -0.036 -0.109 * -0.358 *** -0.261 ***
(-9.54) (-0.35) (-1.83) (-10.78) (-9.08)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) 0.078 ** 0.144 0.079 0.050 0.055 *
(2.5) (1.38) (1.17) (1.42) (1.83)
Insider Ownership*GLBA -0.189 0.027 0.112 -0.218 -0.258
(-1.3) (0.1) (0.48) (-0.95) (-1.13)
Insider Ownership*GLBA*Large Banks 0.134
(0.37)
Insider Ownership*GLBA*Medium Banks 0.234
(0.71)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA 0.016 -0.401 0.239 -0.205 -0.084
(0.14) (-0.46) (1.17) (-1.41) (-0.58)
Blockholder Owenrship*GLBA*Large Banks -1.297
(-1.47)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA*Medium Banks 0.006
(0.02)
Outside Director*GLBA -0.153 -0.131 0.520 0.219 0.315
(-0.78) (-0.12) (1.03) (1.02) (1.6)
Outside Director*GLBA*Large Banks -0.645 ***
(-7.69)
Outside Director*GLBA*Medium Banks -0.435 ***
(-7.17)
M&A =1 if Acquisition -0.030 * -0.074 0.000 -0.054 ** -0.033 *
(-1.66) (-1.27) (0) (-2.53) (-1.85)
Size -/+ 0.105 *** 0.041 0.054 0.188 *** 0.170 ***
(8.3) (0.82) (1.4) (8) (7.26)
Leverage + 0.010 ** 0.014 -0.009 -0.001 0.001
(2.26) (0.75) (-0.79) (-0.17) (0.23)
Growth + 0.299 * 0.257 0.580 * -0.256 0.386 **
(1.7) (0.49) (1.69) (-1.2) (2.2)
Concentration + 0.613 *** -0.321 0.641 ** 0.576 *** 0.643 ***
(5.8) (-0.68) (2.37) (5.14) (5.79)
Non Interest Income -/+ -0.188 0.223 0.122 -0.340 -0.058
(-1.06) (0.42) (0.34) (-1.59) (-0.31)
Net Charge Offs + 0.152 *** 0.310 *** 0.106 * 0.142 *** 0.150 ***
(5.79) (3.39) (1.96) (4.64) (5.77)
Cost of Funds + 1.730 * 2.114 3.834 * 3.672 *** 3.106 ***
(1.73) (0.84) (1.9) (3.01) (3.05)
Inefficiency + -0.117 1.231 *** 0.711 * -0.252 -0.034
(-0.69) (2.62) (1.84) (-1.29) (-0.2)
Real GDP - 24.938 *** 30.924 *** 34.999 *** 21.751 *** 24.630 ***
(9.89) (3.53) (6.44) (7.68) (10.19)
Large Banks -0.653
(-1.13)
Medium Banks -0.090
(-0.36)
Adjusted RSQ 24% 50% 32% 31% 30%
Number of BHCs 146      11          29            106     146           
n 1,898   143        377          1,378  1,898        
Assets >$100B $10B-$100B <$10B
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
Size dummy 
interacted with 
Hypothesys 
variables
Systematic Risk
SmallBase Large Medium
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Table 57: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model by Peer Group for Firm Risk 
  
Expected 
Sign
Intercept 0.069 *** 0.041 0.053 0.044 ** 0.046 ***
(5.33) (0.7) (1.51) (2.32) (2.8)
Insider Ownership -0.006 0.017 -0.049 ** 0.002 0.000
(-0.57) (0.17) (-2.47) (0.16) (-0.02)
Large Banks* Insider Ownership -0.116
(-1.1)
Medium Banks*Insider Ownership -0.050 *
(-1.83)
Blockholder Ownership 0.010 * 0.047 -0.049 ** 0.002 0.002
(1.88) (1.65) (-2.47) (0.16) (0.3)
Large Banks*Blockholder Ownership 0.066 **
(2.31)
Medium Banks*Blockholder Ownership 0.028 **
(2.27)
Outside Director 0.004 0.039 * 0.029 *** 0.003 0.009
(0.47) (0.84) (2.82) (0.44) (0.98)
Large Banks*Outside Director 0.012
(0.4)
Medium Banks*Outside Director -0.018
(-1.33)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.009 0.011 0.010 0.004 0.010
(1.14) (0.22) (0.49) (0.4) (1.26)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) -0.026 *** -0.034 0.026 0.005 -0.027 ***
(-19.5) (-6.31) (1.24) (0.5) (-19.58)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) 0.009 *** 0.018 *** -0.032 *** -0.025 *** 0.009 ***
(6.09) (3.2) (-11.23) (-15.19) (5.92)
Insider Ownership*GLBA -0.010 -0.038 *** 0.005 0.009 *** -0.002
(-1.4) (-2.83) (1.49) (4.97) (-0.17)
Insider Ownership*GLBA*Large Banks -0.037 **
(-2.11)
Insider Ownership*GLBA*Medium Banks -0.003
(-0.19)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA -0.001 -0.019 *** 0.001 -0.003 0.006
(-0.25) (-0.41) (0.09) (-0.24) (0.87)
Blockholder Owenrship*GLBA*Large Banks -0.043
(-0.98)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA*Medium Banks -0.033 ***
(-2.79)
Outside Director*GLBA -0.003 0.010 -0.024 ** 0.004 -0.008
(-0.37) (0.17) (-2.43) (0.59) (-0.83)
Outside Director*GLBA*Large Banks 0.013 ***
(3.22)
Outside Director*GLBA*Medium Banks 0.007 **
(2.3)
M&A =1 if Acquisition -0.002 ** 0.002 -0.014 -0.003 -0.002 ***
(-2.27) (0.73) (-0.61) (-0.28) (-2.6)
Size -/+ 0.002 *** -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 *** 0.000
(3.22) (-1.57) (-0.75) (-3.25) (-0.48)
Leverage + 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000
(1.22) (0.29) (-1.2) (0.11) (1.38)
Growth + 0.052 *** 0.029 -0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.048 ***
(6.19) (1.04) (-2.5) (2.5) (5.67)
Concentration + 0.017 *** 0.014 0.058 *** 0.043 *** 0.016 ***
(3.26) (0.66) (3.61) (4.05) (3.17)
Non Interest Income -/+ 0.012 0.035 0.041 *** 0.014 ** 0.009
(1.35) (1.29) (3.35) (2.45) (1.03)
Net Charge Offs + 0.025 *** 0.026 -0.001 0.009 0.024 ***
(19.48) (5.58) (-0.08) (0.85) (19.25)
Cost of Funds + 0.113 *** 0.100 *** 0.026 *** 0.023 *** 0.127 **
(-2.32) (0.8) (10.26) (14.94) (2.6)
Inefficiency + 0.046 *** 0.027 0.038 0.166 *** 0.046 ***
(5.61) (1.15) (0.41) (2.71) (5.63)
Real GDP - -0.763 *** -0.658 0.068 *** 0.040 *** -0.735 ***
(-6.38) (-1.36) (3.78) (4.11) (-6.13)
Large Banks -0.029
(-1.04)
Medium Banks 0.006
(0.54)
Adjusted RSQ 53% -66% -73% *** -76% *** 54%
Number of BHCs 146       11         29         106       146          
n 1,898    143       377       1,378    1,898       
Assets >$100B $10B-$100B <$10B
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
Size dummy 
interacted with 
Hypothesys 
variables
Firm Risk
SmallBase Large Medium
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Table 58: Regression Results for the Random Effects Model by Peer Group for Risk 
Index 
 
Expected 
Sign
Intercept 0.261 5.829 1.771 -0.639 0.445
(0.28) (1.21) (0.62) (-0.47) (0.37)
Insider Ownership -0.914 -8.798 -8.466 *** 0.860 0.556
(-1.23) (-1.21) (-4.92) (1.05) (0.65)
Large Banks* Insider Ownership -9.225
(-1.24)
Medium Banks*Insider Ownership -8.698 ***
(-4.24)
Blockholder Ownership 0.211 3.272 1.078 -0.079 -0.226
(0.56) (1.54) (1.33) (-0.18) (-0.5)
Large Banks*Blockholder Ownership 3.287
(1.62)
Medium Banks*Blockholder Ownership 1.368
(1.54)
Outside Director 0.724 6.150 * 0.364 0.041 0.297
(1.23) (1.85) (0.23) (0.06) (0.48)
Large Banks*Outside Director 4.671 **
(2.15)
Medium Banks*Outside Director -0.035
(-0.04)
GLBA Dummy ( 1 > Yr 1999) 0.615 0.246 0.213 0.090 0.355
(1.09) (0.07) (0.14) (0.14) (0.62)
SOX Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2002) -0.776 *** -1.294 *** -1.170 *** -0.595 *** -0.756 ***
(-8.11) (-3.36) (-5.7) (-5.09) (-7.7)
Crisis Dummy ( 1 > Yr 2006) 0.713 *** 1.208 *** 0.662 *** 0.699 *** 0.719 ***
(6.79) (3.1) (2.91) (5.65) (6.88)
Insider Ownership*GLBA -0.698 -0.383 -0.689 -0.437 -0.553
(-1.42) (-0.39) (-0.86) (-0.55) (-0.7)
Insider Ownership*GLBA*Large Banks -0.464
(-0.37)
Insider Ownership*GLBA*Medium Banks -0.327
(-0.29)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA -0.399 -4.160 -1.783 ** -0.319 -0.100
(-1.05) (-1.28) (-2.56) (-0.63) (-0.2)
Blockholder Owenrship*GLBA*Large Banks -8.690 ***
(-2.86)
Blockholder Ownership*GLBA*Medium Banks -1.868 **
(-2.24)
Outside Director*GLBA -0.999 -0.252 -0.463 -0.368 -0.567
(-1.52) (-0.06) (-0.27) (-0.49) (-0.84)
Outside Director*GLBA*Large Banks -0.614 **
(-2.12)
Outside Director*GLBA*Medium Banks -0.229
(-1.09)
M&A =1 if Acquisition -0.155 *** 0.075 -0.179 -0.195 *** -0.150 **
(-2.51) (0.35) (-1.39) (-2.62) (-2.45)
Size -/+ 0.140 *** 0.348 * 0.009 0.274 *** 0.144 *
(2.89) (1.86) (0.07) (3.2) (1.91)
Leverage + 0.070 *** 0.070 0.020 0.053 *** 0.056 ***
(4.59) (1.01) (0.51) (2.98) (3.62)
Growth + 2.132 *** 0.075 2.377 ** 2.123 *** 2.079 ***
(3.58) (0.04) (2.02) (2.84) (3.46)
Concentration + 1.761 *** 3.201 *** 3.054 *** 1.674 *** 1.744 ***
(4.74) (1.82) (3.13) (4.19) (4.67)
Non Interest Income -/+ 0.048 -0.396 -0.578 0.123 -0.030
(0.08) (-0.2) (-0.47) (0.16) (-0.05)
Net Charge Offs + 1.695 *** 1.822 * 1.366 *** 1.760 *** 1.682 ***
(19.01) (5.34) (7.38) (16.34) (18.86)
Cost of Funds + 8.106 * 1.069 2.303 8.426 ** 6.766 *
(2.35) (0.11) (0.33) (0.95) (1.95)
Inefficiency + 1.883 *** 3.605 ** 5.674 *** 0.845 2.066 ***
(3.23) (2.06) (4.22) (1.22) (3.55)
Real GDP - -2.225 -0.182 -12.273 2.435 -2.749
(-0.26) (-0.01) (-0.67) (0.25) (-0.33)
Large Banks -3.413 *
(-1.73)
Medium Banks 0.696
(0.83)
Adjusted RSQ 40% 59% 49% 39% 42%
Number of BHCs 146       11     29            106     146           
n 1,898    143   377          1,378  1,898        
Assets >$100B $10B-$100B <$10B
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Note: Cell Values are parameter estimates (t-ratios)
Size dummy 
interacted with 
Hypothesys 
variables
Risk Index
SmallBase Large Medium
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5.6 Quantile Regression Analysis 
 
     Quantile regression analysis has become an important statistical technique that aims to 
provide a more comprehensive view to the conventional linear regression models 
(Koenker and Hallok, 2001). While the least squares method and linear regression models 
estimate coefficients that approximate the conditional mean, the quantile regression  
estimates the deviations from the conditional median or specified quantiles. Quantile 
regression is used in this analysis to assess the stability of the regression model 
specification between the 20
th
 and 80
th
 quantiles, as usually strange relationships are 
likely to be captured in the tails of the distribution due to thinness of the data. 
 
 
     In Figures 2 through 7, the quantile regressions are plotted for each of the 20 
coefficients of explanatory variable by each risk measure, the dependent variables. The 
solid grey line (horizontal line) in each graph represents the estimate from the OLS 
regression. The solid black line in each figure shows the estimate for the quantile, with 
the shaded grey area depicting the 95 percent confidence interval band for the quantile 
regression estimates.  
 
 
     When comparing the quantile regression for the Insolvency Risk model with the least 
squares estimates (Figure 2), it can be concluded that for most of the explanatory 
variables the estimates are stable with the exception of Net Charge Offs and Inefficiency. 
While Net Charge Offs has an incremental impact in Insolvency Risk of 0.8, the impact is 
much larger at the 60th quantiles and above. According to the panel regression, 
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Inefficiency had and incremental impact in Insolvency Risk of 3.7, however, the impact 
is about 2.0 in the distribution between the 20th and 60
th
 quantile.  
 
 
     The quantile regression for SDROA model (Figure 3) and SDROE (Figure 4) models 
show disparities in the variables Concentration and Net Charge offs, where the impact is 
lower at the lower quantiles of the distribution.  
 
     The Total Risk model (Figure 5) shows stable estimates, except for some 
disproportions for the impact of Net Charge Offs, where the impact is lower for the tails 
of the distribution and higher between the 40
th
 and 80
th
 quantiles. Turning to the 
Systematic Risk Model (Figure 6), unequal responses are apparent in the case of Size and 
Net Charge Offs. Size has a higher incremental impact on risk in the right tail of the 
distribution and Net Charge Offs has a lower incremental impact at the left tail of the 
distribution. Net Charge Offs also shows wide impact variation in Firm Risk at both ends 
of the distribution (Figure 7).  
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Figure 2: Least Squares and Quantile Regression Estimates for Insolvency Risk (Z-Score) 
Model to Examine Stability of OLS Model Specification 
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Figure 3: Least Squares and Quantile Regression Estimates for SDROA Model to 
Examine Stability of OLS Model Specification 
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Figure 4: Least Squares and Quantile Regression Estimates for SDROE Model to 
Examine Stability of OLS Model Specification 
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Figure 5: Least Squares and Quantile Regression Estimates for Total Risk Model 
Examine Stability of OLS Model Specification 
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Figure 6: Least Squares and Quantile Regression Estimates for Systematic Risk Model to 
Examine Stability of OLS Model Specification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
144 
 
Figure 7: Least Squares and Quantile Regression Estimates for Firm Risk Model to 
Examine Stability of OLS Model Specification 
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Figure 8: Least Squares and Quantile Regression Estimates for Risk Index Model to 
Examine Stability of OLS Model Specification 
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CHAPTER VI 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
     Deregulation after the passage of the GLBA allowed the U.S banking industry to 
broaden banks’ sources of income, by advancing into more nontraditional fee-generating 
banking activities. Theory indicates potential conflicts among stakeholders in BHCs and 
points that regulatory shift would have a different impact on bank risk depending on the 
governance structure of BHCs. This dissertation examines theories from corporate 
governance and banking literatures to assess four issues: 1) How has the GLBA passage 
impacted the risk profile of banks? 2) Do corporate governance mechanisms tie into the 
changing financial regulatory environment?, 3) How do ownership and board structures 
interact with regulation, and together how do they influence bank risk profile?, and  4) 
After 9 years of the Act’s passage, how do balance sheet data and new measures of risk 
help better assess the bank’s risk-taking behavior? 
 
     This dissertation finds that the BHC risk profile would change after the passage of the 
GLBA. The change, however, differs between book-based and market-based risk 
measures. BHCs tend to have higher book-based risk measures, but lower market=based 
risks measures. Insolvency Risk (Z-Score) and the standard deviation of ROA are found 
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to be significantly higher after the passage of the Act, while Total Risk and Systematic 
Risk were found to be lower. These findings remain essentially the same when the 
analysis is conducted at the peer group level, universal versus traditional BHCs, and 
when controlled for the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
 
     Significant differences found among various risk measures across BHCs with high, 
medium and low levels of Insider Ownership leads us to conclude that bank risk-taking 
behavior somewhat differs according to managerial stock ownership. Higher risk profiles 
are characteristic of BHCs where Insider Ownership is lower. Extending the analysis by 
peer group shows that this finding is characteristic of large and medium BHCs with low 
ownership. Introducing the regulatory change into the analysis leads us to conclude that 
the Insolvency Risk (Z-score) of BHCs differs according to the regulatory environment, 
for a high and low levels of Insider Ownership concentration. The lack of statistical 
significance in other risk measures may be explained by managers’ behavior complying 
with the pre-existing mandates such as the issuance of prompt corrective actions when 
financial or managerial weakness surfaces.   
 
     Risk profile differences are found among BHCs with different levels of Blockholder 
Ownership. The results show that a moderate level of Blockholder ownership is 
associated with lower Insolvency Risk, while higher Blockholder Ownership 
concentration is associated with higher market-based risk measures.  Extending the 
analysis to the peer group by asset size reveals that the dynamic between risk (as 
measured by the Insolvency Risk, Total Risk, Systematic Risk and Firm Risk) and 
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ownership is particularly evident for small BHCs with different levels of concentration, 
where as high levels of Blockholder Ownership are associated with higher risks.  
Introducing the regulatory changes with confirms higher Insolvency Risks for high and 
low levels of Blockholder Ownership in small BHCs after the passage of the Act.  The 
analysis between risk profiles and the degree of board independence shows that bank risk 
does not differ by proportion of Outside Directors in the board. However, after the 
regulatory changes in GLBA, the risk is higher across all levels of Outside Directors in 
the board in small BHCs. In summary, as regulators are concerned with the insolvency 
risk of BHCs, the results call for a closer attention to small BHCs with high and low 
Insider Ownership levels, and, high and low blockholder ownership levels, regardless of 
the proportion of Outside Directors. 
 
     In the 13-year period covered by the analysis, the U.S Banking Industry has shifted 
away from traditional banking activities towards activities that generate more fee income 
and other types of non-interest revenue. This shift is evident in particular for medium and 
small BHCs after the implementation of the GLBA, as seemingly, large BHCs had been 
conducting nontraditional banking activities even prior to the passage of the Act through 
the Section 20 exemptions. While it has been argued that the passage of the GLBA 
created an environment for potential increase in bank risk as they entered into riskier 
activities with securities and insurance businesses, the results indicate that nontraditional 
banking activities have enabled a decrease in the risk profile of banks through revenue 
diversification benefits.  
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     Consequent upon this structural regulatory change, as BHCs have expanded into more 
nontraditional activities, medium and large BHCs have become better capitalized, with 
improvement in the core capital ratio from 8% in 1997 to 10% in 2009. Nevertheless, 
banks continue to be characterized by high financial leverage, which has a direct impact 
on risk. The liquidity and funding structure for small and medium BHCs differs from 
their large BHC counterparts, with the latter relying on more expensive funds. Risk 
profile is found to be an increasing function of the cost of funds.  
 
     At the aggregate level, the results from regression analysis suggest managerial 
ownership has no influence in the risk profile of BHCs. While Insider Ownership is 
found to decrease the volatility of ROA, the impact is minimal and the lack of 
significance in the regressions with other risk variables does not allow us to definitively 
conclude that managerial ownership has an impact in the risk profile of banks.  
Blockholder Ownership affects bank risk-taking, particularly market based risk measures, 
regardless of the regulatory environment. These results are consistent with the argument 
that Blockholders with concentrated wealth prefer that managers follow less risky 
investment strategies. Outside Directors are found to not have an influence over any of 
the risk measures capturing the risk profile of banks. The lack of a relationship between 
Outside Directors on the board and risk is counter to the argument that outsiders on the 
board are effective in their monitoring and advising functions. While the corporate 
governance literature has found evidence of a relationship between board independence 
and firm performance, it is possible that the presence of regulation in the banking 
industry might be the mitigating factor for the agency problem, in effect controlling the 
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risk profile of banks. With the introduction of the deregulatory change, managerial and 
blockholder ownership have a decreasing impact on Total Risk, while Outside Directors 
has an increasing impact on Insolvency Risk.  
 
     In the peer group analysis, it appears that the interaction between regulation and 
ownership leads to distinctive conclusions. Insider Ownership is found to have a 
consistent impact on the risk profile of medium BHCs. That is, managers with large 
equity holdings tend to pursue less risky strategies that reduce the risk profile of medium 
BHCs. On the other hand, Insider Ownership is found to increase the Systematic Risk and 
the volatility of ROA in small BHCs, indicating that managers’ incentives are aligned 
with outside shareholders as they show a preference for riskier investments to maximize 
the equity call option value. Finally, the evidence suggests that Insider Ownership does 
not influence the risk profile of large BHCs.  
 
     Blockholder ownership is found to have an increasing impact on the Firm Risk of 
medium and large BHCs; however, after the passage of the Act the presence of 
Blockholder Ownership is found to favor the risk in large BHCs with a net reduction in 
risk. 
 
     Outside Directors are found to have a U-shaped relationship with Firm Risk, where 
the minimum level of Firm Risk is achieved at 70% of Outside Director presence. 
Consistent with the findings of Adams and Mehran (2008), independent boards do not 
prove to be more effective in the monitoring function to control excessive risk-taking. 
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    This dissertation contributes to the finance and banking literature by using an 
integrated approach to understanding corporate governance and regulation in risk-taking 
within the banking industry. With a comprehensive period of time coverage, this 
dissertation illustrates that corporate governance mechanisms tie into the changing 
regulatory environment and have an effect on bank risk-taking. The findings of the study 
imply that regulatory and governance structures comingle with respect to their beneficial 
roles in monitoring banks and reduction of agency costs. 
 
     Future research in the literature of corporate governance in banks and regulation 
should include periods subsequent to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, considering that 
the banking industry is subject to the implementation of new regulations such as the 
Consumer Protection Act and further enhancements to the Basel III framework and its 
implementation in the United States. 
 
     Findings about the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and bank 
regulation indicate that policy makers should consider corporate governance structures in 
the design of banking regulation, and that investors should also consider governance 
structures and the degree of banking regulation in their investment decision. Regulatory 
agencies should exert closer monitoring in assessing the insolvency risk of BHCs with 
higher presence of Outside Directors after the passage of deregulatory legislation; in 
particular, to the Insolvency Risk of small BHCs.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
A. IRRC Classification of Board of Directors affiliation. 
Inside Director: 
Senior Management 
 Junior Management 
 Employee of common stock ownership ESOP 
 
Outside directors affiliated with the firm: 
 
 Member of an inside stockholders’ group or significant shareholder not employed 
by the firm (where insider group includes those with stakes of 10% or more of the 
company’s total voting shares). 
 Part of an interlocking directorship (defined as directors sitting on each other’s 
boards, e.g two CEOs sitting on each other boards) 
 Former employees of the firms. 
 Related to an officer of the company 
 Member of a professional firm providing services to the company (e.g. law firm, 
consulting firm, investment bank, etc) 
 Officer of a firm that has a significant supplier/customer relationship to the 
company (significant is defined as 1% or more of the suppliers annual sales) 
 Derives personal benefit from the company (individual consultant to the 
company, non-employee chairman or vice chairman of the board who earns over 
$100,000 per year from the position or is involved in transactions with the 
company valued at $100,000 or more). 
 Director who is affiliated with a non-profit institution that received more than 
$100,000 from the company. 
 
Independent outside director: 
 
 All other outside directors. 
 
 
 
 
